



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80 p 917
This work was written to
justify and show the expediency
of our sending a minister
[Mr John Sargeant] to the
celebrated Convention of
Panama, or Tacubaya.

The author is not named
The printer, Mr Kay, may
know him.

My dear Sir,
I have the honor to acknowledge
the receipt of your letter of the
10th inst. in relation to the
proposed amendment of
the laws of the State
relating to the
sale of land.

App. Socy from D. S. DeForester

Politics, Relations, and Statistics,

WESTERN WORLD,

CHARACTERISTICS

EUROPEAN POLICY

WHICH MOST IMMEDIATELY AFFECT ITS INTERESTS:

INTENDED TO

DEMONSTRATE THE NECESSITY OF

**A GRAND AMERICAN
CONFEDERATION AND ALLIANCE.**

Jam fides, et pax, et honor, pudorque
Priscus, et neglecta redire virtus
Audet, apparetque beata plenâ
Copia cornu.

HOB. CARM. SEC.

By Benj. Chew

Philadelphia:

PUBLISHED BY ROBERT H. SMALL,

No. 165, CHESNUT STREET,

See N^o 2627 & 1827. Vernon Syrt to Panama
768 800 or Mix to Panama 1826

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Eastern District of Pennsylvania, to wit :

BE IT REMEMBERED, (that on the eleventh day of July in the fifty-second year of the independence of the United States of America, A.D. 1827, Robert H. Small of the said district hath deposited in this office the title of a book, the right whereof he claims as proprietor, in the words following, to wit :

"A sketch of the politics, relations, and statistics, of the western world and of those characteristics of European policy which most immediately affect its interests: intended to demonstrate the necessity of a grand American confederation and alliance.

Jam fides, et pax, et honor, pudorque
Priscus, et neglecta redire virtus
Audet, apparetque beata plenâ
Copia cornu.

Hor. Carm. Sec."

In conformity to the act of the Congress of the United States, entitled, "An act for the encouragement of learning, by securing the copies of maps, charts, and books to the authors and proprietors of such copies during the times therein mentioned;" and also to the act, entitled "An act supplementary to an act, entitled, 'An act for the encouragement of learning, by securing the copies of maps, charts, and books, to the authors and proprietors of such copies during the times therein mentioned,' and extending the benefits thereof to the arts of designing, engraving, and etching historical and other prints."

D. CALDWELL,

Clerk of the Eastern District of Pennsylvania.

James Kay, Jun. Printer,
S. E. Corner of Race & Sixth Streets,
Philadelphia.

Amer. Phil. Soc.

THE writer has used the first person in the ensuing pages when speaking from himself, and the offensive monosyllable *I* occurs too often. He has intended to avoid the confusion which would have been produced by using the plural, as in most writings; *we* is almost invariably used as signifying the inhabitants of the United States. The expressions, "I think" and "I believe," are frequent, because his first object is to shun every appearance of dictation or of peremptory assertion, deeming it much more modest as well as positively just, to recognize upon every occasion the absolute right that all his fellow citizens, and whoever may read the production, have to form their own opinions, and to entertain their own sentiments, however antipode to the positions which he advances.

The publication of the work has been retarded by accidents unlooked for and uncontrollable by the writer. During the interval between the composition and its going to press, the ponderous engine of politics has moved forward, the world, and inexorable time, have rolled on in their course. It follows that some of the opinions here laid down have been verified, and others have *apparently* been invalidated; but, in the author's view, only apparently, not really: according to his manner of considering the subjects, these

seeming deviations from the general march of the events anticipated have been only fortuitous aberrations, and have not affected the fundamental calculations of the orbits, in which the great bodies of the political firmament are expected to revolve. Therefore the ensuing pages are given as they were written; futurity alone can decide whether the speculations they contain are mere dreams, or cool and well digested propositions. The author considers the commotions which have taken place in several of the South American nations, and the open war waged between two of them, as affording the strongest demonstration of the truth of his position, that the general confederation of all America is imperiously demanded by the interest of the continent, for sake of the peace and happiness of its inhabitants, and as the only sure means of preserving general tranquillity, by repressing with the overwhelming power of the confederation intestine or international hostilities. Nor does he suppress the following arguments on account of the lateness of the period at which they are issued; the congress of Tacubaya had not commenced its sessions at the latest dates: and even although it should have terminated infructuously, he would still advocate the cause, and would persevere in intreating his own country to renew the invitation to the other nations of the continent to unite in an alliance which appears to his humble conceptions to be the most stupendous creation of human intellect.

Philadelphia, June 1827.

INTEREST, or GLORY, has been the object of every rational operation of every people, since men first incorporated themselves into societies; or in other words, since there were two human beings upon earth.—These objects are in fact only one; because glory is the grandest and most perfect interest; and nothing can be the true and permanent interest of a country which derogates from its glory.

If the arguments in the following pages shall demonstrate that glory allures us with imperishable wreaths of laurel and of oak leaf, and that interest tempts us with hoards of gold, to adopt the measures which it is the business of this publication to advocate,—if it be shewn that every fundamental principle which can actuate the conduct of a nation, enjoins upon the United States to take the position here recommended—if these things can be proved, then will the doctrines advanced be the echoes of political commandments.

Can I hope to carry conviction in the arguments accumulated by efforts of my feeble pen?—I dare not.—Truth, however, is mighty and must prevail. I believe the ground taken is true, and that it is only necessary to expose the truth, in order to convince an intelligent people. If I am wrong, it is my great misfortune: but, entertaining my present impres-

sions, I feel that I should fail in the duty which every member of society owes to his country, and should be wanting to myself as interested equally with every other citizen in the welfare of our common mother, if I did not endeavour to open the eyes of the community to what I consider dictated by all the motives which can influence a government or a people. Under these impressions I write, and for business, not style. To my motives, and chief of them to the love of my natal soil, which impells me to encounter much party prejudice and great diversity of opinion, and to the indulgence of my fellow citizens, I trust for the reception of this essay, without an expectation that the manner of executing the task will recommend it to the public.



CHAPTER I.

IN order to enter upon our subject fully prepared, it is necessary to take a view of the actual situation of such parts of the world as are directly concerned in the interests and matters we are about to consider, and of the probable results from existing political circumstances connected with American affairs.

I shall attempt this in the following rapid sketch: protesting at the same time against our assumption of the smallest right to interfere in the concerns of other nations, and reciprocally against their having any right to meddle with ours. The design of a GRAND AMERICAN CONFEDERACY does not contradict this principle; it is most emphatically *our* business, and moreover, our attention to it has been invited by the other nations of this continent. It is no business of ours what policy other nations think proper to adopt, provided it does not operate upon us; and still less

does it concern us what domestic arrangements they choose to make, or what forms of government they choose to retain. We have nothing to do with these things. No government can exist contrary to the will of the great majority of the people; and that majority has the exclusive right to decide upon the point. It is in vain to talk of military force keeping down the majority of a people; this is the pretext of those who are disposed to submit; the numbers would be too enormously disproportionate, if the people were to resist it; the military would be a feather in the scale, they never could compose the tithe of the population, and the body of the soldiery is taken from the mass of the people, only the officers being of the privileged class. I think so well of the strength of the great mass of the population in any country as to believe that the government could not exist for an hour after the body of the people should be so far disgusted with it as to overcome the natural disposition for quiet, and the equally natural indisposition to disturb the existing order of things. Therefore all subsisting governments have the sanction of the approbation of the majority of those who recognize them, and on our own principles we have no right to interfere. These positions are so true that I challenge all history for a single example of successful insurrection which was not instigated by a member or members of what is called the higher order of society, or of that class which has influence enough to excite the body of the people. I do not mean that the originators of insurrections have always been titled noblemen; but even Spartacus, slave as he was in Rome, is recorded to have been a noble Scythian, and evidently had high mental powers, or at least great knowledge of war; but I mean that the chiefs in civil disturbances which have obtained their purposes have invariably been men of talent, of superior acquirements, of high consideration among the people, and have, with very few exceptions, belonged to the privileged class, to which the people were accustomed to look up, when there was such a class in their country.

We claim for ourselves the right of deciding upon our form of government, and of regulating our internal affairs

as we please; and on our own principles again, we have no right to dictate to other nations upon these points: if we have the right, they have it equally; and from its exercise would ensue perpetual hostilities, in which force and chance would determine the party whose opinions should give the law to the rest. There is no exception to the general rule, but the single case when the form of government or the dissensions among a neighbouring people affect the tranquillity of a nation; then the molested nation has the same right to insist upon a change, or to enter and force it, that an individual has to force a neighbour to extinguish a fire in his premises which threatens to destroy the adjacent property.

It is not my intention therefore to discuss any policy of other nations which does not directly bear upon our interests, or which they have not intrusively pressed, officially, or by their popular clamour, upon us for our adoption.



CHAPTER II.

ENGLAND has prohibited the slave trade to her subjects, after having fully stocked her own colonies, and thereby created a production in her West Indian possessions, exceeding her demand for it so much that she is obliged to resort to various expedients to keep out of her home market any kind of competition in the different articles which their climate and soil afford. But she is not contented with having prohibited the importation into her own colonies after their being fully supplied, as she had a perfect right to do; she now goes about canting and preaching to all other nations, telling them what a burning shame it is to traffic in slaves, and to hold any human beings in bondage. This she has no right to do: she regulated her own dominions, and

no body ought to dispute her authority there; but every one must dispute her the privilege of interfering with the arrangements of others. She talks of her glory being concerned in it. What has the rest of the world to do with her glory? Besides it certainly consists at least as much with her *interest* as with her reputation, now that she has as many slaves as she can work, to exhort the Africans, who do not thank her for her interference, and who continue the traffic in spite of her entreaties and of the force which she applies to repress it, and to lecture the governments of Europe and America upon the enormity of dealing in human flesh and of retaining the slaves they have in servitude. I must not be misunderstood as advocating that detestable trade; but I insist that each nation has a right to judge upon it, and on all other subjects, according to its own sense of morality, and that it is an impertinence in any nation to read homilies to the rest: such homilies come with a very bad grace from England, the largest slave holder on earth; it savours of the ridiculous to suppose mankind such gulls as to listen to her representations, when they know that she did not cease to import negroes into her colonies until they were overflowing, and that she holds them as inflexibly as any other nation, whose negro slaves by the bye are now exactly in the same condition as the bulk of her own immediate population was only a very few centuries since, working for their masters five or six days in the week, and having the other one or two days for themselves; with these differences only, that the English slave was neither fed nor clothed by his lord who possessed the power of life and death over him, and exercised it not very sparingly, if her history is correct.

With all these reasons for her taking the beam out of her own eye before she meddled with the motes in the eyes of her neighbours, England has gone through the world, her "*saints*" threatening present and future punishment, and her statesmen negotiating against slavery; she has induced some powers to assent to her proposition for search and for the mixed commission, by which the claims she sets up for searching vessels during war—a pretence which never would be acceded to by any nation able to resist her force—will

be established directly or indirectly in peace also, if they are ever sanctioned; or at least they will be brought forward by her upon all occasions as a precedent. She has not hesitated to accuse the United States, in decent terms by her diplomacy, but in pretty unrestrained language by her presses, of a disposition to oppose the suppression of the slave trade.

Now whatever credit is attached to national exertions for suppression of this traffic belongs of right to us; because we were the first nation which passed laws interdicting it to our citizens, the only persons whom we had a right to interfere with in the matter, as her own subjects were the only persons whose conduct England had a right to regulate: we were also the first nation to declare the slave trade piracy in our citizens. England, taking up the thing after we did, exhibits a disposition, and has had some success in the attempt, to push us out of our precedence in so laudable a career, to deprive us of the reputation attendant upon such precedence, and to induce the world to consider her as the great champion in the cause; in order to effect these objects, she clamours about it loudly, and burthens her diplomacy with expedients for usurping or for inducing concessions from other nations of utter novelties in national law, and of points which no governments can abandon without relinquishing, in some measure, to a foreign sovereignty, their own independence. She interferes with us in our rightful claim upon the commendation of the world for commencing an opposition to the trade and for giving an example, as well as for persevering in wise and just measures to suppress it; measures equally correct in themselves and respectful to the privileges of the other members of the great political society of the world. She does this by operations indefensible in themselves, which never could be tolerated if they were not enveloped in appeals to the humanity and the best feelings of our nature.

But what is her object, or at any rate what will be the result of her course? Her West Indian islands and her East Indian possessions do or can produce almost all the staples which form the wealth and the commercial advantages of

South America and of our own southern states; rice, indigo, cotton, coffee, sugar, dye woods, incorruptible timber for ornament or ship building, chocolate, cochineal, precious stones, and a vast variety of other articles, are produced or can be cultivated in those islands or in her vast dominions in the east, as well as in those countries which enjoy a similar climate and soil. Her own islands, as we have before said, are fully stocked with hands, and her East Indian territories abound in population; she has moved heaven and earth to prevent the other nations which own West Indian islands from acquiring additional labour of the only kind that is adapted to the climate; and they, not having pursued the same plan as herself, of replenishing the islands with hands, will not be able to compete with hers in raising the same productions.—By these means she infallibly must acquire a monopoly of the articles produced in the West Indies, all the result of her operations relative to the slave trade.

But it will be said the southern part of North America, and all South America, will still enter into competition with her in these articles—my answer is deduced from what follows.

England has been for centuries engaged in creating manufactures of every kind in her bosom; she has laboured assiduously, and by dint of bounties, prohibitions, restrictions, rewards, and penalties, she has succeeded in creating capital, knowledge, skill, artizans, labourers, machinery, and productiveness, unexampled in the annals of history: her system was a model of wisdom on the subject, for she has elevated all her manufactures together, giving bounties to each as it was invented or introduced, witness the silk, glass, &c. &c.: she has formed an agriculture capable of feeding her population in ordinary seasons, of supplying them with many materials for their manufactures, such as wool, flax, &c. &c. &c.; and she takes from her own soil most of the metals and minerals they require, she takes them at small cost in consequence of the immense improvement her system has produced in all sorts of machinery. To give only a single item of the enormous power of production that she possesses, her steam machinery is estimated at the power of

200,000,000 men: other details are found in most books of reference, and are well known to those who take the trouble to read these pages, or may be known with little trouble to any person who will examine the subject: general and well known results are all that are required to support my positions. It is hardly an exaggeration to say that England can clothe all Europe and America, and furnish them with nearly every article of manufacture, by only putting her present establishments into activity. With this capability of underselling all nations even in their own markets, unless she is kept out of them by commercial regulations and duties, the consequence of her hitherto inflexible system, she now comes before the world with declarations of the injustice of restraining commerce, with arguments to prove how erroneous are all kinds of regulating duties, and with exhortations to join with her in rendering commerce perfectly free by striking off from it every shackle and every impediment. She also urges the abolition of all discriminating duties upon shipping, while she has 2,542,000 tons of commercial sea vessels, being nearly double of the tonnage belonging to any other country*.—That is, now that she is ripe for the measure, now that she is able to undersell and *undernavigate* (if I may be allowed the expression) every body else, and to flood every market with her staples, she proposes to them to submit to these new doctrines and their consequences; while they cannot introduce a half dozen articles into her ports at prices which would allow them to compete with what she produces; it being recollected that a necessary consequence of such a free trade (if she ever permits it in her own case for her domestic consumption) will be the release from excise of the commodities liable to be affected. Now this is so barefaced an attempt at imposition, that it can hardly be possible the rest of the world will be duped by the plausible arguments she uses to persuade people out of their senses. If she could succeed, she would be able to bring

* See Huskisson's speech of the 12th of May 1826, referring to official reports of the 25th of December 1825. He gives the number of sea vessels at same date as 24,174. These sums do not include the military marine.

CHAPTER III.

THE next power whose state I shall consider is France. "Beautiful France" is next to England in commerce and manufactures; in every thing else that can make a nation rich and glorious she is far before her rival. She stands at this moment renewing her enormous strength, and increasing it by vast additions, occupied almost solely in these patriotic pursuits, and in reconciling herself to the rest of Europe, after the misfortunes of her revolution, at which none is more shocked than herself; after her triumphant and magnificent career under the consular and imperial regimes, when in the intoxication of success she too much disregarded the pride and the feelings of other nations, not to provoke a general array against her of those who suffered reluctantly the weight of her sceptre, which was of iron although gilded; and after the exhaustion nearly of thirty years' war, which, however successful, nevertheless drained her of men, and subjected her to various internal restrictions, in spite of the wisdom which fostered with parental care every species of industry, and called forth by wealth, honours, and by every inducement which could rouse the faculties of the mind, all the talents of human intellect, in order to promote the prosperity of the French people. Having experienced the recoil of her own artillery, and having been overpowered, not ingloriously, by the concentrated force of a whole continent, she has been obliged during eleven years to aim at conciliating those whom previously she either sub-

dued or attacked; she has been obliged by every dictate of policy and common sense to reconcile herself to Europe and to the world. With these views, while her manufactures have gone on increasing, supported by an excellent agriculture, prolific in every means of enjoyment and wealth, while her exhausted marine, commercial and military, is recovering the position to which it is entitled by her innumerable staples, her vast resources, and her important station in the political world,—while every domestic advantage has been sedulously cherished and every thing has prospered with her, she has watched the phases of politics, and her acute and skilful negociators have appeared, openly or inofficially, in every bureau where politics were discussed. France is peculiarly circumstanced; indeed her situation is a perfect anomaly in history. She is very rich, very strong in resources, her finances are the best conditioned in Europe, she is brave enough to do any thing, she is pretty well governed, and she is upon good terms with her neighbours; and yet she is obliged to resort to many expedients, and to observe the utmost caution in order to persuade the world, and even herself, that she has forgotten the roads to the capitals of the other members of the European family, and has also forgotten that they all found the way to Paris—facts which neither they nor she can really forget, but of which, on all sides, they endeavour to conceal their recollection by excessive civility, proper and necessary to all. It is therefore a fortunate thing for France, as matters did take the turn which we have witnessed, that Napoleon was a victim upon whom her offences against the rest of Europe might be visited, and upon whom the animosity of those whom her power oppressed might be, and has been, concentrated. I say this without in the least changing my opinion of that great man; indeed the wish he expressed that his sacrifice might be of benefit to France and reconcile her to Europe, seems to be satisfied; without some definite object whereupon to concentrate the feelings of Europe, she would have continued for more than one generation to be as much hated by her neighbours as she was envied by them in the day of her ascendancy. Her pre-

sent sovereign appears to be a good man, and well advised; and after all it is the chief merit of a monarch to have the tact for choosing able counsellors, and the good sense to take their advice, whether he be endowed with great talents himself or not. He is somewhat bound up however in his foreign relations, by the consciousness that he is indebted, for the restoration of the crown to his race, to the other sovereigns of the continent, and by his family connections with several of them: the latter sentiment is particularly manifest in his conduct with regard to South America; for it is most evident that nothing can be more beneficial to France in her manufacturing and commercial relations than the liberation of the cidevant Spanish colonies, and the opening of those ports so long almost hermetically sealed; most of her manufactures are particularly adapted to the taste and inclinations of the Hispano-Americans, and their productions are peculiarly acceptable to the French population. In spite of these inducements for her recognition of their independence, the king has not yet been able to take a step so obnoxious to his cousin of Spain; and has therefore been compelled to pursue an intermediate and equivocal course, not satisfactory to either party, and which may possibly terminate in the loss of nearly all commercial intercourse with South America, possibly by making France tributary to England for the South American productions, and thus by making her contribute, however unwillingly, to the advancement and to the establishment of the English system. This, it may be urged, will be changed in the course of a few years: but I answer (and I shall have to repeat and expatiate further upon it hereafter), commerce does not so readily, as has been pretended, obey the lead of its interest and seek the connections which are most to its real advantage; affection or inclination go for a great deal in deciding the course of commerce; and when it has taken a specific channel, formed its credits, acquaintances, and correspondences, it is diverted from its accustomed route with great reluctance and great difficulty. Therefore when England shall have secured the good will of the South Americans by her political course, purchased it by lavish expenditure of money in va-

rious shapes, among which are her great loans to the governments and to individuals, fixed her influence by means of the settlement of numbers of her subjects in the mining and other establishments, and arranged correspondences which will require only a letter to supply goods of any description ; when all these operations, daily going on, are completed, France will find it next to an impossibility to acquire the footing and commerce with the South Americans, which at this instant are perfectly within her power.

Thus will the present ostensible policy of France injure herself and promote the designs of her great rival. But if she should change it, and come forward at the congress of Tacubaya, as is not improbable, with a frank and open recognition of the independence of the southern continent, then, unless the United States shall adopt the policy which appears to be called for by every dictate of expediency, France will be another obstacle to our interests.



CHAPTER IV.

SPAIN has not a marine, nor enterprize, nor manufactures, nor capital, to enter into the contest for the commerce of South America with the two above mentioned powers, or with ourselves : she has also so bitterly exasperated the people formerly attached to her, by her inexorable policy, and by the relentless and sanguinary warfare which she has carried on against them, that they are forever alienated from her in feeling as much as they are by their polities. If Spain had conducted this war with only ordinary humanity, if she had even made war as England did upon us during our revolutionary contest, though that was bad enough, she would have regained a portion of kindly feeling towards her

into every market, besides her own manufactures, all the staples of the East and of the West Indies, at lower prices than any other power could afford to supply them, thus securing to herself an absolute monopoly of manufactures and of every species of commerce, carrying trade and all—and yet there are some persons in the United States who advocate our subscribing to the new doctrines.

Nevertheless there are some countries, particularly of South America, which abound in raw materials, and which want manufactured articles, not having yet created establishments to answer the demand, where the new doctrines may be acceded to at present: they will see their error, and will change their system; but nations are slow in making such changes, because many interests are involved in supporting the actual state of things; and therefore fifty or more years may elapse, as they have done here, before the necessary alterations are made: meanwhile other commercial or manufacturing nations lose all the profits of their commerce, and England reaps all the fruits.

If England can persuade the South American states to adopt her new system, she secures their markets for her manufactures: she does more; they have very few ships, and on the Atlantic if not on the Pacific coast are essentially indisposed to maritime operations; it will require at least another generation to alter their temper in this respect; she therefore will secure their carrying trade, and her manufactures will purchase their produce. How will she stand then? We have shewn that, by her *ex post facto* cant about slavery, she is enabled to afford the West Indian productions cheaper than any other power, she can throw into Europe, or wherever there is a demand, unlimited quantities of colonial produce from her East Indian possessions; that she may command absolutely the South American trade, and thus she will be the factor and the carrier of every article of the sort, and will enjoy an unrestricted monopoly of them.

Such are the two leading points of the present English policy, and such will be the results of her success, if she is able to accomplish her designs. With these views, conceived in the maturest reflection, she has poured out blood

and treasure to gain an influence in South America, and with these views is she labouring to form treaties there, besieging every one of their governments with her agents, to negotiate or to intrigue. It is true that these projects will be resisted, but I do not see how they are to be resisted effectually with regard to colonial produce, if England gets command of the South American market, as she will do if she is not met by the system which it is the object of these sheets to advocate, because it is a fact, which is not worth while to conceal, that she can navigate cheaper than any other power. *Obsta principiis*, is a maxim that will endure for ever; if England is not resisted in her first attempts, the introduction of her whole plan can hardly be prevented. We have seen that the *guarda costas* of Spain could not keep her manufactures out of South America formerly, nor secure to the mother country the monopoly to which she pretended, and to which the then excellence of her chief fabrics entitled her—if any thing could give title to such a monopoly, which I am not going to concede. We have seen that the splendid and mighty power of Napoleon in vain drove English commerce and English productions from Europe; they returned by a thousand indirect means—they insinuated themselves even into France by a thousand obscure filtrations. We have seen that marks, and stamps, and signatures, of our own manufacturers cannot keep her goods out of our market, for she does not hesitate to counterfeit them, while she punishes with death similar offences against her own people, as if moral crime was not the same everywhere. She gains access to all countries by the advantage of cheapness, profiting of the selfishness which induces men to disregard the condition of their countrymen, provided their own wants or luxuries are satisfied. She has always complained of the interdictions and domestic monopolies of other nations as public injuries, which she or any other foreign nation had certainly no right to complain of, whatever those liable to them might have, while she herself has been the most rigorous prohibiter and monopolist: she has not hesitated even to go to war or to instigate foreign wars, in order to force her productions into the markets she desired. All these things had taken

place before she found herself in a situation to pretend to act upon her novel doctrines. If such has been heretofore the case, while no one disputed the policy of fostering the commerce and manufactures of nations by protecting duties and interdictions, what may we not expect when an acute people and an interest, powerful from the influence of wealth as well as from many other considerations, now advocate, with all the force of logic, negociation, temptations, and inducements, the adoption of a system not more clearly opposite to the real interest of the rest of the world than the course which she formerly pursued.

It is not an objection to my argument to say, that she has not yet acted upon her new system* with respect to her own dominions: I do not believe that she ever will herself adopt it in extenso; she will always persevere in her old plan of protecting such of her manufactures, and such parts of her commerce, as require nursing: but she argues vehemently with all other nations upon the impropriety of their pursuing the same course; and if, in order to induce them to come into her views, she should offer to put them upon a footing of perfect equality and of unrestricted commerce with herself, it would be a mere deception; because to place them upon a real equality, she must divide with them equally her capital, her mechanics, her mechanical habits, propensities, and information, results of the education and customs of ages; and she must share with them her vast shipping, her sailors, and her maritime disposition. This is impossible; therefore it is also impossible that any bargain based upon abolition of discriminating duties or free importation can be otherwise than to her advantage, and to the injury of every one else.

Nor are the consequences of her plans favourable to the happiness of the human race, or to the general improvement of mankind; it tends directly to drive men back into barbarism:

* It is a *new* system in English politics. Adam Smith was not an Englishman; moreover he was a philosopher, and unfortunately his theory appeared a few centuries too late: the diverse tempers of nations or of their rulers had already rendered its adoption impossible, without deep injury to the interests and welfare of millions; England *exports* such theories, she does not use them.

foreign commerce is necessary to civilization, and manufactures are necessary to the well being of a country—without the former a people must remain stationary, devoid of information relative to the improvements of the rest of the world, and all experience shews that a nation without commerce sinks into rudeness—to argue about it is in vain; men have always done so, and men now are formed of the same materials as they have been since the creation,—the same causes will therefore produce the same effects. Again, without manufactories within her territory a nation is at the mercy of any government which chooses to wage war upon her, and the population may be reduced, by a simple blockade, to the greatest distress for want of articles rendered indispensable by actual necessity or by inveterate habit, and even for want of weapons of defence; the experience of our late war enables us to speak feelingly upon this subject. The system of England goes directly toward constituting her the only commercial power and the only manufacturer in the world; of course to reduce mankind to ignorance, impotency, and barbarism; and she stands by with fallacious arguments, with a tremendous armed power, marine and army, sword in hand, to enforce conviction and compliance with her views.

The actual state of England is constituted by many other relations, composed of her politics, her ambition for political and moral influence, her passions and caprices, as well as the dispositions, friendships, affections, prejudices, or personal ambition of her rulers: but the systems, or rather the *system*, (for that first alluded to is only a cardinal and indispensable part of the grand whole which is developed in the second,) is the leading feature in her policy, and that whose effects upon the general affairs of the world are the most important and the most durable: as such, to it alone I have confined my observations; I have dwelt upon England and English policy much more at length than at first view may be thought necessary, and more than will be required by the consideration of the other powers which will appear in this preparatory survey, because her schemes and her system are the most threatening to our interests, and the most extensive in their bearings and influence.

and a part of the commerce which she has now lost forever. Similarity of language, and some similarity of tastes and habits, would have made that commerce a source of more real wealth to her than all her monopolies, and her dismes upon the precious metals, which have been poured into her for ages like water into the sieves of the daughters of Dardanus. England found this to be the case in respect to her commerce with us; but Spain, when she has lost portions of her dominions, has lost almost all connection with them; thus it was when she lost Holland, when she lost Portugal, and when she lost Flanders; thus also will it be when her contest with South America is determined. That she will clamour against the course pursued by the rest of the world is very certain; it can be nothing but noise; she is too much prostrated, too much distracted, and too miserable, to have any weight or any serious effect upon the affairs of other nations; and it will take her more than a century to restore herself to a reasonable degree of internal prosperity; by that time passion upon the subject will be obsolete: she has every thing to restore, even the agriculture necessary to her subsistence.



CHAPTER V.

THE three above named powers are all that are immediately and importantly concerned in the commercial relations which will spring out of the new state of things in America. The other powers are however deeply interested; some of them, as Holland, or the new kingdom of the Netherlands, will have extensive commerce with South America; although it will be secondary at a long interval to that of France, England, or the United States, for the days when the Dutch broom swept the ocean have gone by never to return. Swe-

den, Denmark, and Russia will also have maritime relations with the southern continent. Prussia and Austria have so few ports that their maritime commerce will be still lower in the scale of importance. Italy, Austrian or other, so seldom sends her vessels across the Atlantic that we may pass her in silence. But all these nations are large consumers of the staples which are afforded by South America, such as sugar, coffee, cotton, rice, chocolate, dyes, not to mention the precious metals, jewels, &c. &c. &c. and furnish considerable supplies of manufactures adapted to that market. Most of the American productions have been and will continue to be furnished to them through the medium, or by the carrying trade of North America, France, and England; while their equivalents will be transported by the same nations, or will assume the shape of credits upon the exchanges of those powers, and this will be the most common form of payment for their importations. They are therefore deeply concerned in preventing any one power from monopolizing the South American trade.



CHAPTER VI.

BUT the four great empires of Europe compose the Holy Alliance, and are connected with other smaller powers whose number and the extent of the connection are unknown in this country, unless to the executive, if even it have full information on the subject. This alliance may view American affairs in a light different from the considerations which have been heretofore detailed. The antagonists of the alliance charge it with a design for extending the principle of monarchy to countries where that form of government does not exist, and for strengthening the principle in those regions

where it is recognized. With the latter design I repeat that we have nothing to do; it is exclusively the affair of those nations which are objects of the enterprize; the homely adage "let every one mind his own business" can never be better applied than to international relations, and it cannot be too often repeated in this country. If our institutions are undisturbed by other powers, we have no right to meddle with theirs. But if the other design be really entertained, it is a very different matter; it would be a direct interference with our immediate concerns, and would demand vigorous repulsion. For myself however, I do not look upon the Holy Alliance as the *bugbear* which it is generally thought to be among us. The people of most of the European dominions have grown old under the monarchical form of government, their habits, prejudices, and feelings are as much confirmed in it as ours are in a republican form of government; they are as happy under their system as any nation can be under a different one; and they would not be happy under another regime opposed to their taste and their modes of thinking: they have as good a right to decide upon this matter as we have, and the same argument which forbids their interference with us, also forbids us to disturb them—every people has a right to choose its own form of government. If the Holy Alliance be a confederation of kings against the privileges of the people, I certainly would be the last to justify such an object; all I can say about it is that we have nothing to do with it, nor has any one but the parties immediately interested; it is preposterous to think of playing Peter the hermit in the 19th century and to go crusading against persons or principles alien, antipode, to us and ours; but if its object be only to prevent wars, by establishing a forum, where, by representation and amicable negociation, the disputes which continually arise among nations may be decided without cutting some thousand throats and burning some hundred villages in order to determine a question nine times in ten not worth the trouble and expense of a quarrel, then in my opinion the alliance has a meritorious and philanthropic object; and I can not conceive that a number of men respectable and honourable in their private characters

would put their signatures to so many public and solemn assurances, if they were a tissue of falsehood, as they would be if their objects were different from those last stated. However, transactions or politics, purely European or Asiatic or African, and principles maintained there, not attempted to be disseminated or imposed upon us, but confined to the continents separated from us by vast seas, are nothing to us; they are nothing to us as long as they do not trench upon our interests. If the people or the sovereignties of the several nations are wrong, it is their misfortune, or rather their bad luck, for the mass of happiness among them is probably as great as it is among ourselves; and our interference, either to persuade them that they are fools or to rise up and kill one another, to acquire modes of government and fashions of living which they do not like and for which their habits, inclinations, and prejudices do not adapt them,—our meddling with their domestic affairs, does not procure us their thanks, nor gain proselytes, except among a few unquiet spirits who have nothing to lose, but everything to gain, by civil discord, and such conduct is in direct contradiction to the fundamental doctrine and principle of the right of self government and of regulating domestic affairs according to the will of a nation, which we correctly and generally maintain. We have much to do at home; quite enough to employ all our talents and thoughts, without wasting them in dogmatizing to other nations; when we have shewn the thousands among our population who now inhabit miserable log huts how to lodge themselves comfortably and neatly, and to add healthful or even luxurious articles to their diet by employing a few days of each year in forming gardens, when we improve our agricultural habits so that our ground will produce four fold the crops now made in many parts of the country, when we persuade one third of the agriculturists even to carry out their manure, and to sow grass seed, and not to cut down their sugar maple trees, when we have created manufactories to supply all our wants, when we have facilitated the transportation of the productions of different quarters to supply the demands or to be exchanged for the superabundance of other quarters, when we have

placed the means of education within reach of all our citizens, when we have codified and simplified our laws which now threaten with their commentaries in every state to surpass in bulk the three hundred camel loads which oppressed the Romans, when we have perfected our national glory and rendered individual happiness the lot of every one of our inhabitants by improving all the means which a bountiful providence has bestowed upon us in the intelligence of the people and in a territory prolific of every thing that can contribute to the necessities, comfort, or luxury of men ; when that blessed period arrives, then, if ever, it will be time to apply to the schooling of other nations talents and attention which are now much better employed when devoted to the service and interests of our own citizens.

I must not be misunderstood (nor will my words admit such a construction which is far from my thoughts) to mean to make myself the champion of the Holy Alliance ; if it requires defence, let those who are interested take up the pen : my sole desire is to convince such of my fellow citizen as may read these pages that we have no business with it in any of its relations which are confined to Europe.

But we shall have some business with the Holy Alliance, if it attempts to extend its views across the Atlantic ; and that precisely upon the same principles which lead me to protest against our meddling with the internal concerns of Europe. Sound policy dictates to us pacific measures of precaution against the conception of such a design, and to guard against any attempts to carry it into effect. This is the only aspect under which the operations of the Holy Alliance can be of any consequence to us, beyond the transitory sensation excited by history or rumour, and instead of wasting our solicitude upon the effects which this conspiracy of kings, as it is called by some persons (although by the bye it is no conspiracy of kings at all) had upon the French who are better competent to judge for themselves than we are to judge for them, or upon the Germans who do not thank us, or upon the Russians who do not understand us, or upon the inhabitants of *terra australis incognita*, if there be such a place ; instead of interfering with things in which we have no manner of in-

terest, and which we have no right to meddle with, it is to the possible direction of European politics and ambition, that we ought to turn our attention, and in so doing we shall not only exercise a right, but also perform a duty; and we shall not have to endure that calm indifference to our opinion which is provocation for blows, nor that infernal smile which is an insult worse than the rape of Helen. We shall be upon ground which the world knows, and, what is of infinitely more consequence, which we feel, is just and tenable; we shall speak upon a subject whereupon we are thoroughly informed, to those who will hear us and must hear us, and who will not have it in their power to consign our writings or sayings to the bureaus of the police, or to the ocean by a simple mandate to the custom house officers, before they reach the eyes or ears of the people; this is the fate of speculations upon the internal policy or the mutual treaties of the European governments, in the tirades of some of our politicians, which only offend the ruling authorities, whose measures are opposed.

By expressing our sentiments on every possible interposition of Europe in relation to the affairs of America, we should treat upon a subject where our opinions would be supported by our power to enforce them, and wherein nothing can be done without our concurrence or without our having the means of resistance in our own hands. I have said any *possible* interposition, but in politics all things which are possible are probable; we should therefore act, not hostilely, but firmly and decidedly, as if the confederation of European sovereigns had an inclination to take part in the concerns of the two Americas; an inclination which our experience teaches us to regard as equally probable and authorized by precedent, for France, Spain, Holland, and Prussia took part either directly or indirectly in our revolutionary contest with Great Britain; Russia and France in our late war with the same power; Great Britain by covert measures, or at least by wilfully shutting the Argus eyes of her government to the supplies of men, arms, and money for the South American war with Spain; Austria and England in the affairs of Brazil with Portugal; and the presence of several agents declared or incognito from European powers at the

place of meeting of the congress of Panama wore the same aspect. We have then great reason to conclude, independently of the vivid interest manifested by the journalists and other writers in Europe, that all the movements of America are regarded there with a deep solicitude, if no measures have been adopted with the view of influencing those movements, an exception which we are hardly at liberty to make since England, at least, has done much in the matter; it would be a political absurdity to think otherwise, when under the eyes of so watchful a government legions, brigades, and smaller corps have been levied, and have sailed for South America completely accoutred for the field; when far the greater part of the arms, ammunition, and appointments of the patriot troops have been supplied from the English workshops; and when millions upon millions have been borrowed from the capitalists by agents residing within a few squares of her ministers, while the stock thus created has been an object of speculation openly in her exchange.

Is England a member of the Holy Alliance? no man in America can give a positive answer to this question. The famous declaration of her sovereign "shyed" it; and I must say that the impression that declaration made upon my mind at the instant I read it, an impression not impaired but rather augmented by every dictum of the ministry and by her whole course of conduct since that speech, was, and is, that England is actually a party to the alliance *sub modo*—with some qualifications or restrictions. Some of her most able and confidential diplomatists have certainly been present at every congress of the powers who are avowedly engaged in the alliance. It is true they might have been present in order to take care that the interests of their country did not suffer, and that immediate information might be obtained of all things that passed; but things did pass which were not in direct accordance with her interests; the determination respecting the Spanish affairs, for example, when France was authorized by the congress of Verona to put down the disturbances between Ferdinand and the constitutionalists. The direct interest of England in this instance was that the contest should continue; because she would have had

the supplying of both sides with arms and clothing, according to her usual practice—a practice so inveterate that her mechanics supplied clothing for the troops of Napoleon in his conflict with herself*. But, asks a partizan of England, is no confidence to be placed in her declarations, and her disposition to support the cause of limited monarchy and a participation of the body of the people in the government?—To this I answer decidedly, *NO*—I place no faith in the verbiage of England on this subject. When has she supported those principles in truth and in reality? She waged eternal war, it is true, against the Bourbons, but she made equal war against France as soon as the revolution was unequivocally on foot, and in every stage of its subsequent progress; she supported the princes of Orange in all their contests with the popular party in Holland, when the declared object of the Orange faction was to place and to keep their chief at the head of the Dutch government; she made war in Spain, first to place on the throne a member of the most despotic family in Europe, and, an hundred years afterwards, to maintain there a prince who was repudiated by the estates of the kingdom; in both instances exhibiting herself as the champion of legitimacy as inveterately as the Holy Alliance can be; she was art and part with the allies in the cutting up of nations, when they were dismembered without the ceremony of asking their consent, at the close of the struggle with Napoleon, including the establishment of the house of Orange on a throne, after so many years aspiration at one; she stood by a passive spectator of the first and the successive partitions of Poland, when a single cannon discharged by her would have prevented those violations of public law: and, where the whole game was in her own hands, in the East Indies, she has instituted or perpetuated the most egregious despotism in the world, not excepting that of Constantinople. No act in her history authorizes the expectation that she will ever be found arrayed on the side of civil freedom. She resembles the Spartans in this; contented with enjoying the name, the shadow, of a

* Vide Segur's account of the conversations at St Helena.

liberal constitution herself, she not only sees with indifference the subjection of other nations, but she even reduces those who are in her power to a state of servitude. I therefore place no faith in any declarations of hers in favour of liberty among other nations; why even at this hour, an explicit and positive declaration on her part would terminate the distresses in Spain by inducing the grant of a liberal constitution, and she might in like manner end the war of extermination in Greece. Men are liable to draw erroneous conclusions from known facts, but there is no reason perceptible to my conceptions for disbelieving that England is a party to the Holy Alliance, either on account of the avowed objects of that confederation, or on account of the views which are imputed to it by its enemies. This argument on the probability of England's being a party, in some measure, to the Holy Alliance, may seem to be a wide digression; its application will be seen presently. But I must add one word more. England has certainly to apprehend from the Alliance something like the armed coalition, to interfere with her maritime pretensions, in case of future wars; nevertheless, I see no reason, for this cause, to conclude she is not now one of the confederates; she would even gain more by conciliating the other powers, and by presence in their councils, than by open and avowed opposition to them.

I will not stop to discuss the question whether it is the true interest of Europe, and particularly of the Holy Alliance, to interpose in American affairs. Interest, well understood, would perhaps be the mother of every good action; for nothing can be more to the real interest of nations or of an individual, than virtue, justice, and correct conduct. But whoever argues invariably upon the presumption created by the adage that all men are governed by their interests, will find himself woefully deceived; he must presuppose that all men are equally and profoundly intelligent. The contrary is the fact, and the whole tenor of experience and history shews that prejudice, passion, caprice, momentary impulse, or excitement, govern men's actions much more than deep reasoning upon causes and their consequent effects. Those

who are at the head of affairs, after all, are but men, and are under the influence of the emotions which regulate the conduct of the rest of the species; "*homo sum et nil humanum a me alienum puto*," may be and ought to be the ground for judging, as well as the motto, of every statesman. In the bosom of a politician ambition for celebrity succeeds ambition for office; a desire of distinction, and, in consequence, an inclination to seize upon and to identify himself with whatever leading or important events and contingencies agitate or attract the attention of the world, and to signalize himself by performing something that may be striking, without much regard to any consideration but that it is striking, and may hand his name down to posterity as well as claim the notice of the present generation; these motives produce the greater part of the actions of the rulers of the earth, whether they are clad in the imperial ermine, or more really sway the destinies of their countries from the less ostentatious recesses of the cabinet. I will therefore not argue now upon the interests of Europe in the participation she may attempt to take in American concerns.

There is a consideration however which demands fuller examination, as it is more likely to induce an interposition of the Holy Alliance or of the sovereigns of Europe in their separate capacities. That coalition proves itself by its actions and by its declarations to be under the influence of the *ignis fatuus* of the balance of power—a notion which has been the pretence or excuse for more bloodshed than any other topic which has agitated the world since the crusades—a novelty in history, which cannot be traced beyond the middle or the latter part of the reign of Louis XIV. when it originated in England as a catch word to serve as a rallying cry for party. It becomes every man to be diffident in assertions of this kind, but my feeble researches never met with the idea until that period; or if they did it has entirely escaped my notice; and if I can be corrected I shall be the first to acknowledge my error. It certainly was unknown during the Carlovingian epoch, during the period of the Norman inroads, during the contests of the English kings for French territories or for the French crown, during the

almost universal empire of Charles V.; or at least I cannot find it until the period above designated.

This idea of preserving the balance of power may lead the sovereigns of Europe (or their cabinets which is the same thing, and indeed the *real thing* as matters stand at present), to apprehend the consequences of the establishment of a number of rich, and several powerful, republics, connected by numerous ties of commercial and political sympathies, although separated from them by the surges of the vast ocean. Should such an apprehension possess the minds of European statesmen, there is no fixing bounds to the extent to which they may think, or pretend, themselves impelled to mingle in American affairs. It is possible—it is much more than possible, it is extremely probable, that such will be the result of the midnight meditations of the members of the Alliance, especially when they see that the southern republics, if not ourselves, are fully sensible of the urgent expediency of uniting their forces and of cementing their natural sympathies, in order not only to resist foreign aggression, but also to preserve that harmony among themselves, without which they must inevitably be the victims to ceaseless and devastating commotions, and be the prey of any power which will take the trouble to seize the dominion of their beautiful and auriferous regions. It will be considered that the prolific nature of the American population, the vast riches and resources of its territories, the maritime inclination of many of its sections, the inexhaustible and excellent quality of its materials for ship building, the vigorous activity inspired by the fresh youthfulness of those nations, together with that derived from the nature of our liberal institutions, will very shortly produce a consolidation of power whose capabilities and whose action can only be circumscribed by the sense of justice, respect for the rights of others, and contentment with its own condition, which will result from the principles on which those institutions are based. If foreigners have not full confidence in such motives and such principles, they will naturally regard with great alarm the incipency of such a power, and will consequently do all that in them lies to prevent its formation. If

this should be the course adopted abroad, nothing is more necessary than that the United States should throw their weight into the scale, in order, by manifesting their determination or by adding their force to the power of America if necessary, to prevent the assailing of the new empires and the subversion of the principles which we maintain: if a contrary policy be pursued across the sea, and I devoutly hope for it, a greater confidence will be inspired by our tempering the southern vivacity with the phlegm of northern constitutions.

The continental powers can hardly be possessed of the fancy that these nations could feel a desire to extend their dominions, when their actual territories are already so extensive that it will require at least two centuries to give them even a moderate population, and when it is so evidently the interest of every man of property inhabiting them, to concentrate the population, rather than to encourage its diffusion over countries added to those whose great extent and sparse population occasion many serious inconveniences. If the allies argue, however, from premises drawn from the thickly inhabited and closely bounded countries of Europe, and if they shall be so misadvised as to inflict upon America the necessity of contending with them to avoid being cursed with the notion of that political hallucination, the balance of power, then will they find the English fleet a most desirable auxiliary to their projects; and then will the question, whether England be a party to the Holy Alliance, become one of the gravest import. They can cross the seas without that fleet; but if England should be inclined to oppose them, it would be a very disagreeable obstacle to a transmarine expedition.

There is a curious circumstance with respect to the marines of Europe: England is eternally counting her ships and publishing their amazing numbers; every statistical or military account is swelled with details about them: on the other hand France, Spain, Portugal, the kingdom of the Netherlands, Sweden, Denmark, and Russia, say scarcely any thing official on the subject of theirs; we find a continental man of war every now and then named in the list of arrivals by

foreign journals; and when any of our travellers happen to go into the harbours of Antwerp, Brest, or Toulon, not to extend the list, they are surprised at seeing forests of masts; and this, after the annihilation of the continental navies according to the English accounts, which by the bye detailed the capture of more vessels during a few years of the late war than France ever owned. What is the reason of this vaunting on one side and this taciturnity on the other? Are there in very truth so many vessels of war in England as she pretends? We know that the vessels of France, the kingdom of the Netherlands, Sweden, and Denmark, are very numerous, but we do not know their number. Are there more men of war built and building in those countries than we have imagined? They are certainly so numerous that there is no cause for concealing the number; but it is concealed; and therefore the reason for the secrecy must be searched for in some other cause. It will be remembered that the public have no means of knowing these details but from official documents published by the governments. If the like conduct were pursued by individuals, we should say that the one desired to intimidate by an ostentatious display of his strength and by overrating it, and that the others really possessed greater force than they thought fit to exhibit. A man who knows the world encounters a "fire eater" with an absolute conviction that he wants bottom. However, whether the number of the English men of war be exaggerated or not, we *know* enough of them to satisfy us that it is an ugly business for a fleet of transports to cross the Atlantic with a prospect of encountering them; although I am persuaded that the marine of the continental powers united is more numerous than the British; and they have been taught by severe experience the absurdity of allowing themselves to be beaten in detail, which has been the great secret of the English naval warfare, whether considered upon the great scale of the plan of a war, or upon the smaller one of a single battle. The extent of the coasts of the maritime powers, and the distance between their naval depots, which of course render the junction of their fleets more difficult, have contributed to enable England to beat them as they attempt to unite, be-

cause she has always kept the main body of her fleets concentrated at two or three harbours not very far distant from one another. This ought to serve also as a lesson to ourselves: the advantage of obtaining provisions and naval stores cheaper by dispersing the ships or fleets in different ports is not sufficient to counterbalance the hazard of their being cut off when they attempt to rendezvous, nor is it equivalent to the important object of having the whole power of a navy concentrated, so that its blows may be struck en masse. The true tactique of a nation which owns line of battle ships is, to concentrate them all at one naval station, upon the first appearance of a war, and not to run the risk of delaying their junction until hostilities have actually commenced. If the French fleets had been concentrated either at Brest or at Toulon when the war with England broke out, European politics would probably wear at present a very different aspect.

Instructed by dearly bought experience, the continental powers will no doubt endeavour by all means to secure the co-operation of the English fleet, if they should meditate a forcible interference with the relations of the two Americas; and this will very probably succeed, by holding out to her the triple advantage of profit to her commerce, by supplying the armaments, as well as by extending the consumption of her manufactures in the countries—of benefit to her shipping interest by the transportation of the troops, and by carrying their supplies—and of permanent emolument by proposing to her the lion's share in the distribution of the spoils and conquests.

But will England unite in projects for interference with American affairs? She will do any thing which tends to promote the sale of cutlery and calicoes. At least I think so, and I believe my opinion to be sanctioned by all her past conduct—by the whole tenor of her history.

If any one should ask why I harp incessantly upon England, and why I still return to the same theme in every stage of my argument; I reply that she is our great rival in every interest, commercial naval or political, and even in glory; that she is at once our most powerful, most enterprising, and

most dangerous competitor ; that she is most able to do us harm ; and that her system, as well as her interest, is most directly in opposition to our own.

I will conclude the present consideration of the Holy Alliance, and of European relations, with saying that, although I place considerable confidence in their public and solemn declarations, and ardently hope that they will be restrained by a sense of justice and propriety, and by respect for the opinion of the world and for the judgment of posterity—of history—yet it is so probable the notion of the balance of power or a desire of individuals to signalize themselves will prompt a course of conduct contrary to our hopes, to our best desires, and to our interests, that all possible measures of precaution ought to be adopted to repress any such impulses, and to obviate their consequences, in case they determine to molest nations which regard them with the most friendly sentiments, but which desire no political intimacy with countries separated from us by half the globe, and differing from us in habits, in prejudices, in system, and in feeling. If the United States take an open and decided part with the other nations of our continent, this weight added to the aggregate force will make it so powerful, that it will probably restrain foreign powers from the conception of interference ; and if inimical designs are formed, it will render their execution next to impossible : if nothing injurious to us be undertaken, such a proceeding upon our side will produce no inconvenience : but if the reverse should happen, then our interposition becomes a matter of absolute necessity.

We have more or less intercourse with many nations whose opinions are certainly to be highly respected, but whose relations with us are not such as to bring them into the scope of these observations ; it is therefore not thought necessary to treat of them separately and specifically.

CHAPTER VII.

I PROCEED to some general considerations respecting the South American states, and Mexico ; observing here that whenever South America is mentioned without remarking the discrimination, it is meant to include Mexico, although she is in fact in North America ; following in this the common and loose mode of designating among us the Hispano-American states.

The question of independence from Spain is settled ; there cannot be a doubt of this. The vast change in every relation may still produce some commotions, whose immediate causes may be, either effervescences among the people unaccustomed to liberty, and as yet scarcely prepared for the exercise of the power of self government which the revolution has conferred upon them ; or, the disappointment and and discontent of some who are deprived of the authority or privileges they lately possessed, and who will run the risk of losing the fortunes left to them as well as the immunities they have in common with the whole body of the people, in hope of regaining by a new order of things a portion of what they have lost, and still regret ; or, finally, the ambition or excited feelings of others who are not satisfied with a state of secure mediocrity, but desire to elevate themselves to rank, power, or fortune, by means of intestine disturbances. Some few may be tempted by Spanish gold and the prospect of European titles to make movements in favour of the old domination of the mother country. The good sense of the people, their exhaustion and desire for repose after their late

struggles, will be sufficient to repress disturbances arising from the first of these causes; and their antipathy to Spain, excited by their sufferings, and by the relentless severity with which the war was carried on, will be a safeguard against any dangerous effects from the latter cause; besides, there are so many men of talents, education, and influence enlisted body and soul in the support of the existing order of affairs, that they will be able to overwhelm all opposition, and to support effectually the actual condition of their respective countries. Spain has really done so much, or to say the least the conduct of some of her officers, for which she is held responsible, has had the effect of alienating the feelings of her late colonies so thoroughly, that they will endure subjection to any other power in preference to hers; they never can forgive her for what they have endured, and her national character does not promise that much will be done on her part to conciliate them: it seems rather probable that the resentment will be reciprocal; as she is not likely to get over the offence to her pride, and the injury to her interests, which have been inflicted by the emancipation of the colonies. The separation from the mother country is therefore irremediable and eternal, whatever may be the discontent or the effect of a few persons who cherish fond recollections of the past regime—of an era which has gone to join the shades of departed centuries in the vast bosom of eternity.

The first settlers of North America came from a country where the principles of civil liberty were well known and established in theory if not in practice. They brought with them their prejudices, their habits, and a fitness for the form of government which was afterwards happily organized; indeed they had every thing but the name of republics, except the presence of a few of the trappings of monarchy, before our revolution; and of course as soon as a republican form of government was proclaimed, they were prepared to enter upon its duties and for enjoyment of its privileges. Many of them had sought, in the wildernesses of the newly discovered world, a refuge from what they deemed civil or religious oppression in Great Britain; many distinguished men fled before the gloomy persecution of the

pretended commonwealth, or from the usurpation by a Dutch king of his father in law's and uncle's crown; and many others, liberally educated and of eminent families, concealed themselves in woods and obscurity, from the cruelties, or at best the watchful jealousy which followed two unsuccessful although courageous attempts to reinstate an illustrious but illy advised and unfortunate family in what they supposed just and lawful rights. Altogether a mass of education, intelligence, and capacity for free institutions was assembled in the Anglo-American colonies, which qualified them for the beautiful system under which we live, and rendered any other foreign to their dispositions and almost impossible to be established. Not so in the Spanish colonies. They were colonies of soldiery in the first instance, familiarized with the obligations of military obedience, made more imperative by constant danger amidst a large population of conquered nations; and in fact they have always worn very much the aspect of conquerors cantoned in subdued countries. Their settlements in America were based upon forcible conquests of numerous partially civilized nations: ours were different; they were locations of civilians in regions almost deserts, and feebly contended for by scattered and small tribes of unimproved savages, to oppose whom few troops were necessary, so few that the civil authority would have been irresistibly paramount, even if the hereditary prejudices of the population, and of the military drawn from its bosom, or from amongst the people from whom both took their origin, had not assigned that preeminence to the magistracy.

That the Spanish colonists did not possess strong features of character and education, with bravery, and talents, would be an assertion contradicted by every page of their annals. They certainly were endowed with all these qualities in an eminent degree; else they never would have been able to effect and to retain the conquests they made. But the very nature and necessity of their establishments were decidedly military, and as an inevitable consequence savoured of despotism. The wonderful smallness of the numbers of the forces by which the conquests were made, tended to increase the habits of military obedience, and of course to foster the despotie

principle (of which prolific germs were brought with them from their native country) because of the necessity of maintaining their discipline, at least so far as was required for the perfect organization of their troops, their aptitude for instant concentration, and for immediately taking the field; a necessity imposed upon them by the dangerous position they long occupied, surrounded and mingled as they were with a multitudinous and scarcely subjugated population. This state of things continued so long as to become habitual, to have infused deeply into the breasts of the conquistadores the military or despotic principle, and to have disseminated it universally among those who followed them as mere settlers or civilians, all of whom brought from home, as we have just said, strong dispositions for it and confirmed habits.

The strong monarchies of Europe arose from exactly similar circumstances. The original inhabitants were very liberal, almost democratic, in their institutions; influenced it is true by superstitious reverence for their religious orders, and headed by a military chief, who exercised but little of sovereign authority except on the field of battle, was elected by the body of the people, all themselves soldiers or by officers who were so elected. In the dark ages and shortly after them, these aborigines were invaded and conquered by Romans, Franks, Goths, Vandals, Moors, &c. who found themselves obliged to preserve their military array in the midst of vanquished nations more numerous than they were; thus they became the privileged class, tyrannizing over their serfs and vassals, a distinct caste in each state, subsequently modified into the nobility of each: They long preserved considerable freedom or license among themselves, but never losing their military cohesion, nor the aspect of armies quartered upon their conquests, which were necessary to enable them to maintain those conquests; a state of affairs, which continued down to the French revolution, and which still partially remains in some countries. Familiarized with tyranny by their own authority over their vassals, and by the military spirit of their institutions, they were not unapt to endure the monarchical yoke, already respectable to them in the persons of their commanders in chief, when the dissensions among

themselves required a modification of their forms of government, and when bold, talented, and ambitious chiefs of the state knew how to extend an hitherto limited command in chief for war, and little more than presidency over civil affairs, and to convert their restricted authority into absolute government, by alternate artifice, corruption, and force.

As the foundations of the Hispano-American colonies were laid upon bases so widely different from those whereon the settlements in the English colonies were established, it is not surprising that the descendants of the first settlers should be found much less prepared than we were for republican institutions. But they have adopted liberal ideas, and these never retrograde; there is not an example of it in history. Rome gives none; she was always a monarchy or an oligarchy; Greece the same; and all other nations which were free owed the loss of their freedom to conquest*. The South Americans will therefore always preserve liberal institutions, whatever shades of difference or mere names of offices may distinguish theirs from ours—saving always the possibility of new conquests, which hardly can enter into the calculation of remote contingencies. The old leaven may however produce some disturbances before the mass of the people become familiarized with their new situation and their new rights, although every day renders them more and more adapted to their condition, and diffuses the ideas and principles upon which they are hereafter to act; they are, as it were, educated or instructed by the passing events of every day in the science of self government; and it appears that nearly all their reading, influential, educated, and talented men are enlisted in this righteous cause. I infer, that although the inexperience of the people in the science of self government may be the cause of some slight effervescences of an anarchical tendency, or the misguided ambition of a few leaders may impel them to attempts of an opposite direction, nevertheless the question of liberal ideas and institutions is finally decided in Hispano-America.

Insurrections or internal dissensions, however slight, are

* Both Rome and the Grecian states were originally conquered countries.

always deplorable events ; and nothing will tend to interdict them, and even to prevent the formation of an idea of them, so effectually as the grand system upon which we shall presently treat.

Am I asked to be more explicit, and to say what I intend by *liberal institutions* ; if I mean forms of government exactly similar to our own ?—Why the fact is, the topic of this pamphlet, however illy it may be here discussed, is too grave for an essay to acquire popularity or to flatter prejudices or to pamper an appetite for subserviency, even if such were the character of the writer, which certainly is not. The whole tenor of this argument, which is all that an anonymous writer need appeal to, proves that its great object is to contribute the feeble effort of one of her humblest votaries, to rivet the glorious standard of liberty upon the loftiest rock of the vast Andes, as well as to perpetuate its display upon the Alleghenies—where its splendid blazonry, surrounded by the meteoric blaze of the middle heavens, and guarded by volcanic fires, may endure forever a dazzling beacon and a rallying signal for all the friends of civil and religious freedom. These pages also shew a sympathy with those who are born in the same continent and an attachment to my fellow citizens which enable me to speak the truth without fear of consequences, if I could fear them ; the South Americans cannot doubt my sincere friendship, nor my own countrymen my allegiance. I therefore answer directly to the point. I do not mean, when I say liberal institutions, that they will be exactly like ours. I do not see how it is possible for the inhabitants of Hispano-America to reconcile themselves or their habits to so serious and unadorned a form of government as that of these United States, until at least two generations have elapsed, and I doubt whether their taste will not always require much more decoration than we do ; nor do I perceive how they can secure to themselves the great objects of civilized, and indeed of every stage of society, security of person and of property, without a much stronger government than we have. But I am convinced that despotism in any shape is now impossible in those countries, and that they are more liable to tend towards an opposite extreme for some time to come ; which

liability will require that their governments be endued with considerable strength and energy: I believe also that oppression on the part of an aristocracy or of the government will not be endured by the people. I do not think that they are arrived at the condition when an unarmed individual, as is the case among us, shews a paper to an offender and desires him to follow, with a certainty of being obeyed, and when the person thus cited does follow such an officer, without resistance, before the proper tribunal; but I believe that public opinion and the laws will not permit informal or groundless arrests there, and much less personal restraint or loss of property without fair trial and conviction by due legal formalities and adjudication by the competent authorities, according to law. These are liberal institutions; and from them will gradually, but certainly, ensue an illumination of the public mind, which will, I hope, prepare them for, and secure to them, as near an approach to our forms as is reconcilable to their climate and to the excitability of their temperament, so much more ardent than ours. With these principles and institutions the name which they may bestow upon their chief magistrate, or the greater or less duration of his office, will not be a matter of so much consequence as it would be in Europe; except as adding to, or diminishing, the security for his not exceeding the restrictions imposed upon him, in which lies the real difference between republicanism and monarchy. Once again I repeat that the system I advocate will have a tendency to increase the spirit of republicanism in America and to diminish any hidden inclination to monarchy—as I believe. However, be my faith what it may in the dispositions of Hispano-América, what I have just said will afford sufficient reason for entertaining some apprehensions in case the Holy Alliance, or one or more of the greater powers, shall think fit, and be permitted, to interfere with their concerns; there is no knowing what may be effected by European intrigue, influence, and, above all, money, operating upon the vestiges of ancient prejudices and habits, in favour of forms of government which may be supposed naturally more agreeable to them, and in behalf of popular leaders endeared to their fellow

citizens by services or by merit. If our conduct towards the new states should alienate their affections and prevent a close and familiar intercourse between us, thus precluding them from witnessing the effects of our institutions, and depriving our example of influence; if, instead of drawing close the bonds of affinity, we induce them, by our indifference or our coldness, to throw themselves into the arms of the allies, then indeed I will not pretend to assert that their new born liberty and liberal ideas may not be so much distorted as to lose all manner of resemblance to the original model. I see no particular reason why animosity towards them should be excited even if the new states were to become monarchies, but certainly such a fate would be a source of infinite regret to us, after our having flattered ourselves with contemplation of the beautiful vision of a republican continent; and the disappointment would give us the more pain, as we should have the consciousness of self reproach, as well as the censure of the expecting world, for not having done what was in our power to influence a different result for the vast expense of blood, treasure, and human happiness which their independence has cost. It would be said that we made a great uproar about the French revolution, and that many of us talked of going to war on that account, when we could have been of no kind of use to France, or to the grand cause of civil freedom; but that now when the nations colimitary with us require our assistance or our influence in favour of the same principles, and when we could be of effectual service in the cause, while we gained their gratitude, we stand aloof; and that it proves us to be a nation of more words than deeds—an imputation to which, as one of the nation, I would be very loth to submit, and which I hope we do not and will not deserve. Permanent foreign dominion I consider now impossible over any of those states, whatever may be the partial effect of temporary incursions; but foreign influence is a very probable circumstance, in case an American system be not adopted; and it remains for us to conjecture what would be the deleterious effect of such an influence upon our own concerns—nay, it can hardly be termed conjectural, it is as plain as the light of the noon day sun; and if there

shall be a universal confederation of the American states from which we are excluded or from which we exclude ourselves, there are no bounds to the injury we shall sustain. We cannot prevent such a confederation, although we may refuse to join it; and it is manifestly a thing decided upon; nor can we prevent the European powers, or at any rate some of them, particularly England, from acquiring an influence which we reject, and from exerting it to our disparagement; we shall, by neglecting them and the conjuncture, alienate their present friendly feelings, give umbrage, and create sensations of suspicion or jealousy; the consequence will be a disinclination for political and commercial relations with us, of which England and the rest of Europe will instantly take advantage; and probably these sentiments will be followed by a coolness towards the forms of government of which we have given the example.

It is directly the interest of the new nations to form a grand confederation in order to keep the peace between themselves and to enable them to defend themselves against foreign attacks. They have the first principle, the germ, of confederation in their being all of one family: Brazil to be sure is only a kind of cousin to the rest: identity of language and of religion strengthen the fraternity. There is therefore every reason to be certain that they will confederate, and the reasons are quite as cogent as those which induced these United States to do so, but their vast extent will necessarily prevent their confederation from being so intimate as ours: it will be more like a fascia of nations than one nation. They have abundance of intelligence and of perception of their true interest to convince them of the expediency of the measure, and the example of the Holy Alliance proves that a grand confederation of nations is a possibility and is in conformance with the illumination of the age. There would be little doubt therefore of their confederating, even if Bolivar had not proposed it now. If the system is formed without us, in the very probable case of any contest arising between them and us, we shall have to oppose the force not of one member of the confederation, which we should do with success, but of the whole united strength of the allied

powers, and the conflict would be most perilous. I have sufficient confidence in the resources, the *vis* of my country to believe that it can not be subdued, but a contest with the power of all the rest of the continent would be excessively prejudicial to us. France, with her immense strength and wealth, has given an example of what a nation has to expect when a continent is arrayed against it; we can not rationally calculate upon being more successful than she was, especially when we recollect what innumerable armies she possessed, their admirable discipline, their familiarity with war, the strength of her government, and above all that she was headed and her armies led by the first captain of the world.

I have no doubt the rest of the continent will confederate, with us or without us, and it appears to me that it would savour of the most unpardonable imprudence and rashness, that it would be tempting and defying destiny, to hesitate in uniting in a system which promises us safety from every peril, which will secure to us every advantage that politics can afford, and which does not threaten us with a single inconvenience, unless peace and safety, commerce and wealth, are inconveniences. If we choose to preserve the right of making war when we please, we may do so; but then we must abide the lot of war against fearful odds in America, and of foreign war without assistance, or even with a risk of having our limitrophes marshalled against us.

A proof of what has been said above, about the influence of ancient habits and prejudices, is found in the actual state of the Brazils. It does not seem that the imperial government will possess much influence or ascendancy over the other states, nor that it will change its form in its own territory; the prejudices of the people, and the power of the aristocracy, are too great to anticipate a change, and the latter have too much to lose to part with their present prerogatives without a severe struggle, which the great majority of the inhabitants does not appear inclined to make against institutions familiarized by the recollections of infancy, and rendered attractive by the pomp, ceremony, and captivation of regal splendour.

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CHAPTER VIII.

MEXICO will probably continue pretty much as she is. She had a rich, brave, and powerful nobility; such of the noblesse as have not fallen in the revolutionary contest, or have not emigrated, have consented, whether voluntarily or on compulsion makes no difference, to the abrogation of their privileges, and are prudently enlisted in the interests of the republic—prudently on both sides, since the mass of the people have thus secured to themselves the education, talents, and hereditary courage of the cidevant nobility, and these have avoided the dangers and misfortunes of a contest, which might otherwise have overwhelmed the whole country. Besides, Mexico is so proximate, has had openly or secretly so much intercourse with us, that she could not fail to have imbibed a portion of our democratic spirit, much larger than the other states had an opportunity of acquiring. Hence has ensued their adoption of our singular form of confederation, which differs in so many points from the Germanic, Helvetic, Batavian, and Rhenish confederations, and from several former governments in Europe, and which nevertheless agrees with them in many of their prominent features. The differences between those and the Mexican confederations are so considerable that it is almost certain ours was the prototype for the present Mexican government. The establishment of this peculiarity was unexpected to the world. It possesses a compactness, a principle of adhesion, beyond ours, because all that is now comprehended in the Mexican confederation formerly composed one viceroyalty, and, although divided

into presidencias, audiencias, and capitancias generales, was still subjected to the central authority of the kingly representative at Mexico, formed part of a great kingdom, and was united by the community of feeling or interest which characterize a nation, and radiated, together with the settlements, from one common focus. This *entirety* has been recently, not broken, but only politically divided by ideal lines, for sake of more convenient government; the sympathies and interests, laws, customs, and habits of life, as well as of ideas, remain as heretofore the same in their leading principles. The North American states on the other hand, were originally settled by emigrants for different causes, at different times, of different castes, with different sentiments, different interests, and under different leaders; nothing, for instance, could be more dissimilar than the puritanical settlers of New England, and the royalist cavaliers of Maryland and Virginia, the quakers of Pennsylvania, and the catholics of Maryland. They formed separate communities and governments with no bond of union between them and in no wise connected, except by their common responsibility and allegiance to the sovereign of the mother country: of course, when they threw off this allegiance they were each as sovereign and independent of each other as countries could be; they broke no ties between themselves, because there were none to break; they had no tie to break but that by which they were bound to the English crown; and their future connection was an alliance between sovereign independent nations; the confederation was a compact, and a relinquishment of the capital or general government with many points of particular government, to a central delegated sovereignty—it was the melting down of many nations, and recasting them into one colossal image of strength and power, of which they composed the mighty limbs—an operation, an event, as indispensable to our welfare, and happiness, to our domestic tranquillity, and to our external security, as the breath to the nostrils of our life. But the fable teaches us that the members once repined at their dependence upon the common source of their strength; and it is sometimes necessary to remind the states of our confederacy of this wise apothegm.

The circumstance of all Mexico having so recently composed one body corporate, gives us abundant reason to hope that a long time will elapse before the motion of the great wheel of government will create a sufficient centrifugal power to inspire the least tendency in any of its members to fly off from their mutual cohesion.

Whether it has been perfectly prudent or not in Mexico to have adopted this system, remains to be proved. All the great nations known to history have, at one time or other of their existence, been little else than confederacies; and all have, in the lapse of years, in the process of illumination, or of ambition, been agglomerated into homogeneous masses. The examples I will name are, the English heptarchy, not to penetrate the darkness of Pictish tradition; I think the same may be said of her condition under the Norman aristocracy, a mere confederation of nobility, down to the dynasty of the Tudors; the union of the English and Welsh crowns from Edward down to a comparatively modern date and perhaps even from an anterior date; the feudal relation of those countries; the scarcely more than *suzerain* submission of the Scottish clans, with the kingdoms of Man, and of the Isles, to the crown of Scotland; the union of the Scottish, English, and Irish crowns, when the brows of the descendants of Fergus the first were bound with the triple diadem; the Irish sovereignty conquered by the English kings: France under the Merovignian, Carlovingian, and Capetian kings down to Louis the eleventh: the accumulation of crowns on the heads of the house of Este or Austria descended to the branch of Lorain: and Spain until Charles the fifth. All these and many others have exhibited exemplars of confederations, and all have been merged in united and uniform monarchies, except the German empire, which still shews an appearance of separate governments, as far as this idea is reconcilable with the empire of a single head, and a central cabinet at Vienna. Our confederation began upon different principles, with a greater exemption from foreign violence than any of those quoted, and promises, from the cool reflecting temper of our people, to remain much longer than any of them in its present situation, et fac Deus omnipotens per-

petuam rempublicam. We were separate sovereignties, and practically and deliberately united ourselves into one grand republic. Mexico was one undivided nation, and has peaceably and deliberately subdivided herself into separate although confederated republics.

Thus both have originated in principles and rudiments very different from those to which the present state of Europe owes its commencement. We might perhaps improve our condition by the introduction of a greater degree of uniformity in our laws, and constitutions; but the fundamental principles and the general system are the same in every state of the union, and the machinery of our government is so generally harmonious and so good, that it is better for us to rest contented with some slight inconveniences, rather than in an attempt to "make well better" incur the risk of damaging parts which can not be ameliorated. Mexico, having adopted our plan, will probably be of the same opinion, and we have therefore every reason to expect that her system will endure for a long period.

She is less liable to be affected by foreign influence or force than any part of South America, because she is so much stronger. She is even as strong at least as ourselves, for Humboldt in his last publication of statistical works* whose accuracy, talent, labour, and research, are beyond praise, estimates the population of Mexico in her average most settled parts, comprehending an extent of 600 continuous square marine leagues, at 1300 inhabitants to the square league; while the most populous region in the United States covering only 522 leagues has not more than 900 inhabitants to the league†: again the whole territory of the United States contains an average of 58 souls to the square league, while Mexico averages 90 souls to the same superficies. He states the population of Mexico at seven millions at the date of his estimates, and that of the United States at 10,220,000: the superficial extent of the territory of the United States he calls 2,086,800 square miles, or 174,306 square marine leagues,

* Vol. VI. Part I. pp. 185, 196: English edition, 1826.

† By the census of 1820. Ibid.

and of Mexico 75,830 square leagues*. Hence there is a much greater relative population in Mexico, than we possess, upon a similar territory. She has the advantage of a capability of producing every thing our country affords, and many other richer staples; we have to counterbalance these advantages the characteristic perhaps of greater energy of character, or at least of somewhat greater industry. If therefore it is morally and practically impossible to overpower the United States by a foreign force as I confidently and devoutly believe, it is also impossible to overcome Mexico, and neither the one nor the other have any thing to apprehend for their institutions except from themselves, except from the operation of domestic causes. "Liberty may expire in anarchy or by the transitory usurpation of a daring chief; but the true elements of monarchy are nowhere found in modern colonies." I agree with this sentiment, generally: it will be seen by the argument used some pages back, that my opinion is that all the European monarchies are founded upon conquest, by which the race of the conquerors acquired the distinction of *caste*; the word is technical, there is none other to substitute for it; party, order, faction, will not do; noblesse not more, for they have frequently bought into it; *gentilhomme* will not, for it means now "*a certain set*," in which Brummel was, and the Murrays, Northumberlands, and Butes, the Montmorencies and the Montgomeries, were not. The armies or hordes which conquered, were either chiefs otherwise called officers, or soldiers: the former became nobles of various grades according to their ranks; what we should call lieutenants general became dukes, fursts, and so forth, according to the different languages, and the other officers were entitled according to their ranks down to simple knights, ritters, &c. the soldiery were the gentry or the yeomanry of the conquered countries; some of the aborigines who united with the conquerors were gratified with titles. The mass of the conquered nations were vassals, serfs, or tenantry. The commanders in chief became konig, kings, and imperators. This was the primeval origin of the

* Humboldt, Vol. VI. Part I. p. 127.

dynasties and aristocracies of Europe—as I think, without pretending to censure those whose opinions differ from mine.

But the South American and Mexican settlements were not conducted altogether according to the European model. Immediately after the conquests, torrents of civilians, ecclesiastical, commercial, agricultural, and mechanical, poured into those golden regions, in numbers far exceeding the totality of the victors of any one of the territories which now constitute primary monarchies in Europe. William the conqueror (*conqueror* translated “acquirer” by Blackstone, drolly enough) is said to have conquered or *acquired* England with no more than 60,000 men. The descendants of the conquerors of France were computed at the breaking out of the revolution at one million of souls out of twenty-five millions. In Mexico alone Humboldt calculated that in 1810, about three centuries after the conquest, there were of the pure white race (without discriminating how many ecclesiastics were coloured*) 1,107,567, out of a total population 6,122,354. This datum by itself suffices to shew that the conservation of an aristocracy of the conquerors is impossible; it would be so numerous as to be a democracy of *aristoi*: and in consequence we find that the titled nobility there was very inconsiderable compared with that of Europe. It therefore is very evident that the elements of monarchy are wanting in Mexico, and whatever individual element there was, is now destroyed by the destitution, with their free consent or by the force of popular sentiment, of the nobility *created* by the Spanish crown. I emphasize *created*, because the European saying, which is arrogant enough, that “the king can make a nobleman, but cannot make a gentleman,” has more political truth in it than would appear at the first glance, in as much as it indicates the truth of the position that the origin of nobility and of monarchy is to be traced to the first conquests of the nations where it exists. These observations apply to the rest of the Hispano-American states.

The time appears to have gone by when it was possible to subjugate such countries as Mexico; the lights of the age

* There were very few, and they were of the Indian race.

are two widely diffused, the population too numerous; and any power which might acquire an ascendancy, would have to adopt the forms of government, as well as the habits of thinking and of acting, which prevail in the country: indeed a pretty decided proof of this has been given in the fruitless attempt of Iturbide, (who was certainly a distinguished, a gallant, and a brave man) and in his unfortunate endeavour to imitate Napoleon's return from Elba, although it rather resembled the affair of the courageous but rash Murat; he lost his life in a way and from causes not well understood in this country, and his fate will be a warning to others for a long time. Still I am far from being utopian or enthusiastic enough to say that the official organs or the details of government cannot be changed by powerful invasion, assisted by a faction in the country, rendering the army or the magistracy too strong to be reconcilable with our ideas of republican government, and too formidable to the neighbouring nations. It is to guard against the possibility that my arguments run. I think nevertheless that any such conquerors, if they may be so called, will be obliged to conform to the popular sentiment—a sentiment which will be inflected however much as possible, in all the great leading maxims of government; and nothing like absolute power can exist; it could not exist without a calm and deliberate legislative and popular surrender of the popular rights, such as took place in Denmark in the last century, a thing utterly improbable, after all that has passed. An objection may be made that the mass of the people is very uneducated, has in fact not been the decided and active agent in the revolution, except a portion of it followed some leaders to the field from mere personal attachment or induced by prospect of gain, and that these are proved by the shouts it has bestowed almost equally upon royalists or patriots as either was triumphant; which shews that it has not yet a decided public sentiment. But public sentiment is in all countries the opinions and the impulse given by the aristocracy, if I may be allowed the expression, of activity, talent, education, and influence. In Mexico, to their glory be it spoken, this aristocracy, and that which is composed of wealth and rank in society, as well as the magistracy and military, have generally taken up

and propagated liberal ideas ; they have espoused the people's cause, and have set to work in earnest to qualify the mass by education and instruction to understand, appreciate, enjoy, and perpetuate the principles of freedom.

But let us suppose for a moment that a popular and powerful brave man of talents were to arise there, who had the ambition to set himself at the head of the government, recast in the strongest shape which the prejudices of the people would admit, with a title for the chief magistracy new or of undefined import to the ears of the descendants of the European race, such as cacique, inca, principal, or any other—for as I have before said, it is not the name but the spirit of the magistracy which makes a difference in the form of government, and Cromwell was as despotic with his title of protector as he would have been with that of emperor—suppose his project be to perpetuate his dynasty by means of elections by a conservative senate, the members of which are appointed by himself and his successors, or who are susceptible of appointments to offices at his gift or are under his influence by any of the thousand modes which ambition would devise ; suppose he commences by the stale trick, older than the age of Pericles, of exciting discontent and feeble attacks upon the person of the executive, and demands, what could scarcely be refused under such circumstances, a faithful and well paid guard to defend his person and to carry into effect the ordinances of the legislature ; suppose that he enter into communication with some European power which would be disposed to assist in raising up a monarchical form of government in this hemisphere and which would furnish him with supplies of treasure. What then would be the effectual defence of republican institutions in that country ; and, if they should be subverted, what would be our condition in relation to a strong, armed, and ambitious government, upon our borders, with an army demanding occupation and employment ? We should have to fight, and we are able to do so, is the immediate answer of a young man. Agreed ; he has good health, a good horse, a sword, and a cloak, can raise a legion, and would be one of the combatants ; but he will grow old ; and then ? Why the fact is that this

business of fighting is a bad affair at best. Besides, we all profess to be attached to republican government; and yet a large army, which we must have to make war upon a neighbouring nation, is the most dangerous enemy to republics; large armies have always been the destruction of republics: they would cease fighting at some time or other; and how are they to be disbanded? If they are strong and led by a man of talents—none other would be competent to encounter our enemies—they would not permit themselves to be disbanded: “find me the men and I will find money to pay them,” is said to have been the answer of a distinguished officer to a similar question. What becomes of our republican government, what of our institutions, in that case? Fighting is the ultima ratio; and it ought to be the very last: it is an argument which exhausts, and so produces a temporary cessation of the dispute; but it never convinces, and it leaves behind the germs of future discussions of the same kind; or at least it excites antipathies, resentments, rivalry, and a thousand rancorous sentiments which break out in new aggressions and fresh hostilities, as soon as either nation which has been engaged thinks itself strong enough to recommence a war. Therefore it is infinitely better to prevent the origination, the birth, of such feelings, to anticipate by a prudent and harmonious policy, the possibility of inimical proceedings; instead of relying upon the old method of burning towns, and of putting to death some thousands of our species, in order to persuade the survivors into measures that we wish.

At no period of history down to the present time has there been a perfectly clear opportunity of carrying into effect the pious and truly political principle of peace; because never before has there been an instance of a whole continent inhabited by nations without previous prejudices against one another, without rivalry, and without causes of mutual offence. The spectacle of an entire quarter of the globe in absolute harmony has never before been exhibited; and if this beautiful picture could be perpetuated, human virtue would have gained over human passions a victory, whose reward would be the eternal applause of all the good and great.

Mexico is the most important nation to us in projecting such a system; because, being our next neighbour, there is the most probability of our coming into collision with her; and with her is dissension most to be deprecated. It is with nations as with individuals; if they stand upon punctilio, if they are watchful for any unintentional want of etiquette, they will have abundant causes of discord; but if they are bound together by ties of interest and of close friendship, mutually respecting one another, and mutually attached by sympathy and feeling, neither expecting slights, and neither wishing to elevate its own reputation at the expense of the other, they would not be apt to quarrel; this is the experience of the world, which is and will be pretty much the same at every epoch. That frank and generous intercourse which arises out of respect for our companions and consciousness of meriting theirs, from a consciousness of courage and of strength without a vain glorious desire of exhibiting them (often occasioned by a little internal voice which whispers that they are not so great as they are proclaimed), and the intercourse of a liberal and manly disposition with those whose pretensions to the same characteristics are not disputed, very seldom are broken by the contests which occur between persons of different qualities: when such masculine characters do quarrel, it is generally about some irreconcilable interests, and they are infinitely the most dangerous enemies, as they are the most valuable friends. Nations being only societies of individuals, national characteristics are those of the majority of the most influential of the individuals who compose the society; and therefore almost all arguments which apply to individuals or to individual conduct, are equally applicable, but on a grander scale, to nations at large.

The government of Mexico seems to be now quite as much consolidated as ours was at the same or even a greater distance of time from our declaration of independence: it exhibits all the indications of solidity, and its machinery appears to work with the regularity of a settled establishment. In so new and so extensive a nation, some tumults or some local opposition to the laws are to be expected; but they will

probably be no more than temporary effervescences, to be repressed without much difficulty by the ordinary powers of the police, or at worst by the intervention of a small armed force; they will resemble the circles formed by some falling body upon the surface of a tranquil lake, which subside without disturbing the deep repose of the waters, and we have hardly to fear that tempestuous waves will again be thrown up by passionate hurricanes to threaten the safety of the barque of state. The people are fatigued and exhausted by the long sufferings of the revolutionary contest; the fortunes of their great men are diminished; the number of their leaders is decreased; every thing demands repose; and before the body politic has recovered from the effects of what has passed, and before it has so far forgotten the calamities of civil discord, as to render it liable to fresh excitement, a generation will have elapsed, the measures now adopted for popular instruction will have operated, and the principles of civil liberty, will have been deeply enracinated, will have obtained a maturity which will enable them to defy most of the storms that can assail them. Nor is this calculating too largely upon the intelligence of the Mexican nation; the nation which was susceptible of the school of mines, which has furnished the world with the greater part of its circulating specie, where the desagüe Hucbuctoca was excavated, where the immense labours near Acapulco were executed, where a republic has arisen upon the debris and ashes of a despotic colonial servitude, where the prejudices and antipathies, sedulously cultivated for ages, against the oppressed aborigines have been surmounted, where that too long degraded race has been magnanimously elevated from its prostration, restored to its due consideration among mankind, and raised to the level of a constituent portion of the commonwealth—such a nation, so gallant in war, so generous in peace, calls forth the highest expectations of its destinies, the largest calculations upon its talents and its intelligence.

It is sufficiently evident that until education (in which term are included not merely reading and writing but also information upon the arts of civilization) is more generally extended in Mexico, the higher classes of society, which are

educated or instructed, will be elevated to a distance more removed from the mass of the population than is compatible with the principles of genuine republicanism; for in my opinion the essence of those principles is the elevation of the mass of the people to a level with the rich by diffusing among them equal lights, thus enabling and teaching them to take advantage of the resources of the country; when this diffusion becomes universal in a nation the people will be all nearly as equal as the infirmity of our nature permits; no disparity will then exist, except that which Heaven creates in forming some men without talents enough to profit of instruction or with too much indolence to do so, or finally that which arises from the vicious disposition of bad men. Until instruction becomes general in Mexico the educated men there will have great advantages over those who are destitute of education, and fortune is the apanage of instruction and talent. Those who are rich, and those who belong to rich or to educated families, will naturally desire to increase their fortunes. Without this instinctive desire for acquisition and preservation of property, wisely implanted in our breasts by divine providence, mankind would be little better than the brute creation, indifferent about tomorrow and generally without an impulse for distinction or for improvement of their condition. But this very desire of the rich to retain or to improve their property, and of the instructed to acquire, is an additional guaranty to the stability of the government; they must know from the slightest reflection that their interest imperiously demands public tranquillity for some years, and will of course exert themselves, now that the first tempest of passion is passed, to preserve tranquillity: individual ambition is the only emotion which can at present interfere with the domestic peace; and if there be the amount of intelligence in the nation which I attribute to it, the influential members of the community will interpose to repress it.

Among the incidents which accumulate the guaranties of the stability of the government, the national debt must not be forgotten. The exact amount of it is not accurately known to me, as I hesitate to adopt any data of whose

general correctness I am not satisfied ; in forming that idea I may be mistaken, but I have taken the greatest pains to avoid error. I have no estimates of the present state of the Mexican finances upon which I entirely depend ; the debt however is large*. The security to the government afforded by the debt is a blessing which arises out of an inconvenience. If all the debt were due to the inhabitants, the internal tranquillity would be additionally increased ; but on the other hand that part of it which is owing to foreigners is in fact so much money appropriated to purchasing the interest of their sovereigns in the durability of the Mexican government. If a person has an insurance upon a life, we may be very sure that he will not attempt its destruction, and that he will defend it from the attacks of others. Nor is this position at variance with what has been before advanced, that interest does not alone and exclusively govern the human race. I believe that men are *more* governed by temporary impulses or passion, than by mere interest ; nevertheless when an interest is plain, not contradicted or diverted by an opposite interest, it certainly tends greatly to restrain the impulse of the moment, and to moderate passion. The fears of the creditors of a nation for the safety of their debts is one of the strongest bulwarks of its government ; they will recollect that Frederic the great sequestered the Prussian debt to English merchants in order to retaliate upon England some aggressions upon his commerce, and they will recall to mind several other instances of the sort upon record ; they will fear that if a government be entirely swept away, the power which succeeds it, in order to disentangle itself from a heavy incumbrance, in order to have large funds at its disposal, and in order to acquire that short lived popularity which is created by a pretended economy, will be disposed to question the policy and the validity of the contracts entered into by its predecessors ; they will apprehend the efficacy of the

* Mr Poinsett estimated it in 1822 at sixty-one millions; but large additions to it have been since made, without considering, as we might fairly, the sums invested in the mining establishments by foreign capitalists. See Notes on Mexico, p. 106.

principle that national engagements made by a sovereign de facto are obligatory on the nation under any form of government and under any actual sovereigns. The proof of this is found in the market prices of government stocks, which fluctuate according to every rumour of domestic agitation or of disturbance in foreign relations. Hence the debts of the Mexican government due to its citizens will induce them to oppose any thing which tends to a radical change of system, and what is due to foreigners will secure all their influence over their own rulers to countenance the actual state of things; an influence whose extent will be bounded only by the proportion between the weight of those foreign creditors in their own country, and whatsoever force other persons may have who are interested in an opposite line of conduct. Every additional sum of debt gains an additional adherent to the government. I must not be understood however here to recommend the policy of overwhelming a nation with debt; such an interpretation would be equal to supposing a quart of laudanum is meant when ten drops are prescribed; this is a medicine designed only for cases when the human body is diseased, and debt is an application proper for a nation only when the body politic is in a state requiring extraordinary remedies; neither the one expedient nor the other is to be tampered with, and either is to be avoided, except in extreme cases; but it is the same with respect to debt as medicine, poisons in themselves, a judicious use of them in necessary cases may produce good effects.

So that, upon the whole, I see no reason to anticipate fresh convulsions in Mexico for a considerable time, or at least I do not anticipate any of a very formidable nature; and I consider the government as permanently established as any other of its cast, always excepting the problematical interposition to which I have previously alluded.

Mexico must always possess a great predominance over the Hispano-American states; she was the colony which attracted the greatest attention of the mother country; her viceroyalty was more splendid than the others, was a more striking personification of the metropolitan sovereign; she

added the name of a kingdom to the long roll of the titles of the Spanish monarch; part of the revenue she afforded, went directly to the support of some others of the American possessions of Spain: these things must have an effect upon ancient prejudices; and at present her greatly superior population, revenue, wealth, resources, and strength, must give her a decided ascendancy; so that, if her government be administered with only ordinary prudence, policy, and moderation, her influence over the other cidevant colonies must infallibly be very great. Her example is therefore of vast importance: if she adopts a monarchical form of government, a precedent will be given which will be much respected, and which can scarcely fail to find imitators; if, on the contrary, she adheres to a republican form, it will afford a cogent argument for the liberal in the other Hispano-American countries.

A question of serious consequence to us is, whether Mexico will ever become a great shipping power. That she will be a commercial power of the first order is unquestionable; the soil which produces cocoa, coffee, vanilla, cochineal, dye and furniture woods, sugar, grapes, cerealea, cotton, and vast amounts of the precious metals, which supplies, or is capable of supplying the staples of the tropical regions, as well as those of the most favoured among the temperate climates, can not fail to attract the merchants and the merchandize of the whole world; her silver has constituted by far the largest part of the plate and specie of Europe, and a great deal of that of Asia, since the first discovery of the southern continent, and this article alone would be sufficient to make her the rendezvous of commerce. But will she possess a large amount of commercial shipping, and will she carry for herself? The question can not easily be answered as yet; nor until the radical and wonderful change in her political situation, domestic and external, shall have wrought its inevitable consequences upon the character of her population, and until the effects of so many and of such vast causes be thoroughly developed. During her colonial subjection maritime enterprises were forbidden to her by every restriction which the most watchful jealousy could devise; since the revolution;

she has been constantly occupied in contending for her emancipation, or in arranging her internal affairs; nor has there been time for her previous habits to be altered. Whether her inhabitants ever will have a taste for navigation is doubtful; because the great majority of them reside upon the elevated land, which is remote from the Atlantic. The region which skirts the gulf of Mexico has the reputation of being very sickly, and this reputation appears to be too well founded. It is almost impossible that large towns can exist in a malignant climate, and large towns accessible from the sea are invariably either the causes or the consequences of a great amount of shipping. Besides, it is not easy to conceive how a large number of vessels can be built in sickly regions, because their mere construction necessarily concentrates numerous workmen, and their families. We can not estimate the effects which may be produced by future improvement of the country, cutting down the forests, and agriculture; but these, if they ever take place on the coast, must be the work of ages, for the work cannot be commenced on the sea side; that is the focus of the bad air; it will have to be a gradual progress by working downwards from the inland heights towards the sea; yet every step made from the heights brings the labourer into the infectious district, with the disadvantage that the volume of bad air lies concentrated in, and spreads from, the flat lands and the forests between him and the sea, while he cannot attack the evil in its source without a certainty of loss of health, nor can he attack the outskirts of it without approaching, with some risk, that mass of vapour and of miasmata, whose cause is, to use the expression, inaccessible to him. It might be different if the rivers which make into the gulf were adapted to navigation; but their estuaries, or all that part of them which could otherwise be navigated, lie within the insalubrious district; when they penetrate deeper into the country their beds partake of the elevation which so remarkably distinguishes the interior from the sea bord. If it were not for the climate, Vera Cruz now containing only 6000 or 7000 inhabitants, would be one of the largest cities known; and yet the universal movement

from Tampico to Vera Cruz, after the castle was taken, proves the latter to be the best port on the coast.

It may be said that the produce of the soil and of the mines will enable the Mexicans to buy ships, if there be a difficulty in building them. On the other hand if the ships are owned there they must often lie in port for considerable time, while their crews are liable to all the atmospheric influence, with that danger enhanced by their constitutions having been divorced from their native climate by voyages to northern latitudes, wherein far the greater portion of their commerce is demanded. In short, unless the information we have about the climate be most egregiously incorrect, or unless changes are effected which seem to be forbidden by nature, I do not see how Mexico can be a large ship owner on her Atlantic coast. We are told that the shores on the Pacific bord are more healthy; and from the configuration of the territory a considerable coasting trade must be carried on there, especially after California becomes well settled. The coasting trade is the nurse of maritime enterprise; and the demand for silver in eastern Asia, as well as for several of her staples in the archipelagos of islands near the Asiatic coast, will be a strong inducement for great navigation there; indeed it seems highly probable that Mexico will be able to trade from her western coasts to China, Hindostan, and the islands, with so many advantages, such as cheapness of silver, low price of provisions for crews, saving of distance and time, as well as avoiding the risk of doubling cape Horn or the cape of Good Hope, that she will supplant the European and North American commerce with those countries, becoming herself the great India trader and the entrepot of that trade which will be transported across from the Pacific to the gulf coast, while the rest of the world will go to her to receive teas, silks, and fine muslins. If her inhabitants take an inclination for navigation this will probably be the consequence. The opinion is justifiable that Mexico will be a maritime power on the Pacific, but that her trade with Europe, North America, and all the Atlantic ports, will be carried in the vessels of other nations.

What other nations? What nation will be her chief car-

rier*? This is the all important point. Each nation will participate in the trade; but England has the greatest number of ships, can navigate at least freight, and will strain every sinew to engross it. One of the greatest objects I have in view when advocating the American system, is to enable us to compete with England on this point, and to secure to ourselves a large portion of what promises to be the most lucrative commerce ever known, by conciliating the affection of the people to whom we are connected by a thousand ties of major interest.

After discussing the question whether Mexico will have a large commercial marine, the next desideratum is to ascertain whether she will possess a powerful military marine. If the position be correct that ship yards for merchant vessels can not safely be established on the gulf coast, it follows with double certainty that naval depots, or places of construction, can not be located in this quarter for men of war; because they require much larger congregations of workmen; if the inference be right that the Pacific coast will be the site of her mercantile building yards, it follows that her fleets will be constructed there. But it is not enough that her building position be ascertained; in order to bear upon her relations with the nations which border the Atlantic, she must have some port on this ocean for refuge, for refreshment, and for repair: otherwise, however powerful she may be in the western seas, she will be a zero in the great scale of European and North American maritime politics, as far as force is concerned. Where will that port be? Her relations with Columbia will perhaps afford her such a harbour. If Cuba should cease to belong to an European power a naval station on that island would be much more convenient. The other islands are too small to sustain a population sufficient for defending a post of such importance. Besides a fleet at Cuba would occupy a position analogous to a *tete de pont*

* See Niles' Register, 7th of April 1827, where the whole number of foreign vessels entering her ports is called 641, of which those of the United States are said to be 399.

in army tactics, it would defend a vanguard post, and seal the entrance to the gulf. If a port should be found in our territory of Florida capable of receiving fleets of line of battle ships, that, or the mouth of the Mississippi, would be the next best; and these could not be used by Mexico in time of war, without compromising our neutrality. Her fleets would not only protect herself, but in case of necessity, would be important to the security of our gulf frontier. Therefore intimate relations with her which would authorize our permitting her the use of our harbours would not be advantageous to her alone; we should ourselves derive great advantages from them.

It will be impossible for Mexico to be a great naval power unless she builds her own ships; she may form a nucleus for her future fleets by purchasing vessels abroad at first; but all history shews us that no nation has been formidable at sea, which depended exclusively upon foreigners to supply her with ships. If therefore my data are correct, Mexico cannot be a strong maritime power unless she builds upon the Pacific, and possesses a safe harbour upon the Atlantic; which harbour she must acquire either by intimate connection with another nation, or by conquest. The former is the better alternative; and my hope is that we shall afford it to her, for our own sake, as well as for hers. There are few things more desirable for us than that Mexico should have a strong navy; united to our own, a power would be presented to foreign nations, which they would hesitate to outrage; whereas a long period will elapse before our navy will be numerous enough to cope with that of the great maritime powers of Europe, without alliances with other nations, and conjunction of theirs with our fleet. Mexico will not be a dangerous competitor for us, because of the disadvantage (if what has been said be true) of her centre of maritime strength being on the western ocean; and it will be very long before her navy rivals even the present number of ours.

The next point of view in which Mexico is to be considered, is in respect to manufactures. She is already a great manufacturer: we justly consider our iron works as a most

important branch of our manufacturing interests; but she is a metal manufacturer to a much larger amount; as is evident from her coinage alone, which was in 1809 \$26,172,982 at the mint in the city of Mexico and \$1,500,000 at other mints*; it is better proved by the amount produced from the years 1492 to 1803, which was \$2,028,000,000; of which from 1690 to 1800 \$1,353,452,020†. Can a country, that has worked up such a value in a single article, be supposed an insignificant manufacturer? Again, the value of manufactured tobacco was in 1802 \$7,686,834: the total value of manufactures in the same year is given by the author I quote, who generally appears to have taken the data from baron Humboldt, at eight millions of dollars; although I do not clearly understand how this amount is to be reconciled with the statements of the amounts manufactured in several provinces, nor with the details of wine and brandies of different kinds, nor with the table of exports he gives a few pages previously, most of which necessarily undergo some degree of manufacturing, as even the agricultural produce‡, could not be exported without it; still less do I coincide with him—although I feel it to be a *prima facie* evidence of error to differ from that accomplished gentleman—when he computes the manufactures to have diminished one half in consequence of the war; there can be little doubt of the diminution of the metallic production, but of the others I hesitate. It is much to be regretted that we have not official statements of the actual condition of affairs. The immediate clothing, and other articles of household consumption, for the use of the body of the people in every nation must always be the production of household or village industry; since no nation upon earth could purchase them from abroad, they must be made upon the spot. For example, we imported during the year 1825 \$11,392,264§ worth of woollen cloth, when we had at least eleven millions of inhabitants; now the consumption of

* Notes on Mexico in the Autumn of 1822, pp. 104, 105, by Mr Poinsett.

† Ibid. p. 174 From Humboldt, I believe.

‡ Ibid. pp. 96. 98. 100. 102.

§ Vide Treasury Report.

woollens averages for man, woman, and child, at least five dollars per annum, which will make fifty-five millions value of cloth of one kind or other made of wool: the same reasoning applies to every country and every article, and shews that universally manufactures must exist sufficient for the ordinary wants of the mass of the people, however moderate those wants may be, in consequence of the state of civilization, of their customs, or of the climate. But in every country fashion or caprice will occasion, among the rich and luxurious, some demand for fine articles and foreign productions; and the only way in which we may feel the effect of manufacturing industry in Mexico, is by her making up things which interfere with the sale of those that we prepare for exportation, or which can be sold here at a price less than what we can make them at for our own consumption. I do not see any cause to apprehend either of these contingencies for a long time in any of the manufactures yet established among us: on the contrary, it is so evident as not to require demonstration that Mexico will afford a market for many of the articles we now manufacture: whether we or England are to supply her is a different question, the decision of which I think will depend in great measure upon the course adopted with respect to the grand object towards which the arguments in these pages are directed. The distance that the manufactured articles will have to be carried by land to the sea board will always operate to prevent a rivalry with us, if Mexico shall hereafter be able to manufacture much cotton, wool, or leather, the only items I observe in Mr Poinsett's notes which are likely to be extensively worked upon in both countries. If the accounts we have of the scarcity of fuel in many parts be correct, there will be a difficulty in the establishment of steam works, and it is also said that there are not many scites for water works: if these accounts be true, we can not be competed with in manufacturing, at least for export. But there are so many articles in either country which cannot be procured without great expense in the other, that it is for their mutual interest that both should prosper in those which are appropriate to them, since they would then be better able to procure what they want, by purchase or exchange, and what

can be supplied from the work shops of that one of them which is best able to answer the demand. It is not the actual existence of dead or torpid resources, even of silver, which constitutes the real wealth of a country ; it is the active passing of those resources from hand to hand : it would avail little to a nation that the people should eat off of silver, if they wanted clothing, nor would lots of cloth be of great profit, if they wanted bread ; it is the facility of exchanging the one for the other, the ready sale, and steady demand, which "make a wilderness to blossom like the rose." The United States and Mexico should therefore from interest, as well as from a better feeling, desire the prosperity of one another. I do not, in fine, expect competition between us and Mexico in manufactures, but I anticipate that the increase of the means of either will give an ability to exchange its productions advantageously with the other.

Agriculture occupies the major part of the inhabitants of all America. Will the Mexican agriculture interfere with ours ? We will include the productions of the forest in this, to avoid making another head, for it is quite as germane as stock agriculture to simple cultivation. The productions of the Mexican soil are generally so different from those of our own, that I do not see in them any prospect of rivalry. I believe that she has live oak, and she has mahogany ; these and perhaps some other woods may come into market with our ship timber ; but they will have to be procured within the region of maladies ; and the present price of such timber is so large that our shipping interest at least will not be the worse for an additional supply which will lessen the value of the article ; the quantity of these woods is so limited, they are so difficult of access and of working, that we need not dread too great an influx of them into the market, to injure those who own forests in which they grow. Her other woods are only exported for dyes or furniture ; we do not possess them, except some sarsaparilla, of which we do not supply much. Her vanilla and cochineal are not yet introduced here. She will no doubt be able to grow coffee and sugar for exportation ; the land we have adapted to their culture is circumscribed within narrow bounds. Provisions and

flour will be consumed by her increasing population in a larger ratio than by ours, because she already has more inhabitants to the square league than ourselves, as was shewn above ; if she exports them to Europe, we are nearer to that market by a thousand miles and have more vessels to transport them. She only exported in 1802 \$300,000* ; of flour and of provisions \$100,000. She can never injure our grain market, baron Humboldt to the contrary notwithstanding, although I differ from any remark of his also, however casual, with great reluctance. But it is manifest from what is just said, that she cannot send grain to Europe as cheaply as we do. As to the West Indian islands, how can she compete with us there in these staples ? what can they give her in return ? Not sugar or tropical productions ; she will raise them in such quantity herself that they will be drugs if she brings them home, and, when all the sugar countries come into cultivation, it will not be the policy of her merchants to add to the stock abroad by taking cargoes from the islands to glut the market, when she has so much of her own to sell ; not specie, for she is herself the mother of silver (if I may translate a Spanish term) and the price of the precious metals must be such in her territories that importation of it will be a losing concern. The staples of our country then, will not be interfered with by her in the islands ; she has so many richer productions that she can well dispense with the exportation of grain and provisions, unless to some of the South American states on the Pacific ; the profit awaiting her more important productions will be so much larger that her chief attention will be devoted to them, and they are so different from the articles we raise, that they can create no uneasiness to us. To sum up, the produce of her soil instead of being an impediment to the vent of what is afforded by ours, will rather be a prolific source of commercial prosperity to both, by force of the trade and exchanges it will enable the countries mutually to drive. In peace neither can injure the interests of the other, and the commercial relations must be

* Notes on Mexico, Chap. IX.

fountains of prosperity to both. Her trade with the new southern states will no doubt be considerable, but it is not likely to diminish in a formidable degree their demand for those things with which we are able to supply them, not even for our lumber, grain, or provisions, except on the Pacific coast; and it is very certain that, if those countries are well governed, they will very soon be able to suffice to their own wants in these articles; timber to be sure is not wanting on the Pacific bord, but in Buenos Ayres they will hardly be able to make it grow on the vast plains near the city, and there will of course always be a demand for it in that market; our supplying that demand will depend upon our being able to furnish the article cheaper than it can be brought down the river; but Mexico will find it difficult to compete with us.



CHAPTER IX.

THE gulf of Mexico, that “close sea,” and the Caribbean sea, demand particular attention from us and from all America. An immense commerce is destined to traverse their bosoms, where a very great and rich navigation now exists. The trade of Mexico, of Guatimala, that is of the whole isthmus of Colombia as far as Punta Galera, the extreme point of the island of Trinidad, our own of the Floridan coast of the Mississippi, coasting or foreign, must exist, waver, or cease as those *Western Mediterraneans* are secure or dangerous. An enemy’s fleet in that sea would be ruin to the commerce of all those vast regions. It is true that the inconvenience will be partially, and not more than partially, alleviated, when our wise and splendid projects for uniting the waters of the Mississippi, by means of canals, with those which flow into the Atlantic, are accomplished (if they ever are accom-

plished), and that a palliative for impediments to the trade of Colombia will be found in the egress of part of it through the Rio Orinoco; but these will be poor compensations for the loss of the natural channel for the commerce of such immense regions as circumscribe the gulf and the Caribbean sea.

In order to insure the possession of these seas by the American nations, the constant presence of a strong fleet is indispensably necessary. It is no argument to say that hitherto, since the independence of South America, the danger of foreign force there has not been felt; the political attention of Europe is only just now attracted to the southern part of our continent; the curious, ill judged, expedition of England to the mouth of the Mississippi at the close of the late war is warning enough for ours and the succeeding generations; and the pirates who infested the islands have demonstrated what mischief may be done even by small and desultory forces in that quarter.

The gulf and the Caribbean sea may be well defended by a strong squadron within them, or at one of the islands which compose their Atlantic outline. The passages or entrances between the islands are scarcely any of them entirely free from hazard, and are all of them hazardous for the ingress of a fleet; that entrance which can be made by floating in on the current which enters this immense basin, is the one which demands the most apprehension: but the same current of water or of wind which brings in an inimical fleet, will carry the one stationed to oppose it, beyond reach, if not strong enough to fight in the gorge. When the enemy is in the basin the protecting fleet may either fight, or manœuvre from the eastward so as to impel its antagonist upon the coast of the continent, guarded in some places by rocks and shoals, and in others by the inexpiable climate; or, being acclimated, it may keep the continental side of the basin and drive the enemy towards the islands, where the hazard of action is unreasonable, because in case of disaster it would be hardly possible for any ship, which might be disabled or driven before a superior force, to avoid being carried by the variable winds and currents upon some of the innumerable reefs, shoals, and dangers which encompass the

islands; nor could the sound ships escape without incurring the same risks, as well as others which make the navigation among the complicated passages between the islands objects of anxiety even to single merchantmen, and much more formidable to vessels of great draught, pursued by an enemy.

But these dangers are reciprocal: if the protecting squadrons be defeated, they are exposed to what the assailants would have to encounter. They must fight for it then. The hazard to the defenders would not be so great, however, because they would have the long circle of friendly coast for refuge, and their danger in case of defeat would not be great unless they injudiciously fought to windward and beyond the middle of the gulf or of the Caribbean sea. They should never fight, even with the view of driving the enemy upon the continental shores, unless they were nearer to the continent than to the islands. These must be our grand tactics if we are ever called upon to contend for the mastery of that vast naumachia, in spite of the gallant maxim of our seamen, TO FIGHT WHERE THEY SEE THE FOE. The particular tactique, the details, will one day probably exhibit the most beautiful scene of naval operations, the finest specimens of marine skill and science; in which every talent for manœuvring, and all the daring of courage, will be nerved to the highest exertion. Dangerous passages of entrance to contend for, a fine smooth water within for action, with the site fenced in by shoals and rocks, leaving room enough for the grand evolutions of two large fleets, affording a certainty to the fleet which may conquer of a complete and efficacious victory; these circumstances combined will render a contest for possession of the gulf and the sea one of the most interesting studies that can engage the eye or the meditation of a military man.

If an enemy should obtain possession of the gulf or the sea, his means of annoyance would be unlimited, every port would be ipso facto blockaded, and he might devastate the whole coast; but, if he were beaten, his whole fleet would probably be lost.

I dwell upon this subject in order to communicate my deep impression of its importance, and to shew the necessity of

the presence there of a fleet much larger than we are ourselves as yet able to spare from the force it is indispensable for us to maintain upon our Atlantic coasts, and which I see no means of providing, except by an intimate connection with the other nations of the continent: it is as much for our interest as for theirs, and it is essential to the interests of all, that such a fleet should exist in the gulf of Mexico, and in the Caribbean sea. It will not do to wait for the breaking out of a war and then attempt to get possession; the odds are so largely against a fleet endeavouring to enter in face of an enemy, that the power which is first in possession will probably keep it: therefore the American powers must in common prudence be always in actual and strong possession. The island of Trinidad will be a most important station in such a contest, and should be acquired by the American nations, strongly fortified and occupied, standing as it does at the extreme point of the continent, and covering the gulf of Paria, which should be made the southern rendezvous of the protecting fleet, provided the Dragon's mouth, the channel between Cape Paria and that island, is or can be made passable for men of war*, and provided it be healthy, which is doubted; since it will not escape observation that the game of the protecting fleet is to be harboured in such way as to manœuvre inside, and a little in the van, of the entering force, which is far preferable to the *pis aller* named above of pressing the latter towards the coast of the continent; the currents and the island reefs will be more serviceable auxiliaries when the assailants are pressed outwards; *væ victis* would be more than a mere proverb to them in that case; the chief object should be, keeping as much as possible in the middle of the sea or gulf to force all their fleet into the variable currents, where they must drift at a rapid rate, and to close upon them and fight only when they are off some of the reefs; if they are able to get into the middle of either, we have nothing left but to make for the bottom of the gulf or of the sea, or if there be any equality of force to have a

* It is passable no doubt.

fair battle for it, ship to ship, and gun for gun. The gulf of Maracaibo should probably be the middle rendezvous, and a port in our territory the most northern, if Cuba continue in her present political situation. We may talk of peace and safety, but our southern frontier, and whatever is covered by it, as well as the whole basin of the Mississippi, can neither have peace nor safety if an enemy to this country rides at large in the seas bounded by the islands: there is a proximity of combustible materials in that quarter which are too full of hazard for us to permit our coast to be approached by a foe. This is a delicate point I know, but the whole of my theme is of the deepest import to the United States, however illy it may be here discussed; and the truth had better be whispered now, at the moment when a safeguard against evils is proposed, than thundered forth in an hour of peril when precautions are to be synchronitic with the approach of their exciting causes. I do not however apprehend any thing like permanent conquest, by an enemy in consequence of an excitement of the kind to which I allude, I place too much confidence in the stalwart bravery and the vigour of our citizens to fear conquest, or permanent possession of territory, or lasting change from those causes in the condition of those citizens who inhabit the part of the country spoken of. But great disasters and individual distress may arise from thence; and to prevent these I would "hang out the banners on the outward wall"; I would have the access to our coast on the gulf forbidden to an enemy. In order to maintain possession of the gulf and the Caribbean seas, their circumference must, in my opinion, be possessed by nations in close amity with one another; and the basin of the gulf itself must be occupied by a fleet strong enough to drive out whatever power may attempt to enter it. That fleet can at present be furnished only by a union of the squadrons of the nations whose dominions form the coasts. The enemy I apprehend will not be American; the power of the nations of this continent will shortly be too equally balanced for any of them to be able to domineer in the gulf; and their means of retaliation are too great to allow any one to meditate annoyance to the others in so delicate a point.

CHAPTER. X.

IN considering the importance of the gulf of Mexico, and of the Caribbean sea, and the mode of defending them, our attention is naturally directed towards the islands, and especially to Cuba.

Human vision is not strong enough to penetrate the obscurity of the future destiny of the West Indies. If the islands were large enough to support a large population, or if there were unity, or even sympathy of sentiment, language, or principle, among their inhabitants, sufficient to induce them to coalesce, they might at some distant day become independent, and compose a powerful state of the second order; maintaining and protecting their existence as a people by means of a large navy, for which the richness of their productions, the extensive commerce they might possess, and the number of the population they might contain, would afford ample resources: there are many circumstances which would tend to qualify them for such a system, if the character of their inhabitants were different from what it actually is. But it is in vain to speculate upon what might be the result of circumstances which do not exist. The islands are inhabited by proprietors who have emigrated (or are descendants of emigrants) from countries as different from each other in dispositions, inclinations, and character, as they are distant in position on the globe; and however these dissimilarities may have been lessened, or even run into a common type of general uniformity, by the influence of a common climate, by the identity of their occupations, pursuits, or

habits, and by the changes of sovereigns, which most of them have undergone, there still remains the fundamental principle of different origins, and especially the aversion, or, to express it more moderately, the disconnection of feeling, which constitutes the individuality of nations, and which has never in history been subverted, except by conquest, or by the application of power equivalent to conquest—even then it has endured for ages in spite of amalgamation by community of government and of general interests.

These proprietors form but a small minority of the population of the islands* : the great bulk of the inhabitants are of the servile class, of a different race of the human family, kept in subjection by the presence and exercise of an armed force. The pride, the interest, and the prejudices of the one class, with the desire of equality and the characteristics of the other, render any idea of a fraternal concord, sufficient to constitute a nation, almost an absurdity. The masters cannot even occupy the position of that soldiery which originally acquired the dominion in Europe, which has been discussed at some length heretofore ; there was not the same dissimilarity, not the constitutional antipathy, between the blue eyed Gauls and the dark haired Franks, nor between the Norman and Saxon, as between the white man and the negro : the subjugated countries were possessed by men of the same denomination as the subdued in the roll of mankind ; there were therefore no insurmountable obstacles to their incorporation into the same social compact. It is vain to contend with the prejudices of the world, however benevolent or utopian may be the ideas of some abstract reasoners ; but the white and the black races can never be amalgamated, the prejudices are too deeply rooted, and seem to be implanted in our very natures ; nor do I know that it would be better for either race to eradicate those prejudices. Humanity dictates that the disparity should be rendered as little offensive as possible, and that the superiority of the complexion which has the ascendancy should not be exercised in acts of oppression, still less of cruelty ; but the difference

* As one to five.—Humboldt, Vol. VI. Part II. p. 833.

does actually exist in the nature of things, and it will exist, in spite of cant, or of argument, which is much more effectual. If it were not for the total distinction of the two races, the violent opposition of the two colours, which interpose a barrier (whose subversion certainly would cause a blush in the great majority of the white race) to the commingling of the bloods, there would not be so wide a difference between the state of civil society in the islands and that which subsisted in Europe in the periods immediately following the conquests of the several countries of that continent; there is not very great difference between the actual condition of the negro slave and the pristine state of the serfs, villains, and franklins of Europe, although some, or at least one, of the countries where the bulk of the population was composed of these classes, do make such a clamour about the modern imitations of their ancient customs. The same antipathy, or proud superiority, which was entertained by the Franks towards the Gauls, by the Normans towards the Saxons, the Moors towards the Spaniards, and by these last towards the Moors, when they recovered the dominion of their natal soil, the same sentiments, natural to the conquerors towards their captives, were entertained, now are felt by the white masters towards their negro slaves. But as there did not exist such strongly delineated traces of demarkation between the conquerors and the subdued in Europe, as between the white man and the black, the prejudices were not so inexpiable, the repugnances were not so violent, nor was the inequality so irreparable. In this case, until the sentiments and prejudice of the world shall undergo an entire revolution, the anticipation of which is not authorized by any appearances or by any sound reasoning, there can never exist a mediate condition between the complete subjugation of the blacks, and the expulsion or destruction of the whites in the West Indies, nay in any country where such an adverse population is found. I know how little these positions will be relished by some persons in this country, the only one whose approbation of what I write is essential to me; but I cannot fawn for popularity, nor can I gild and sweeten phrases, when subjects are treated upon which relate

to the future destinies of a vast continent, and above all of my native land ; I write what I believe to be political truths ; if they are disapproved, I have only to regret that the truth is unpalatable ; and I have yet to learn that the enlightened and reasoning citizens of the United States will censure the expression of what is believed to be truth, when it is not done in an offensive manner, without imputing improper motives to those whose opinions are different, and without disputing the right of every man to entertain his own sentiments ; a right which I concede as freely to others as I claim it for myself.

The causes of the permanency of the colonial state of the West Indian islands are, the national divisions according to the several origins of the inhabitants of the islands, acknowledged however to be much modified by circumstances and past events and to be of itself alone an insufficient reason for their not being expected to unite into a confederated or consolidated independent nation ; and the peculiar character of the mass of their population, which we cannot hope will be blended into identity with the portion which rules, and which possesses the education, the talent, and the arms ; without which identity, compounded of feeling and interest, a nation cannot be constituted. Perhaps even these causes would not perpetuate their colonial condition, if the white inhabitants possessed great vigour and activity of mind and body ; in this case, reinforcing their numerical strength by connecting with themselves the interests, the pride, and the sympathy of the coloured or mulatto part of the population, and thus forming a middle class in society, they might be able to place themselves more nearly in the condition of the European nations in former ages. But the debilitating influence of slavery upon the character of the islanders, vastly enhanced by the effect of a voluptuous climate, seems to forbid the conception of a plan which would require a development and constant exercise of the strongest energies of the mind, and also an exercise of great bodily activity. Important indeed, in commerce, politics, and the general affairs of the world, would be an insular nation composed of the West Indian islands, with a strong navy, and a large

army occupying their numerous strong holds. Some data whereon to found reflections on this subject appear in the note*, in which I have placed a summary of the statistics of the West Indies as given by baron Humboldt, one of the most laborious and intelligent of modern writers: it is probable that, as M. De Humboldt himself states, the calculations may be only approximative; but this is all that can be expected in political economy; and when nations are counted, a few thousands more or less do not affect the general deductions from the data.

There is one contingency under which an insular nation might be created in these regions. It is that of one or more of the most powerful nations of Europe, or of America, adopting the plan of forming the new nation, and constituting itself, or themselves, the protector of the new born empire, as in the instance of the Ionian isles, or resembling the former state of colonial America. Some recent examples in Europe do not make this idea seem so visionary as it would have appeared fifty years ago. If such an event should happen, it is possible, that, after having been accustomed to a modified self government for a half century, secured from foreign violence and domestic insurrection by the assistance of the protecting power, the relations between the islands, and among the different classes of the inhabitants, might be cemented into a national consistency, and they might be qualified to take the forces of empire into the hands of their own government; such would certainly be the ultimate destiny of the new nation, as it has been of every people separated by distance from its metropolitan government—excepting always the possibility of a new dis-

* The whole surface of the Archipelago of the West Indies contains nearly 8300 square leagues, 20 to a degree, or 74,700 square miles. Total population 2,843,000; of which, whites, 482,600, or 17 per cent. Black and some mulatto slaves, 1,147,500, or 40 per cent. Free men of colour, mulattoes, and blacks, 1,212,900, or 43 per cent.; of the slaves the mulattoes are taken to be one-twentieth. Cuba, 700,000 souls, of which 256,000 are slaves. Haïty, 820,000. Jamaica, 402,000, of which 342,000 are slaves.—Humboldt's Personal Narrative, Vol. VI. Part II. English translation, 1826, (calculations brought down to 1824), pp. 818. 834.

memberment by conquest. To this idea (which has never met my eye before) is to be objected; first, that it has not yet been broached in any country, as I believe; secondly, that few governments are generous enough to assist in the creation of a new people, merely from a desire to obtain the glory of adding a member to the great family of nations; and thirdly, that the design would be opposed by the sovereigns who own the several colonies, as well as by those who would be jealous either of the power which must thence accrue to the protecting power, or of the glory to be acquired by such an act of magnanimity. At least, all things seem to indicate that the islands will remain colonies, owned by their present possessors, or by powers who will hereafter conquer only to bring them under their own yoke. No nation will take the trouble of fighting them free, and the discordant nature of their population will prevent their doing it for themselves: and of course all precautionary measures should be taken by the two Americas with an expectation of the permanency of the present condition of the islands.

The existence of negro slavery, in a country where the blacks are numerous, is a thing not to be temporized with, to be alleviated, nor to be got rid of, by any contrivance as yet devised. The colours cannot be blended: the mixture of them only creates a new caste, which does not belong to either colour, with the bravery and fierceness of the white race before it was mollified by the effect of climate, with its intelligence and talent, and with the capability of enduring the climate which characterizes the black. This caste is the great implement in hands of the ascendant race for repressing any attempts of the slaves to acquire a superiority, for which nature never intended them, if we may judge by their condition and history in the countries whence they were originally brought, or by what we have seen of them with our own eyes in the countries where they now are. We have seen nations of tawny men formidable to the whites, and distinguished in the arts; but we have no example of a black nation being distinguished for any thing but their barbarism: they are slaves in their own land as much as they are elsewhere, and slaves there to barbarians of their own

colour. If the mulatto race were any where to attempt to overpower the whites, a rancorous hostility against the mulattoes would be found among the negroes, by means of which, with any reasonable policy, such an attempt might be repressed; and in this case the negroes would fight better, because the similarity of their origin and of their colour would preclude the natural sense of inferiority which they feel towards the whites, and which will always give the latter a decided superiority in the field, unless enormously outnumbered. Thus, by means of the antipathy subsisting between the two colours, the white race, with any prudence, will always retain the mastery.

As the condition of a country wherein there are many blacks cannot be altered, there is no medium between slavery and extermination; for if the slaves be set free they compose a miserable, idle, volatile, dangerous, and worthless population, as we have seen not only in the United States, but also in their boasted Haïty. There does not appear to be danger of a successful insurrection of the blacks in any country where they are not many fold the number of the whites; nor even where this is the case, if the whites are not imprudent to the highest degree: by a slight attention to management, they may keep up the antipathy between the mulattoes and blacks, and use them mutually to keep down one another. There is only one event in which an imminent peril can occur; it is in case another nation, forgetting every law of nature and of religion, shall furnish arms to the slaves, with white or educated mulatto leaders to head them; this crime of which some of the colonists accuse an enlightened nation, ought to be punished by putting any government capable of it, out of the pale of national law; it should be placed on the footing of piracy by consent of all civilized countries, and instant death should be inflicted upon every person detected in attempting it. The greatest misfortunes of inhabitants of the islands particularly, and of all people who own slaves, are the enervation and luxury produced by the condition itself of slave holding, by their riches, and by the climate. If the chivalric habits and propensities of the early age of Europe, when the body was nerved by martial exercises, could be

introduced among slave holders, they would be safe; for experience teaches us that the white race is sure of conquering in battle vastly superior numbers of blacks, and even of coloured men if these are not commanded by whites; Hindostan affords proofs enough of the fact. The colonists ought to rely chiefly upon themselves, maintaining a military organization ready for instant concentration and action. A strong force of regular and standing troops, with the possession of well constructed fortresses, incapable of capture but by regular sieges conducted according to the rules of art, are also necessary; with these and a military organization, as well as a martial spirit among themselves, the slave owners would always be safe; although they may be liable to partial insurrections and violence more like offences against the police than formidable civil wars. But the unpardonable offence against the whole white race, from which, if persisted in, the worst imaginable consequences must be anticipated, is the arming and disciplining the blacks. One nation has done this to a considerable extent as is before intimated. It is all very well to exclaim against negro slavery, although how to get rid of it where slaves are numerous is a question not to be answered; no man who has common humanity can extenuate cruelty towards them, but he who, under pretence of compassionating them and of fine feelings, should kindle the volcanic flames of servile wars against his own colour or his own countrymen, would deserve the most severe punishment, and would merit the concentrated execration of the world. He must want common sense, and is utterly destitute of the humanity which he pretends, who would provoke and exercise cruelty towards the whites, under the false colour of compassion for the blacks. The wretch, who unchains tygers and turns them loose upon a populous city, is kind, benevolent, humane, in comparison to him, accursed of his race and abandoned by a just God, who would set the poor uncultivated slave at his master's throat; the horror, ravage, slaughter, and devastation, consequent upon such an atrocity has had no parallel—let St Domingo bear witness.

Although I do not believe that with proper precautions

the whites of the islands could be subdued by the blacks, yet no one can answer for the consequences of first educating and rousing all the higher passions in the breasts of some blacks and especially of the mulattoes, who are scarcely inferior to ourselves in talents and courage, and who, by the unfortunate effects of unbridled luxury and the partiality of their white parents, are likely to be employed in the islands in posts of trust and to be the most carefully educated, and then embodying these blacks and mulattoes into armies and carefully disciplining them: some Spartacus will be found among them, who will scoff at the feeble, the paltry; expedient of setting white officers to command them. The first law of safety is to keep arms out of the hands of the blacks, or of any population which it is necessary to keep down, and to prevent their acquiring a familiarity with the use of arms; the second is, to prevent the formation of a nucleus whereupon an insurrection may form, and which may bear the first brunt of attack in case of insurrection. But the fearful plan of raising black troops, destroys both precautions; they are familiarized with arms, and they are the centres round which the numerical force of their own colour may rally; besides, they are, and must necessarily be, cantoned, quartered, or garrisoned in the strong holds and fortresses: if they get possession of these, arms, stores, and all, the affair would be decided at once. Let it not delude any one that hitherto the black troops in those countries have been faithful; the hour has not arrived, their leader, their Spartacus, has not appeared. Of all the fatal, of all the detestable, measures of modern policy, this is the very worst; it is a cruelty, a barbarity, of the most direful aspect; the worse, because those who originated and who persevere in it are far removed from its dangers, to which one could be almost reconciled if they were exposed to the hazard; but it is not they, it is the colonists, who are thus laid open to every evil of which our nature is susceptible; upon their devoted heads will the tornado burst, while the men, the nation, and the government, which have prepared these horrors, are safe, remote, and indifferent spectators of the catastrophes which they have prepared. If black troops

must be levied, they ought to be removed instantly after their enrolment to Europe, where they will be innocuous, and replaced in the islands by white troops.

In considering the relations of the West Indies, Cuba is of sufficient importance to demand special observation. The first and most urgent point to discuss in regard to this island, is, whether it can or will be separately independent. I doubt its occupying this position. Cuba and Porto Rico have a superficies of 4430 square leagues according to Humboldt* who has deviated from his usual critical accuracy in not giving the separate measurement of each, but Porto Rico does not enter into my consideration, as Haïty interposes, to which in case of dismemberment, it is more likely to belong. Cuba contains 700,000 souls according to this author, of which 256,000 are slaves, upon a superficies, according to my assumption, of 38,000 square miles. Now this population may double in about twenty-five years : but suppose there will be more than a million and a half of inhabitants, the ratio of population, would be three hundred and fifty-five and ten thirty-eighths souls to the square league, or thirty-nine and eighteen thirty-eighths to the square mile ; prolific as is the soil, it cannot be expected to produce aliment for a greater number than the relative population of France which is 1178 to the square league†, and to support them, the ground now occupied by plantations of the articles which constitute her riches, must then be converted into fields for cultivation of mere food ; of course diminishing her wealth and the sources of her public revenue : as to manufactures on a large scale for exportation,

* Vol. I. Part I. p. 127. This number of square leagues equals 39,870 square miles. There is a curious discrepancy in the estimates of the area of these islands : Rees's Cyclopædia gives for Cuba 38,400 square miles ; Darby's Edition of Brooks's Gazetteer, ed. 1823, 42,000 square miles for Cuba, and calls Porto Rico 100 by 50 miles ; Morse's Universal Geography, 54,000 square miles for Cuba, and 4140 for Porto Rico ; Melish's Geographical Description of the United States and the contiguous countries, ed. 1822, calls Cuba 54,000 square miles, and Porto Rico 4000. All calculations of the area of countries are merely approximation ; therefore I assume the content of Cuba in the text as sufficiently correct for so general a treatise.

† Humboldt, ut ante, Vol. VI. Part I. p. 197.

they can not be expected from an island under so hot a sun; and a very long period must elapse before such a population as that last named, or any thing like it, can exist, if it ever can. If Haïty should be cited to contradict the idea that Cuba is neither large enough, nor susceptible of population enough, to be entirely independent, I have only to reply that Haïty holds her independence at the mere will of the great powers, and may be conquered in any six months by the first that shall undertake the task and can surmount the jealousy of rival sovereigns: if the 24,000 men sent out formerly by France for this purpose were not sufficient, 50,000 would do the business; and if such a body would be difficult to transport at once, they might be concentrated upon one of the other islands by successive embarkations. The stability of Haïtian independence would not be worth six months' purchase if either England or France were to attempt seriously the subjugation of her inefficient population.

A society of a million and a half of souls is not large enough to constitute a separate nation as the politics of the world stand: the example of the Scots, as brave, high minded, industrious, and intelligent, a people as the sun ever shone upon, is before our eyes, as proof of this position.

But Cuba may easily form a confederated state with either of her powerful neighbours, the United States or Colombia; she might do so with Mexico, but that she is almost too distant: she so nearly touches the others that she would naturally be attached to one of them. The objection to such an union, strengthening and protecting both parties, will be found only in the jealousy of the European sovereigns, in their desire to prevent a coalition which would irretrievably seal the gulf of Mexico against any hostile invasion, and in their apprehension for the effect of an example of the kind, if they were to allow Spain to be deprived, either by conquest or by purchase, of so important a colony. This however is the destiny of Cuba, and probably at no distant day. Then will appear whether the above motives will be strong enough to counterbalance the jealousy which the powers of

Europe will feel towards each other in relation to any of them interfering in American affairs.

It is in vain to use any circumlocution upon this subject—Cuba must be adopted into the great American family. If we could calculate with any reasonable certainty upon that island remaining in the possession of a power too weak to make use of it as a point whence to attack us or the other nations of this continent, and yet just strong enough to maintain her dominion over it, or rather if we could suppose the power of the sovereign of the island sufficient to prevent any other European nation from getting it out of his hands, and yet not so strong as to prevent America from taking possession of it whenever we please—if we could suppose a thing impossible and absurd in itself, then we might regard Cuba with indifference. But as such an idea is absurd, we can not, and we ought not, to forget for an instant that Cuba is the hermetical seal to the mouth of the gulf, and that she stretches out a long flank of coast to that sea whose freedom and safety are indispensable to Colombia, and to our own trade with the great regions which form its continental outline. The gulf could not be entered if Cuba were occupied by a strong naval power at variance with the nations whose territories circumscribe it; nor could the sea south of her be then navigated, with any security. Therefore Cuba must not pass out of the possession of Spain into that of any other European power; and as Spain is not strong enough to keep it, the island must be united to the American system. When she is united to that policy the gulf will be safe, for the grand rendezvous of the defensive fleets will be on her coasts, with a perfectly free option of contending for the entrances into the gulf and into the sea south of her, or of fighting within them with friendly ports on all sides. This language may be called bold, if the whole theme upon which I write were not the vital interests of my own country and of all America; it might even be termed rash, were it not best to declare the whole truth to those for whom alone I write, however appalling it may be.

The question immediately occurs, how is America to obtain Cuba, not with the design of perpetuating her colonial

state, but of making her part of ourselves, a confederated state or nation. I will not speak of the *ultima ratio regum*, although a point of so much importance is worth the cost and the peril of war; but it is to be hoped that milder measures may obtain the same result. Spain will have to abandon in a short time her inveterate obstinacy respecting her late colonies; they are lost to her for ever; and the sooner she submits to the inflexible decrees of fate, the greater will be her prospect of sharing with the rest of the world in the advantages of commercial relations with the new and rich countries whose trade is now thrown open to competition. She is at present overwhelmed with public debt; and, if she is wise, Cuba may be purchased from her at a price which will relieve her of a considerable part of her burthens, or which at least will give her some instant relief. To this plan the other powers of Europe ought not to oppose any objections; because it cannot be for their well understood interest that the countries, from which they will derive vast resources, and with which they will have have an incalculable amount of trade, should be kept in a state of alarm and of war: while such a state of things exists, the late colonies cannot devote themselves fully to the production of the means of purchasing what Europe is prepared to supply to them; of course every hour of delay is an injury to the subjects of the only powers whose opposition is to be apprehended, or whose objections can be made good by force. They must also be convinced, by this time, of the truth of what has been so often stated by their politicians, that Spain will never occupy herself in increasing her internal resources so as to become an efficient member of the European system, which is necessary to their beau ideal of a balance of power, until she is completely weaned from the delusions of her colonial dreams, and from the consequent desultory and impotent condition to which she is reduced. They are therefore directly interested, even in order to strengthen the great features of European policy, in advocating, instead of opposing, a cession of Cuba.

But what are these arguments? They are to shew that

wise men, good men (these are convertible terms) or generous men, would take pleasure in seeing a continent placed in a position which would insure its safety and peace, while an ample field would be opened for the exercise of all the grander human passions within its shores. Love of glory would find unbounded scope for action in the wide range presented by the numerous nations, now in the earliest stage of their youth: and where is there a glory comparable to that of improving society and of adding to the happiness of our species—so blest a glory—whose holocaust is the homage of hearts? Ambition, or desire of governing, will be, or ought to be, a desire of governing under the will and according to the inclination of the citizens of a country. Ambition for the fame of strengthening and consolidating the power civil or military of a nation, has almost boundless opportunity for exercise in the new states—all the grand emotions in their best dictates, regulated by public will, and directed to public good, not those which lead men to sacrifice their species to bloody and devastating personal triumphs—all will have, in the consolidated interests of the continent, abundant field for their display and their exercise; they will have sufficient employment at home to prevent their seeking it across the sea; they will make their own land powerful enough to resist foreign aggression, but the distances are too great for them to think of, and every other reason will dictate to them to abstain from, aggressions on Europe; indeed the strength of the countries will be required to support the fabric of their own system, without any to spare for foreign outrage; their strength applicable to foreign powers will only be that of resistance to attack. To these ought to be added the wish that the country, which would, at a first and contracted view, appear to suffer injury by the loss of a colony, should by this loss of an excrescence be obliged to turn her undivided attention to her domestic situation, and thus recover her station in the great family of nations, and re-establish the prosperity and happiness of her people.

Such ideas as these would govern, if statesmen were truly

wise ; but ours is not the golden age, and we must take men as we find them : history shews us by precedent what we are to expect ; passions of a thousand different shades, and interests of collective bodies and orders, or of mere individuals, will continue to govern the world. Therefore, some powers will be jealous of the rising importance of America, forgetting the living example before their eyes, in which they see that all Europe, and especially the country which was said fifty years since to have lost the brightest jewel in her diadem, has derived ten fold the wealth to individuals and ten fold the revenue to her government by her intercourse with the United States that she ever obtained from them while they were her colonies. They will suppose then, that, if Spain is to part with Cuba, they might as well succeed her in possession of it ; and they will oppose the accession of that island to the American system. But opposition to the contrary notwithstanding, Cuba must belong to America, and she will be amalgamated before many years expire. It may cost a war ; although, if Europe sees her own interest clearly, she will not resort to such an extremity. War or not war, Cuba must be American ; the interest and the welfare of a continent demand it.

Let me for a moment collate some facts. At the congress of Panama were assembled the most powerful of the Hispano-American states ; certain treaties were concluded there, of which an outline was published ; and certain secret articles or treaties were also made. The proceedings appear to have been of two great importance to be entrusted to common messengers ; this is a fair inference, for one of the ministers of each party carried them home to their respective governments. England was represented at the congress, or at least she had a commissioner on the spot ; and judging from her course of diplomacy, she must have penetrated the secret of the private articles. The United States were not represented then, in consequence of the death of one of the envoys, and the absence of the other in consequence of nobody knows what. The effect of the United States not being represented at the congress, however, has been that we

could not know the nature of the secret conventions; at any rate we could not know them with the same certainty that the English government does; we must therefore infer their tenor from circumstances.

A report was universally prevalent for some time preceding the congress, which seemed to be countenanced by various expressions of public documents of the Hispano-American governments, and which was corroborated by the evident and natural interest of those states; the rumour was, that an invasion of Cuba would be made by the confederated forces of the new states. Our own president gave credence and currency to the idea, by stating as one of his motives for sending commissioners to the congress, that he wished to influence the parties to abstain from such a design. The absence of any representative of the United States, after the violent discussions last winter upon the subject, certainly afforded to the congress at Panama a pretext, and no slight grounds for a real belief, that we were not very much in earnest about any of the objects that were talked of as being intended by us: therefore, after waiting a most unreasonable time, the conferences were opened, and various treaties concluded, among which were the secret conventions. Previously, and during at the time the congress was assembling, several movements, directed towards the coast, took place among the troops of the parties, which all the world said were preparatory to the invasion of Cuba; and what all the world says, although it may be mistaken in details, has always some foundation in fact. These movements were suspended, for which the reasons are perfectly manifest, they were the disturbances in Lima, and in Venezuela. At a distance we only hear of such things after they break out*; but a watchful government on the spot sees the germs

* The dates are as follows: the first explosion in Venezuela was at Valencia on the 30th of April 1826; Paez's first proclamation, on the 3d of May: the conspiracy in Peru, in which admiral Guisse and general Necochea were implicated, was discovered on the 28th July: and the disturbances in Guatemala broke out in June: and those in the southern part of Mexico appeared nearly at the same time. If these conspiracies had not a common origin, they exhibit the most remarkable coincidence in history.

when they only begin to sprout : this accounts for the suspension of the movements of the troops before most of us in this country were informed of the approaching uneasiness. It even appears possible that the squadron sent round by Chili, which must have sailed from the shore of the Pacific at nearly the period when the other military movements began, was intended as much to serve for an accessory to the grand design as for an augmentation of the force of Buenos Ayres. Isolated facts, when brought together, assume a marked significancy. Spain is indebted to England many millions, and has been pressed more than once to arrange this debt ; not long ago, at about the time when the invasion of Cuba was most talked of, it was said that England threatened to pay herself, if Spain did not meet her demands : almost concurrently with this report came out another, that Spain was about to commit for a time the custody of Cuba to one of the great European powers, and France was indicated as being the one intended. Spain however was very soon said to be making great exertions to reinforce Cuba ; troops and ships actually came out. As soon as the congress of Panama adjourned, with the view of meeting at Tacubaya, Mr Dawkins the British envoy sailed for England : there was just time for him to arrive to make his communications, for the cabinet to determine upon its course, and for the intelligence to reach us, when another report, which has been current within a few days of my writing this sentence, reaches us, that England is about to take possession of Cuba. While all these transactions are on foot, England betrays more and more jealousy of our relations with the colonies ; exhibiting it in the negotiations now broken off, with respect to her own possessions ; and now it appears that our affairs with her are in a very ticklish posture ; this appears not only by the communications to congress, and by her recent proclamation, but also by her presses which seem to be trying to excite the feelings of her people against us by the revival of almost forgotten subjects of discussion, by the acrimonious censure of our proceedings in regard to some of the yet unexecuted articles of our treaties with her, and by exclaiming against

our general conduct as well as the designs they attribute to us*. All these reports are familiar to the whole community and have run the rounds of our gazettes; I am not one of those political "quid nuncs" who see cause of alarm in every idle rumour, nor do I fancy that the above have been perfectly correct in all their details: but as state secrets almost always break out, as the enumerated reports have obtained universal currency, and as they have a remarkable coincidence, not only with each other, but also with those things which we know to be facts from official documents or publications, I am led irresistably to the conclusion that there have been, or do exist, some considerable grounds for them, that the matters to which they refer have been seriously discussed in high quarters, and that various projects of similar nature have been entertained, particularly in Spain and in England, for the purpose of preventing Cuba from being united to the American system, and for either preserving her in her present condition, or for placing her in the hands of a power better able than Spain to defend the possession; finally, I infer that it is a settled determination abroad that Cuba shall still be European, and that the mouth of the Mexican gulf shall continue to be guarded against American interests; the coincidence of so many facts and reports, which do not strike one until they are brought together into one view, oblige my mind to come to such conclusions. It is almost certain that Cuba will have to be fought for some day or other; but it will be a curious event if the contest arrives so soon, and with a power to which she does not belong.

Does there exist any where a desire to monopolize the West Indian islands? The Dutch, Danish, and Swedish islands contain a population of 84,500 souls, of which 61,300 are slaves; viz. St Eustache and Saba, St Martin, Curacoa, St Croix, St Thomas, St John, St Bartholomew; the French islands 219,000; of which 178,000 slaves, viz. Guadeloupe and its dependencies St Maria Galante, La Desiderade, and part of St Martin's and Martinique; the Spanish islands

* This section was written in December.

943,000, of which 281,400 slaves, viz. Cuba and Porto Rico, Marguerita which is included by Humboldt in these numbers now is Colombian and has 15,000 inhabitants*; the English islands 776,500, of which 626,800 slaves, viz. Jamaica, Barbadoes, Antigua, St Kitts, Nevis, Grenada, St Vincent, and the Grenadines, Dominica, Montzerat, the Virgin isles, Anegada, Virgin Gorda, and Tortola, Tobago, Anguilla, and Barbuda, Trinidad, St Lucie, the Bahama islands: the anomaly Haïty containing 820,000, of which 30,000 are whites†. This list I think answers the question.

If the islands are to be absorbed by an overweening power, the necessity of adding Cuba to the American system is becoming doubly imperious; Trinidad ought also to be attached, in order to complete the defence of the gulf and the Caribbean sea.



CHAPTER XI.

FROM the West Indies let us return to South America.

So little is known in this country with certainty or in detail about Guatemala, or the republic of central America, that I cannot pretend to speculate in relation to it. All I will say is, that their condition, their form of government, institutions, and future destiny, must be materially influenced by the attitudes of Mexico and of Colombia. The government of Guatemala will no doubt surmount its present difficulties, and the state of society is not more irregular than is to be expected in a country whose independence is so new.

* Noticia sobre la Geografia Politica de Colombia, p. 16.

† I refer again to Humboldt, Vol. VI. Part II.

The utmost population which I have seen assigned to this confederation is 1,800,000; but it appears to be probable that it does not much exceed 1,200,000: placed between Mexico and Colombia there can be little doubt of the inclination of the government and inhabitants, as there is none of her interest and of her destiny, to be united to the general system of America.



CHAPTER XII.

COLOMBIA, in 1823, contained 2,785,000 souls, equal to thirty to the square league, or more probably 2,900,000*; at this date it is likely that the population is above 3,000,000; the *Exposicion que el Secretario de Estado del despacho del interior, &c.* to the congress of 1826, p. 15, speaks of the population at 3,000,000†. The population of Venezuela was, in 1822, 785,000‡, or twenty-three souls to the square league. Of the total of 2,785,000, Humboldt calculates the whites to be only 642,000, the Indians 720,000, and the mixed races 1,256,000; the blacks he does not specifically distinguish, but from the above numbers they would be 167,000; and yet he assigns only 387,000 to the whole of continental Spanish America§. I am obliged to doubt the exact accuracy of these calculations, again protesting that I almost feel

* Humboldt, Vol. VI. Part I. p. 127.

† But by *Noticia sobre la Geografia Politica de Colombia, &c.* ed. Bogota, 1825, pp. 3. 47. the population is given at 2,700,000 souls, equal to 29 per square league.

‡ There is a singular discrepancy between Humboldt and the *Noticia sobre la Geografia*, on this enumeration. See note in page 104.

§ Humboldt, Part II. pp. 835, 836.

myself wrong whenever I differ from him. He estimates the area of the territory of the republic at 91,952 square marine leagues, of which Venezuela 33,701*.

This vast republic, whose territory is equal to much more than the half of the entire territory of the United States, to more than one and a third times that of Mexico, and whose population is more than half the average of ours per square league, abounding in or capable of yielding every commodity which can make a nation rich, with a long extent of sea coast, is certainly destined to occupy a distinguished position in the human family. The character of its inhabitants, or at least of that portion of them which appears to possess, and which no doubt will retain, the ascendancy, the whites, seems to be marked with as strong features as any of the Hispano-American people; the whole course of the revolutionary contest among them, and even the effervescences which have taken place in the country, corroborate this idea; and for some time past it has attracted the largest share of public attention: it has also taken the lead in the most important question that ever occupied America and the world; no slight proof this of the vigour of Colombian intellect, that it should have emanated from the gigantic mind of one great man born on her soil, who is not contented with having hewn out her independence with his sword at the head of her brave citizens, but who extends his magnificent ambition to the permanent establishment of her prosperity.

The greater part of the political considerations which were dwelt upon in speaking of Mexico, apply to Colombia; it will not be necessary to repeat them. But the great point for our meditation is the permanency of her government. I approach this subject with that apprehension which must arise in a writer's breast when he attempts to prognosticate the destinies of a nation while unfavourable rumours are afloat, and while there is an actual excitement existing in the country, which may possibly contradict his conclusions before his sheets pass through the press. What is written

* Humboldt, Part I. p. 160. See also *Noticia sobre la Geografia*, &c. p. 45.

may turn out to be erroneous ; but it must be risked, relying upon the general accuracy of the data, collated with some labour, leaving the demonstration of the correctness of the inductions to future events, and to the judgment of my readers.

I do not consider the disturbances in Colombia as likely to terminate either in the dismemberment of the nation or in the overthrow of the government. There is a natural cohesion among the inhabitants of each of the former viceroyalties, which constitutes a national identity, and which can be dissevered by nothing short of conquest. The same feeling existed in the United States, and constituted the real demarcation between the cidevant colonies. A tendency to direct their views towards the same metropolis, a concentration of those who have business with the government at the same points, a frequent and familiar intercourse brought about by these causes, habits of business together also induced by them, and a consequent connection of interest, all combined, create that kind of sympathy which unites masses of men into nations. We cannot at once reconcile to our habits of thinking in this country (where we are accustomed to regard the former provinces as distinct states) the strong cohesion of the different provinces of the late viceroyalties; and we seem to look for it as a thing to be expected, that the provinces should be states like our own; but in order to follow our example to the letter, the different viceroyalties would be separate states, as in fact they now are; they formerly bore the same relation to one another that we did in our colonial condition, separately governed, and with no other immediate bond of connection than the common, but individual, allegiance to the same sovereign. Our position would probably be now different if the plan proposed in the year 1754 of a confederation, among the then colonies, had been adopted by them and by the British government, or if it had created a governor general here, as in India, and if such arrangements had endured for some twenty or fifty years. If the whole of Spanish America were to form one grand confederation, retaining the local governments of the several states, the parallel with our institutions would be complete.

We might as well expect the different counties of our states to assume the shape of independent but allied powers, as to anticipate such events from the different provinces of the late viceroyalties; the political or governmental divisions were not more strongly marked in the one case than in the other, nor do the amounts of population differ so widely as to render the comparison inapplicable. Mexico and the late captain generalship of Guatemala have closely imitated our forms it is true, but it remains to be seen whether, in spite of the extent of the regions they cover, it would not have been better for them to govern themselves by means of one general congress, in place of subjecting themselves to the enormous expense and other inconveniences of many distinct legislatures. In this country it was impossible that any thing else could take place; we were already separated into distinct governments, as the Spanish Americas into viceroyalties, and it is always impossible to change suddenly the habits, dispositions, modes of thinking, or prejudices of a people. The great Peter incurred the greatest hazard when he commanded his subjects to shave themselves, and the Sultan would lose his head if he were to attempt to force his subjects to wear tight clothing; one of his predecessors did actually lose his life in consequence of his undertaking to put his Janizaries or the Bostangies into something like European uniforms and to form their line of battle like men of sense. If such trifles could convulse nations, how absurd would it be to attempt to do violence to the prejudices of the people in the fundamental principles of government. In order to change them, a long time, and the actual presence of an overpowering force at the commencement, are requisite. The identity or individuality of nations is changed with much greater difficulty; many ages elapsed before the Saxons and the Gauls lost their nationality in their countries and formed each one nation with their conquerors; we have seen Lorain a foreign country in France, almost to our own day; we now see Scotland a separate nation, after an hundred and ten years of union with England, and more than two hundred since the race of Fergus the first began to wear the triple crown. And Ireland is yet a conquest, and has no national identity with England.

As every act, since the breaking out of the revolution in Spanish America, has demonstrated that those countries which now form the different nations are nations in sentiment, in feeling, and in prejudice, I infer that there is very little room to apprehend the dismemberment of any of them. The very circumstance that Guatemala and Buenos Ayres have been divided into separate states, the former in confederation, and the latter having been incessantly in dispute with some of the provinces and having had Paraguay and the Banda Oriental separated from her, proves my position; their want of national coherence arises from these viceroyalties having had some of their provinces annexed to them at different times, and in some instances separated from them and then reunited, as suited the views of the Spanish government. Thus, not having been ab initio consolidated governments, they never acquired national consistency. It would swell this memoir too much to give a history of these changes, which are familiar to those who have paid attention to the annals of Spanish America; I will therefore only point out the most remarkable case to support my reasoning, which is that of Paraguay, now as much independent of the government of Buenos Ayres, as it was under its first priestly masters before it was united to the late viceroyalty; indeed the instance is the stronger, because Paraguay has reverted to an isolation for which its first government gave the example. I instance also the Banda Oriental, which has been the subject of dispute between Spain and Portugal from its first settlement.

Colombia then will not be separated. It may be that some change from the present form may take place in the administration of the local concerns of the late provinces or capitancias generales, but it appears to me that even if cabildos or juntas in the several provinces were to be endowed with considerable powers in relation to local concerns (and I am persuaded this will be the utmost extent of any alterations) the nationality, the cohesion of the people, are too deeply rooted to be eradicated by any events within the scope of probability. The late disturbances in Venezuela bear the impress on their front of mere desire for personal aggran-

dizement of one or two individuals, or of personal and individual discontent of one or two chieftains. This is evident from the very outside of the affair, and it is confirmed by private anecdotes and information to which it is not for me to give publicity : if a person is said to be discontented with not having the position in the government assigned to him to which he supposes the agency he had in the cabinet work of the revolution entitles him, or if another is said to find it out of his power to make up his public accounts with any degree of accuracy, or to pay over the balances against him, or to account for their loss by any excusable reason ; if such causes as these are assigned for some of the movements, far be it from me to "give them a local habitation and a name." The recent proceedings in Venezuela attracted considerable attention : but it certainly is a curious idea to infer that those proceedings have the sanction of the people's inclination and will, when Caraccas at first refused to join in the designs which were *said* to be popular and adopted by general consent in other places, in consequence of which the ostensible chief of the insurrection marched upon the town with a considerable number of troops ; in order to render the project popular I suppose ; then this chief earnestly advised the city to adopt the plan proposed, and it was so adopted, by acclamation. This is the drollest way of making a thing popular that has been yet devised ; we have heard of various modes of solicitation and of coaxing, but coaxing with the bayonet is something entirely out of the common line. Nevertheless, whatever, or whoever, may be popular, there is a popularity throughout Colombia, manifested in every act and proclaimed in every paper, which is paramount to every other ; it is the dearly purchased and well deserved popularity of Bolivar, on whose valuable life the destinies of Colombia most essentially depend. It seems necessary in the great emergencies of nations, that public sentiment should be concentrated to one point and directed by one individual, upon whose intelligence and virtue, or the want of them, hangs the future situation of the country, its happiness and prosperity, or the reverse : and heaven appears always to raise up at the crisis some one to be an instrument in its hands ; history is full of

such men, the Tells, the Washingtons, the Bolivars, who emancipated countries; nor will posterity forget him who rescued his country from the most horrible condition into which a civilized nation could fall; posterity will say that Napoleon was one of those instruments of heaven which are necessary in the critical moments of nations, in the agony of revolutions—posterity will say so, even when it acknowledges that he forced his beautiful France on to her welfare with too strong a hand, and that he sacrificed other nations by hecatombs to her glory—but where is the man who would not sacrifice the earth to his country? The engine of government in Colombia was in operation with considerable regularity for some time; long enough to extend the ligaments of society and the communications of the authorities very generally through the community: this being the case, the persons at the head of affairs may be changed, but their places will be supplied by fresh individuals, who will have the same interests and the same views as their predecessors, when they are established in the preeminence. Man is the same always; there must be a head to every society, in Caffra-ria as in Rome; the name of the office and the occupant may be changed, but the substance remains the same; call it khan, chief, or Cæsar, it is still the head of the government: the modification of power is the result of the mode of thinking of the people; and of course it would be as impossible for a mortal man to be a tyrant among us, by whatever empty title he might be styled, as it would be for a Turk to be a republican: the whole moral constitution of the people must undergo a complete metamorphosis first; it is possible for divine providence to work this by a miracle, or that a combination of causes might produce it in the lapse of a long period; but nothing else could effect it. Therefore whatever be the nature of the powers ascribed by the general disposition of a people to its magistracy, those powers will be possessed by the persons in authority, how often so ever the occupants may be changed. The only difficulty in applying these axiomata to real life is in discovering what is really the disposition of the great majority of the people, and

upon this point men will differ as long as they do not all see through the same eyes.

The data which have been enumerated are sufficient to convince myself, although I cannot answer for their having the same effect upon others, that the people at large of Colombia are not disposed to change the fundamental principles of their government, which therefore possesses the principle of fundamental durability : although it may and most probably will be remodelled in some of the details, and perhaps it may temporarily assume some appearances which at first view may seem to indicate a very considerable change of system ; but I do not believe that in its essence, in its vital principles, it will be essentially different from its actual state : for if they should have a nominal dictator for a time, I do not believe that the disposition of the people would permit him to be a tyrant, still less do I believe that Bolivar, the only man who could be dictator, would be a tyrant under any circumstances.

Is this government, or will it be, republican, democratic ? No ; not according to the signification we affix to these terms. Can it be imagined that there can exist any thing like an actual equality of rights, privileges, and of eligibility to office in a nation of 642,000 whites with the greatest part of them arms in their hands, certainly very brave, the descendants of the conquerors, with all their recollections fresh of their supremacy, with all the prejudices and pride of the nobility of their colour, as De Pradt calls it—of about 170,000 negroes, of 720,000 Indians, and of 1,256,000 of mixed races, with the education almost exclusively confined to the whites, and by no means general among them. It is impossible that such a country should be democratic at present, there are too many means of defence in hands of the superior class ; the discordancy of the colours is a most important barrier, since with mere ordinary tact the whites could always array the other colours against one another ; the habits of obedience, the custom, which has hardened into a disposition, among the whites themselves to follow a chief and to range themselves under his banners, is another formidable impediment to the establishment of democracy. Any republic in

Colombia, until a considerable time elapses, and until education and information diffuse themselves much more generally than at present, will be upon the model of a Spartan republic—which, in spite of the glittering deceptions thrown over it by our school studies, was not a democracy. But Colombia will enjoy very liberal institutions; all the great immunities of society will be faithfully and powerfully maintained; life, liberty, and property, of the poor, or of the inferior classes, whether black or of the mixed colours, will be defended from aggressions of the rich or dominant, as much as they can be in any form of government; for in any country a bold bad man, having acquired the affection of the majority of those who reside around him, may commit acts of individual outrage which are difficult to punish; the attachment of his neighbours alone is adequate to shield him: but in Colombia there will be a strong protection of the first classes against encroachments of the others. The habitual deference of the other colours to the whites, and the clanish disposition, or rather the vestiges of feudal prejudices among the whites, will tend to preserve the present condition of society. As to equality in the distribution of offices, it will follow the same course; the prejudice or sentiment of inferiority among the subordinate castes, and the habit of command, as well as the natural cohesion among the dominant colour, will, without recurrence to the letter of the laws, prevent the superiority of the whites, and of the chiefs among that colour, from being subverted. Nothing but time, accompanied by sedulous cultivation of generally diffused education, can efface these prejudices, with their consequences; and it remains to be proved whether those, who have now the ascendant, will contribute to and seriously promote such operations; knowing, as they must, that their result will be to diminish the predominancy of the present ruling colour. The laws and professions of the magistracy are, it is true, favourable to a change in the relative condition of the different castes; but these are not enough, unless they are cordially supported by the dispositions of the people at large, and especially of that part of it which has now the ascendancy. There will arise, no doubt, many conspicuous, popular,

influential, and powerful individuals among the subordinate castes, who will force their way into power, or who will be placed there by those who possess it, but as soon as they have entered, their interests will become identified with those of the persons who compose the magistracy, and they will of course make common cause with them; so that the advancement of a man of colour, whether of the Indian or of the African race, will not be the elevation of his caste, it will only be an exception in his favour; it will not be the advancement of a class, but only of an individual. Therefore I have no idea that there will be a chance, for a long time, of an equality in the distribution of offices among the castes in Colombia, any more than there would be in our Southern states: for, although the subordinate colours are technically and legally free in Colombia, the prejudices of colour are nearly as strong there as in our country; we have seen here some very distinguished individuals proud of their descent from the caciques of the aborigines, justly feeling themselves doubly American from that circumstance; but nevertheless the Indian tribes have no political importance; it is the talent, the personal influence, and the connections of those individuals which have taken them out of their caste, which has not been raised with them in the scale of political importance. Thus will it be in Colombia.

It has been said that if she is not to be truly democratic, she might as well have been spared her revolution, and has not gained much by her emancipation from Spain. But I can not agree with this; even if one is to be tyrannized over, it is surely better to have a tyrant at home than to be slaves to a tyrant abroad: it is certainly better for the people that the revenues of the country should be spent among them although they were spent extravagantly, instead of being drained from them to enrich a country a thousand leagues off. But I have no idea that such a fate is reserved for Colombia; on the contrary I have perfect faith that it is out of the question while Bolivar lives; he will not be a tyrant; and there is no other man in the country at present who has popularity or personal influence enough to be one in case of Bolivar's death: the influence of the prominent characters

is not sufficiently universal; it is too local, or confined to particular parties, to enable any one of them to seize upon the reins of government with an absolute hand, even supposing, which I do not, that the people were prepared for it. Bolivar is evidently the only man to whom the whole country looks up, and who possesses its unlimited and universal confidence, and he is too great to be a tyrant.

Colombia will continue to be republican, in as much as it will be governed by laws, enacted by a representative legislature, and administered by a judiciary independent of the executive. The representation, as is evident from what has been said above, will not be what we call in this country purely democratic; because it will not be elected by universal suffrage; a considerable portion of the population is not ready for this kind of government, it wants the requisite education and information, and the minds of the individuals have not yet been sufficiently disciplined. Qualifications for the electoral privileges will therefore be adopted, by which the rights of suffrage will be confined very much to that part of the population which is, or is supposed to be, prepared to exercise it with discretion; and probably qualifications for office will be required, by which the choice will be restricted to those who are from their situation in society, or who ought to be, the best educated and the best informed.

As to the chief of the executive branch, the office will no doubt be invested in, or continued to be bestowed upon Bolivar as long as he lives, or as long as he will choose to retain it; and I have no fear of his abusing the trust. The executive will unquestionably be clothed with much more strength than ours. To cause this every thing will combine; the ancient prejudices of the country accustomed to a despotic regime; the singular mixture of the population, demanding the restraint of a vigorous administration; the extent of the territory whose limits are hardly to be reached by a weak arm; the novelty of their institutions, and the consequent difficulty of executing the laws or of protecting either persons or property in a country affording so many facilities for escaping from punishment, and among a people just set

free, just feeling themselves so, after having been for ages habituated to the peremptory exercise of absolute power, without having been schooled and prepared for the immeasurable change. At the same time, the population has become so inured to war, so much familiarized with resistance, they are so generally armed, and their character appears to be imbued with so much excitability, added to the daily increasing consciousness of the social importance of individuals, that they would be very apt to repel any thing which savoured of wanton and despotic abuse of authority. The scenes which were lately acting in various parts of the country tend much to confirm these ideas, since we see that the popular pretence for them was the mere want of sufficient participation in the government by particular districts, which in the present state of the nation is certainly going far to discover some excuse for insurrection; and whatever may be the secret causes of the discontent of the chiefs of a popular commotion, they are always obliged to throw out some captivating lure to the mass of the people to induce their following them into the field. These disturbances I do not consider as threatening a dissolution of the government, much less a dismemberment of the country. Venezuela and Guayaquil*, with one or two less considerable provinces, have neither the numerical nor the moral strength that would be necessary to produce these results; Cundinamarca† and the provinces which adhere to her are much more than a match for those which are discontented, if the question would require force to decide it; besides, the army is considerable, has seen so much service that it must be in a pretty good state of discipline, and is faithful to the government, except the small portion of it which was under the immediate orders of Paez: added to which is the mighty name of Bolivar, himself a host. But the thing is manifestly decided; the discontented provinces have invoked him and have bestowed upon him absolute power over themselves, while he is the actual

* Venezuela, 350,000, Guayaquil, 90,000 inhabitants. *Noticia sobre la Geografia, &c.*

† 371,000 inhabitants, *ibid.*

as well as the titular head of the government recognized by the constitution; and he comes forth in his usual unequivocal manner, he throws himself, his vast influence and popularity, and what is the conclusive argument, like Brennus in the Capitol, he throws his powerful sword into the scale; but, more prudent than the rash Gaul, his explanation is not woe to the conquered; he adopts the safer and more humane course of conciliation and of compromise. Some palliatives will be applied to assuage the discontents, some of the insurgent chiefs will be bought off with gold or with honours, or will be crushed under the wheels of his triumphal car, which is drawn by the people, and the disturbances will be appeased*. We must not be surprised if that population, which have been constantly engaged in war for fifteen years and which have arms in their hands, should adopt a mode of expressing their sentiments a little more expeditious and a little more peremptory than we are accustomed to; if we were discontented, we should hold sundry town and county meetings, whereat a quantity of very long speeches would be made, and very furious resolutions passed; it may be that we should abuse one another a trifle, particularly in the papers; but people who have been fighting for so long a time, who have got so much used to it and whose weapons are not laid aside, would naturally manage things differently; they would perhaps have a meeting or two of a couple of hundred persons, make some short declarations of opinion, and put the vote; when, if the military liked the complexion of the orators, they would fire a few times up and down the streets; if not, they have nothing to do but to fire two or three volleys upon the rhetoricians, and the question would be decided. This argumentum ad hominem or ad corpus may strike our ideas as being somewhat dogmatical and rather at variance with the ordinary rules of logic; but it

* Since this was written the question has been decided, peace has been restored, and Bolivar has tendered his resignation; whether it be accepted or not, these proceedings prove the positions assumed in the text; if it be not accepted his popularity will be again ratified by the popular will, since he has put it into the people's power to resume the trust if they choose.

should be remembered that force is an evil which generally cures itself, and that although there would be a very different state of things if the regular army alone decided every thing, yet as almost all the people have military habits, the same manner of acting which produces some violent disturbances, also guaranties them from the imposition of any form of government which has not the sanction of the will of the majority.

The state of affairs at present is however by no means agreeable; there are discontents at home, and a foreign war is still pending, at the moment that a grand design is in agitation for consolidating American independence. Such a crisis demands extraordinary vigour, extraordinary measures. What will these measures be? Several of the provinces have called upon their liberator to assume a dictatorship; they have called upon him in the most moving and affectionate terms; *salvam fac rempublicam* has been their united prayer. Old Rome gave them the original precedent, as well as examples of moderation to the dictator, and their common safety has been the urgent motive for their appealing to him who made them free, for protection against anarchy, and against intestine war. I believe he will accept this eminent trust, if he finds that the dissensions are not otherwise to be appeased, he has already assumed the extraordinary powers with which the constitution invests the president in extreme cases; and again I say I have no fear that he will abuse it*: his fame is too great to admit the formation of such a fear. He is too greatly ambitious; he has not the common ambition of being the founder of a dynasty; he aspires to the rarer glory of founding a republic, of refusing a crown: besides, he has no children to whom he might bequeath it. He has the power of a monarch, and it will last for his life, without any of the carking cares and envy that wait upon an acquired royalty; his is an empire over

* These anticipations have become realities in Paez's affair; and I can only prove by my publisher and by friends who read the manuscript, that it was written before the disturbance in Venezuela was terminated.

the affections of his fellow citizens; this is evident in every public act, and the attachment of the people will revert to his family connections; he has a large fortune of his own, and may have any revenue he desires, of course he will be surrounded by all the splendour and state that riches can procure, without the censure and privation of ease that kings have often to encounter; his recommendation and influence do and will place his friends in the offices he wishes for them; what more can a monarch require, how few of them can command as much? A man like him can not be contented with the throne of a single country, the admiration and esteem of a world are his thrones. Bolivar will not abuse his dictatorship; he has been appointed to one and has abandoned it, convening a national representation, and giving a constitution which was adopted by those whom the people (who have paid him the glorious compliment of assuming his name) empowered to legislate for them: he has long possessed a virtual dictatorship in his own country; for his advice has had the force of laws. But he will do what he believes the condition of his country requires, and he will act more emphatically, more energetically, than has ever been necessary in this country. Still, he has nothing to gain by abusing his authority, for he possesses every advantage that a man can have; and he has every thing to lose in risking these; above all his gigantic fame is an unimpeachable security for his good conduct. Would he place this at hazard? To imagine it would be to suppose him mad.

But if events, which the whole tenor of his life forbids us to anticipate, were to happen, their effects could not outlast his life, for there is no one to take his place.

Colombia will then settle into a republican form of government, of a strong character, with modifications demanded by the state of her society, by the extent of her territory, and by the singular intermixture of her population; and there is no reason to apprehend the stability of her institutions. She does and will exercise a powerful influence over the neighbouring states. The whole of Spanish America, our country, and even Europe, are deeply in-

terested in her condition. England for instance has too much of the capital of her subjects invested there in shape of loans and otherwise, has lost too much blood in the revolutionary contest, and now, in expectation of a much larger trade, drives a commerce far too lucrative, to permit her to regard with an indifferent eye the future destiny of Colombia, or for her to permit, without interposing her force, a country which never can be a colony of hers, to have the foundations of its society and its government broken up.

How wonderful are the dispensations of providence! and how often do we see good arise from positive evil, from violation of moral obligations! The author of good has beneficently ordered it so that after the offender has been scourged, the tendency of his evil deeds themselves is obviated, their ill effects diverted; sometimes indeed after a long interval; there is a curative power, a *vis medicatrix*, a restorative force, in all the grand operations of nature and of morals. England has been the greatest monopolist of the world, no nation has promoted its commerce, manufactures, and agriculture with such interdictions, none has been so tyrannical over its colonies*, none has guarded them with such Argus jealousy, down to the time when she has engrossed almost all colonies, and has created such a prodigious mass of manufacturing industry as to enable her to undersell every other nation in every market, and to render nothing so desirable for her as to induce other nations to take off all interdictions; and therefore she now offers the delusive temptation of removing her interdictions, if other nations will do the same—she can well afford to do so, when her previous measures have placed her in a situation to supply the whole world, and to break up all commerce and all manufactures by underselling them in their own parts and at their own gates. While she pursued the most rigorous policy with regard to her own colonies, she never ceased to violate the rights and the laws of other nations in respect to their colonies; she has never ceased to be the great smuggler of the

* Let any one who doubts this remember the East Indies.

world; she has always endeavoured to destroy the restrictive system of others; she constantly made her way into Spanish America, in spite of the opposition of the mother country, in defiance of the guarda costas and all the attirail of Spanish despotism; she seized at every favourable opportunity ports, and islands, as Trinidad, the Falkland isles, English Guiana, and innumerable others, convenient depots for her merchandize, and convenient stations whence to run her goods into the interdicted countries (I will not here trace her course in other regions, but confine my observations to America) and in order to open markets for herself: she has contributed to the acquisition of the independence of all colonies which she could not appropriate to herself, St Domingo, and Spanish America being the most striking examples: she has permitted ships of war, and levies of troops, to sail from her ports to aid the Spanish colonies in their contest with Spain; professing neutrality, she made, to be sure, some demonstrations, put forth some proclamations, which came out after the most important expeditions could not be seriously affected by them; but it is a farce to say that so watchful a government would be ignorant of the circumstances, when men were levied by legions, and when frigates were building in her ports; her merchants supplied the greater part of the arms to the colonies, and millions were publicly raised on her exchange for loans to them. Thus did the most signal selfishness on her side largely contribute to the emancipation of a continent, and to the independence of a numerous and gallant race*. Let no man say that it

* De Pradt, in his work *Des Colonies*, &c. has expressed these ideas better than I do:—

“—— Les métropoles les plus jalouses de l'exclusif chez elles, *sont* les plus infatigables à le violer chez les autres. Ainsi l'Angleterre, tres exclusive dans ses colonies propres, et sans cesse occupée à violer l'exclusif chez les autres, en faisant pénétrer ses marchandises dans leurs colonies. Depuis qu'il y a des colonies espagnoles, elle n'a pas cessé de sapper leur régime exclusif, elle fit la guerre de 1740 à l'appui de ses contrebandiers. Dans les vingt-cinq dernières années, elle a fait encore plus, car partout elle a affranchi et porté à s'affranchir, pourvu que l'exclusif disparut à son égard: fait elle autre chose, depuis dix années sur la rivière de la Plata, et sur toute la cote de l'Amerique meridionale?”—De Pradt *des Colonies*, Vol. I. p. 247.

was English philanthropy, the sturdy spirit of English freedom, which could not bear the spectacle of slavery—stuff! let her emancipate Ireland*, let her set her West Indian slaves at large, let her throw open the ports of her islands, let her establish liberal institutions in Hindostan, and then we might put some faith in this “euphemism.” The result, however, of her policy, directed solely to acquiring fresh and larger markets for trade and for employment of her capital, has been to involve her to such a degree in the questions of independence and of the stability of the South American governments and of none more than that of Colombia that she can not now afford to lose the investments she has made—I mean the investments of her subjects; and she therefore must, she is obliged to, co-operate in the maintenance of both; she will do so by negotiation and influence, if she can; if not, she will interpose force. It is certainly a great and important point gained (whether in consequence of accident or necessity, or of a profound and admirable design the result of the most enlightened policy†) that so powerful a nation should be implicated, interested, inextricably bound, for her own sake, to support the order of things which is imperiously demanded by the welfare of Spanish America, and especially of Colombia, one of the most important members of the new constellation of empires.

It would be to protract too much a memoir, already much longer than I intended it to be when I began to write, if I were to enter at large into the financial and statistical details of the countries which are treated of; most of the documents are accessible to the readers, although they are not as explicit as could be desired: besides, these details are not necessary to my design, which is only to shew the general relations, the numerical strength, and the probability of the permanency of the governments. I therefore

* See Chateaubriand's Address, translated in the National Gazette, February 1827.

† Mr Canning says, “I called America into existence.” Do the records of declamation afford a parallel to such arrogance? If any foreigner could say so it would be Mr Clay. But her own spirit and her own good sword gave independent existence to South America.

pass to the next great division of the continent, without touching upon the Guianas, of too little consequence in the grand scale to delay us, and destined when they acquire sufficient population, if that ever happens, or when circumstances demand it, to be absorbed by one or other of their more powerful neighbours.



CHAPTER XIII.

BRAZIL, with an area of 256,990 square marine leagues, 82,690 more than the territory of the United States, contains 4,000,000 inhabitants* ; of which, whites 920,000 ; Indians 260,000 ; negro slaves 1,728,000 ; free blacks 159,000, slaves of mixed blood 202,000, freemen of mixed blood 426,000† ; the aggregate of these numbers, 3,695,000, differs from the first total on account of an estimate which the baron makes at the distance of four or five years from the dates of the enumeration effected between September 1816 and 1818 ; the present numbers must considerably exceed four millions, without computing the Banda Oriental, but I take this sum as being the best authenticated ; the proportions of the several races probably maintain nearly the same ratio to one another. Taking Brazil at 257,000 square leagues, and the population at four millions, there are fifteen souls to the square league‡, which however are very unequally apportioned on the surface of the country.

Whatever has been said before of Mexico and Colombia relative to the aristocratic or despotic propensities induced

* Humboldt, *ut ante*, Vol. VI., Part I. p. 127.

† Ibid. Part I. p. 141. and Part II. p. 837.

‡ Ibid. Part I. pp. 185, 337.

by the colonial institutions, the peculiarity of the conquest, and above all by the diversity of the castes among the population, applies with equal force to Brazil. But the immense number of slaves, and the continuation of slavery in Brazil, make those observations apply to this country with a vastly increased force. The immigration of the king of Portugal, the court, and a strong body of troops, added to the former prejudices and predilections of the inhabitants of Brazil, sealed the fate, and decided the form, of its government. Every thing said to shew the probability of a strong government being established in Mexico and Colombia, applies with ten fold vigour to Brazil, from the same causes; the number of the slaves superadds to the probability; they cannot be kept down, outnumbering the whites, as they do so largely, unless there be always a strong military force on foot; which, while it protects the whites, and particularly the masters, from insurrection of their slaves, will be ready organized for action against any attempt to change the existing order of things among the rest of the population. There can therefore be no revolutionary movement in Brazil like that in the Spanish colonies, and there has been none. No two things could be more dissimilar than the absolute rejection of the Spanish dominion, metropolis, monarch, dynasty, allegiance—in short the total abruption of every connection with the antecedent regime, in the Hispano-American colonies, and the separation of Brazil from Portugal. In the one instance every bond was burst asunder, in the other there was a mere nominal division of the relation between the mother country and the colony, without in the least affecting the allegiance to the king, and without the least disparagement to his title; because the whole operation emanated from the monarch and was conducted by himself. The consequence is that he finds himself at the head of an empire more powerful, now it is divided, than both kingdoms were while united, and infinitely more so than the mother country. We see therefore that the present monarch has wisely branched his family into two dynasties, retaining for himself the best country, and allotting to his daughter and to his brother, whose aspirations for a crown had previously compromitted the tranquillity of

both countries, that kingdom which gave birth to the empire to which he has limited his desires. The whole apparatus of monarchy was actually existing in Brazil, and when the late king immigrated he brought with him a vast accession of strength and materials for it. These continued under the regency, and Don Pedro had nothing to do but to assume a title when the bases of the empire were already laid, to assume the name when the essence and spirit already existed, to place the throne upon the dais already raised to support it. I will not recapitulate the observations formerly made, but will only say that every cause for a monarchical government in Mexico and Colombia, which have since been modified there, exists in Brazil, that there are stronger causes, and many others have been added in Brazil, none taken away; no modification, no causes to operate a change, have been created; and no revulsion has taken place to alter the essential forms of the government, nor to change the spirit and inclinations of the people. The expansion of intellect which characterizes the age, and the good counsels, as well as the enlarged views, by which the emperor appears to be guided, have impelled him, and will continue to do so, to establish as much liberality in his forms of government, and as many liberal institutions in his empire, as can be expected from a monarch or from the extraordinary combination of circumstances which characterize the population and the country. Brazil will settle down, and in fact has already done so, into a constitutional monarchy, with a representative body, and a chamber of nobility; the whole forming however a very strong government. I see no probability for an age to come of any thing like a republic there: some commotions, rebellions, or insurrections may take place, but they will subside into the original forms; the foundations of the existing state of things are too deeply laid to be overthrown. Brazil however is entirely and absolutely American (with this exception) in all her views, all her interests, all her policy; they are cemented, identified, with the rest of the continent; and her destruction would be the inevitable consequence of an attempt to divorce herself from the American system. I consider her government as among the most firmly establish-

ed on the continent. This militates I know against the wishes of many of my fellow citizens; but I can not help it, it is my candid opinion; nor do I see how a philanthropist, with a full knowledge of the nature and character of her population, can desire that every link of society should be disconnected, in the hope, the mere hope, the remote chance, of a form of government more congenial to our feelings being created out of the chaos which must arise from an attempt to alter institutions to which the whole nation is familiarized and attached. If Brazil should ever undertake to propagate her prejudices among the other nations of the continent, she would deserve and would receive exemplary chastisement; but she will not be so mad, she must know the danger she would incur, and must anticipate the fearful retaliation to which she is open: on the other hand it would be a bad specimen of the adherence of republicans to their principles, especially to the one which they maintain so strongly that every nation has a perfect right to determine upon its own form of government, if they were to infringe upon the right in this instance.

Brazil is a strong constitutional aristocratic representative monarchy, but in her other characteristics is American all over; and the permanency of her government can not be doubted.

To suppose that she is not to have disputes with her neighbours, is to fancy the return of the golden age; but they will find great difficulty in making effective war upon one another because of the distances which are enormous, and of the risk as well as the expense of supporting armies in countries so thinly settled, notwithstanding the supplies which may be drawn from the abundance of the herds, and the advantage of being able to find green provender almost universally, unless for a short interval during the year. Europe, with its area 304,700 square leagues and 195 millions of inhabitants equal to 639 to the league, would be enabled to maintain perpetual war if the same circumstances existed within her boundaries; but in Brazil and the neighbouring countries the facilities afforded for indulging warlike inclinations are obviated by the expanses over which armies would

have to move, and the expense incident to driving after the armies live provisions which they cannot expect to find every where; as in Europe, and of transporting the munitions of war; as to war by means of fleets, countries cannot be subdued by it although they may be distressed and their colonies subdued. Until therefore the lapse of ages shall replenish those regions with inhabitants, a thing by the by not to be expected in the vast pampas, and until the formation of the splendid compact, which is destined to restrain the wonderful propensity nations have to cut one another's throats, there may be dissensions, and even hostilities, but they will not be of such moment as to disturb seriously the general tranquillity, in spite of the jealousy that must prevail between governments of such different forms. The contest between Brazil and Buenos Ayres is of this stamp: they are disputing about the possession of a country which certainly does not belong to the latter, not only because it does not choose to belong to it, but also because Portugal was the first occupant, if there be any faith in history, and was disturbed in the occupation by subsequent force and intrigue used by Spain or by her colonists; this priority of possession has heretofore been the test of titles to territories in America. The Banda Oriental, about which they are fighting, never has been in possession of Buenos Ayres; unless we call the pendency of a negotiation a possession, which in fact was broken off by the Banda Oriental; and this induced a war between it and Buenos Ayres. The possession of the sea port of Monte Video by Brazil is very little to the purpose, when Artigas at the head of the inhabitants of the country was, and the latter are yet, in open hostilities with both Buenos Ayres and Brazil. The country will itself decide the question, by declaring to which it thinks fit to adhere; and, with the assistance of the power to which it does adhere, it is well able to make its decision valid. They are therefore disputing about a country which in point of fact, whatever may be the abstract right, belongs to neither of them. And really it is of no great consequence to either, as they both have already more territory than they can manage, and much more than their population can cover: to the Banda Oriental however it is a

question of consequence, because the city of Buenos Ayres seems to persevere in the exploded doctrines of Spanish monopoly, and to be determined that hers shall be the only commercial port on the river of the Amazons; a most unjust and absurd pretension, and one which deserves to be punished by the loss of the left bank of the river with its great estuary.



CHAPTER XIV.

THE cidevant viceroyalty of Buenos Ayres, or the Provincias Del Rio de la Plata, contained an area of 126,770 square marine leagues, with a population of 2,300,000 souls*; equivalent to 18 souls to the league†. Of which Paraguay‡ and the Missions have 140,000; and the Banda Oriental contained 45,000 on 86,000 square miles; Entre Rios 25,000 on 104,500 square miles§; according to the report of Theodorick Bland, Esq. to our government, dated the 2d of November 1818. The proportion of the different races is||, whites 320,000; Indians 1,200,000; negroes about 60,000; and the mixed races 742,000. Although the amount of population taken off by Paraguay is not exactly known, the numbers are sufficiently accurate for our purpose.

But the country called by Spain Provincias del Rio de la Plata, recently under the viceroyalty of Buenos Ayres, and embraced in the above calculations of Humboldt, has been

* Humboldt, Vol. VI. Part I. p. 127, relating to 1823; though in page 364 he calls it 2,371,000 or two and a half millions.

† Ibid. p. 377.

‡ Ibid. p. 171, 7424 square leagues.

§ Ibid. p. 171, 6848 square leagues.

|| Ibid. Part II. pp. 835, 836.

divided. Upper Peru has become the republic of Bolivar, covering 37,020 square leagues* : Paraguay is independent ; and the Entré Rios and Banda Oriental have never recognized the supremacy of Buenos Ayres ; the latter is the subject of the war with Brazil. Humboldt gives the area of the United Provinces of Buenos Ayres at 91,528 square leagues†. The *Gaceta de Colombia* of the 11th of December 1825 enumerates the provinces, viz. Buenos Ayres, Cordova, Mendoza, San Juan, San Luis, Rioja, Catamarca, Santiago del Estero, Tuman, Salta, Santafé, Entre Rides, Corrientes ; giving the population as 569,999 souls ; and stating this as an extract from an order of the government, under authority of the general congress, circulated on the 17th of June 1825 to *all* the provinces. This I assume therefore as the most correct statement of the population of the United Provinces.

The same mixture of population, which so remarkably characterizes the rest of Spanish and Portuguese America, prevails here ; and the observations upon the subject, and upon its probable effect, need not be repeated. I approach with much apprehension the next head which I have made in treating of the other countries ; but I have vowed to speak the whole truth, as it appears to my feeble conceptions.

The country known in the latter years of the Spanish domination by the general appellation of the viceroyalty of Buenos Ayres, comprehending a great number of intendencias and governments, or provinces, has been the seat of more intestine disturbances and of more opposition to the government, since the declaration of independence, than any of the other cidevant colonies : it has scarcely been at rest for any six consecutive months : revolution after revolution has changed the rulers and even the outline of the government in the city and its vicinity : many of the provinces have disputed the supremacy of the metropolis : and many of them have formed themselves into independent governments : the revolutions, as well as those disputes, hav-

* Humboldt, Vol. VI. Part I. p. 171.

† Ibid. p. 151.

ing been maintained by armed force, and in many instances by sanguinary conflicts. These symptoms render the stability of the government of the provinces extremely problematical. Buenos Ayres was the scene of more than one invasion by foreign powers, and had more intercourse with them than the rest of the colonies; the vestiges must have been left behind of European principles: we see them in a rough and undigested form it is true, mingled with the ancient prejudices, and with the consequences of the diversity of races which compose the population. The white population seems to be more democratic than that of the other late colonies: but how democratic? the principle does not seem to have extended itself in fact, however it may be granted by the letter of the laws, to the other castes, which appear to have been made use of only to swell the force, to fill the ranks of the troops under command, and direction, and, what is of much more importance, under the influence of the whites, who disputed with one another the supremacy. Slavery has been abolished during these turmoils, but the slaves seem only to have been transferred from their agriculture to the armies. They have not been invested with the real and essential rights of citizens, nor can they be, in any part of America, as long as the distinction and consequent prejudice of colour continues. They have no electoral nor pacific influence in the country; they have been taken from their master's ploughs, to fight their master's battles, lured on by the donation of red facings to their coats, and by some merely captivating or existing temptations; but they have not in fact been made partakers of the advantages or authority, to acquire which for those masters they were led into action; they have not ceased to be slaves, because they are as much slaves in the army as they were in the fields.

These observations generally apply to the Indian and mixed races: if they were not slaves they were of no civil importance in society under the Spanish regime; although the Indians were sometimes rendered formidable by insurrections, or by the warfare of those who continued to be termed *bravos*, those who were not completely reduced to submission. They, and the mixed colour, appear to con-

tinue to hold pretty much the same station in political relations that they did before the revolution. Their physical and numerical forces have been made use of, in the same manner that the blacks have been used ; and in like manner they do not appear to have any other political, and still less moral, influence in the country.

The report of Mr Bland exhibits a melancholy state of public feeling in 1818, and a discordancy among the provinces truly lamentable. Since the date of that report, the government and the country have gradually improved in consolidation, tranquillity, and permanency ; but not sufficiently to bring my mind to a conviction of the permanency of their institutions yet, without the influence of some powerful interference ; such as would be exercised by the pacific impulse which will be given by the grand American confederation. If this consummation, devoutly to be wished for, does not take place, I should not be surprised if the anarchical materials (for from what has passed it must be evident that they cannot be considered truly democratic) which exist in the temperament of the predominant caste, the whites, and in the distracting contrarieties of the three other inferior colours, should terminate in the adoption of a monarchical form of government, savouring more of despotism than the institutions of any other state of the American continent. So near are the confines of anarchy to those of despotism, and so prone are mankind to take refuge under the protection of the strongest form of government from the evils of that state of affairs in which neither persons nor property are safe. Should this be the case, there will probably be still preserved something like a legislative body, but it will be characterized with so many qualifications that it will be nothing more than an organ of the executive will : there will not be a regularly constituted and efficient aristocracy*,

* Perhaps the term *nobility* would be more correct ; for the sultan's favour creates a kind of aristocracy among his slaves ; offices do the same every where ; and failing these nature herself has made some men stronger or wiser than others. What I mean by a regularly constituted aristocracy is one on the model of that of modern Europe, and of Rome and Greece, not to speak of the original inhabitants of the other countries.

for such a class does not belong to despotism ; and if there must be a monarchy it is probably the most effectual defence of the rights of the whole community against the encroachments of the sovereign authority. But I believe that Buenos Ayres is reserved for a better fate, if the American system goes into operation.

The revolution in Buenos Ayres may fairly be said to have had its first sparks struck at the date of Sir Home Popham's invasion ; so that the flames of independence, which have since, like a glorious bale fire, blazed on the mountain tops and illuminated every valley in America, were kindled there quite as early as in any of the Spanish colonies. The separation of this country from Europe is as decided and irretrievable as that of any of the others, whatever phase the government may assume. If a monarchy were established, a king might be borrowed from abroad, but he would necessarily be American in his politics, as would be any other form of government. The question of complete disseverance from Europe is decided for ever all over this continent. Buenos Ayres therefore will unquestionably be thoroughly identified with American interests and with the American system.



CHAPTER XV.

PARAGUAY is nearly a terra incognita ; we know almost nothing about it. The singular isolation in which it has been the policy of its government, or of its ruler, to keep the country, has prevented any certain and detailed information of its state of society, or of its concerns, from reaching the rest of the world. All that can be said is, that if Buenos Ayres should pass into the hands of a vigorous government, Paraguay will probably fall into its possession.

But Paraguay cannot for a long time be amalgamated with Buenos Ayres; whatever may be the form of government established, if that country be comprehended, it must form a separately governed province or state, with nothing more than an allegiance to the common head: the diversity of sentiment and the opposition of the institutions of Paraguay to those of the rest of the ancient viceroyalty, indicate this in a manner not to be misunderstood. The existence of a very small independent nation is out of the question at this time of day, especially of one surrounded by the dominions of large powers. This is indicated by the fate of the minor sovereignties of Italy and of Germany; none of which have been for several ages in fact entirely independent, except for very short periods of time, and when contests among the greater powers occupied so much of their attention as to leave no leisure to attend to inferior relations. Paraguay cannot therefore maintain its independence with its present population; it will be absorbed by one of its greater neighbours, no doubt by Buenos Ayres, before it acquires population adequate to make good its independence; and by the time that it contains numbers sufficient to do so, the inhabitants will be habituated and reconciled to a different state of affairs. In addition to the argument drawn from precedents and from the antipathy of the world to the existence of small, detached, independent, nations, it is very plain that such a one would not be endured with institutions so entirely at variance with the policy and the interest of the conterminous countries. As long however as this province continues in its present state, it must be entirely American; every interest and every policy tend to connect it with the American system: it is of course as definitively alienated from Europe as any of the other South American nations. The area of Paraguay, as has been before said, is according to Humboldt 7424 leagues, with 140,000 inhabitants.

CHAPTER XVI.

THE next country of which I shall treat is Chili. To this nation also applies much of what has been previously said of the others; and repetition will be avoided as much as possible. Chili upon an area of 14,240 square leagues had a population in 1823 of 1,100,000 souls*, being nearly seventy-seven and a half to each square league, which is considerably more than equal to half the average population of the United States east of the Mississippi, which comprehends our densest population.

I am not able to give as exactly as heretofore the estimate of the numbers of the different races; because Humboldt has not discriminated between Chili and Peru, but has given both together; nor have I been able to rectify the omission from any of the documents I have. Baron Humboldt gives for Peru and Chili, Indians 1,030,000, Whites 465,000, the mixed races 853,000, and for all the Spanish continental America 387,000 slaves. It is true that Mr Bland in his report says that the population of Chili is more homogeneous, has less of the African blackening, and a smaller proportion of slaves than any other portion of Spanish America; that there were at the time of his mission 50,000 descendants of the Indians who were slaves; that there had been great mix-

* Humboldt, as before, Vol. VI. Part I. p. 127.; it is stated however to be 1,200,000 in Mr Bland's Report made in 1818.

ture ; that the huasos or peasantry of the country are all of this class ; and that not more than one-third of the population of Peru are whites, the other two-thirds being negroes and mulattoes, bond and free*. These statements agree with communications to the writer from a distinguished gentleman, a native of Chili ; but they are not precise enough to authorize any numerical discrimination here. I think, however, that we may fairly conclude that Mr Bland's account of the total number of the inhabitants was nearly correct, and believe that they are at present, at the distance of eight years from the time when he wrote, at least 1,300,000 or perhaps 1,400,000. Among these there are very few negroes or offspring of a mixture with them : but, from all the information I have been able to collect, I infer that the Indians and the mixed race of their blood amount to at least two-thirds of the whole population ; leaving say from 450,000 to 500,000 of the pure white race, although the number of this class is rated much higher by some of the South Americans. If the last should be greatly more numerous than my estimate, should they even compose half the population, the foundation for the induction which has been drawn in relation to the other states applies also here, in a greater or less degree according to the proportion of the several races, which I have no materials for determining precisely. This induction is that there cannot exist a democratic equality in the country as long as the prejudice shall continue, (which has endured until it appears to be a natural sentiment) of pre-eminence of the whites over all the other colours. Laws go for a great deal ; persistence in an uniform system of legislation will gradually affect the moral principle, the habits of thinking, of a people ; but the grand and fundamental law, the constitution, of a nation at any given time is the prejudice, or the opinion, of the population at that particular period. The wisest and best laws may be enacted, but if they are not supported by the sentiments and assent of a considerable portion of the country, they cannot be executed. This assent may be given from different mo-

* Mr Bland's Report, pages 108 and 112 of the copy published for congress.

tives: part of the inhabitants, and the most active part, is engaged in supporting the government in various ways, in the thousand civil posts from the minister of state down to the catchpole and the taxgatherer, or among the military from the commander in chief down to the sutler and batman, and to the apprentice to the tailor who makes the uniforms; all these have their families dependent upon them or have influence over one or more persons; and thus in every country there must exist a large number of individuals who are bound by their interest to support the ruling powers in whatever they do: another portion of the inhabitants give their assent to laws because they have a reverence for laws in general; thinking that, whatever the law may be, there is an obligation upon them to comply with it and to support it, or because being interested in the common welfare they would prevent any change from taking place in the institutions—these support the enactments for the law's sake. Another and far the greatest portion adhere to the law, or suffer it to be executed, out of sheer apathy; provided they are not disturbed, they care little how the world goes; whatever may be the speculations in Utopia and elsewhere, the great body of mankind belong to this class; if they did not, we should never hear of oppressions, for otherwise when an act disagreeable to them were committed the body would move, and a single motion of such a mass would shake down any throne however fortified, as the movement, a mere tremor, of the earth prostrates palaces of kings and crumbles the cloud capt mountains. An assent to laws must then be given by the different classes or component parts of a population, and by the great bulk of it, either by engaging actively in obeying them and causing them to be obeyed, or by quietly submitting to them; the interest of one class leads to the former course, the indifference of another to the latter course, and universally there is a prejudice among the people in favour of law. But where this prejudice does not exist, law cannot exist; and where a law is made contradictory to a prejudice which is stronger than the general one on the side of the law, or in other words stronger than that prejudice upon which obedience to the laws is founded, in such a case

the repugnant ordinance would just go out; it would be as if it were not enacted, unless indeed some madcap were wild enough to make it the excuse for disturbances, or, what is more usual, some interested or ambitious man were to endeavour to make it the subject of popular excitement and the stepping stone for his interest or his ambition: Such would be a law in this country, in the south at least, that negroes might be members of congress; it would be as if it never had been made, the prejudices of the people would deprive it of efficacy, and it would be as much unexecuted as if it never had passed.

I give this strong example only to make my idea thoroughly understood, and not with any intention of an offensive application to races which in my opinion (be it right or be it wrong) are far superior to that just named.

The result in my mind of this train of reasoning is a conviction that the laws which declare the different races to be perfectly equal in Hispano-America, however just and correct they may be, will remain for many generations nearly as inoperative as if they never had been passed. I say *nearly*, because there may arise some highly gifted individuals who will be exceptions to the general rule. But the system, or theory, of equality will be *nearly* nugatory, because it is in direct opposition to the pretension, and the prejudices of the inhabitants, prejudices which subsist as strongly among the coloured population as among the whites; they entertain an hereditary reverential prejudice of the superiority of the whites: it is the same sentiment as that which enabled an handful of whites to conquer millions of their forefathers, and to overrun the vast territories now under consideration: if it had not been for this prejudice the vast hosts which opposed Valdivia and his two hundred Spaniards, nay the Mapochians alone, would have covered the invaders with a tumulus of stones, which they could have done if each of them had thrown one, in spite of a few horses and of some bad matchlock muskets. As long as this prejudice, or rather these prepossessions, exist on both sides, or on either side, the whites must remain in the ascendancy over the other race, whatever may be the disproportion of the numbers.

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Among the whites themselves great inequality must exist for a long time, and until a total change shall take place in their habits, their education, and their character. The country was originally laid off in large donations to the conquerors ; and, as in all such cases, the officers had the lion's share. I have before dwelt so much upon the inevitable feudality, in principle and in practice, whatever may be the letter of the law, which is incident to all conquests followed by location on the conquered soil, that I need not renew the argument here. Chili does not form an exception to the precedents quoted above, nor to the inductions drawn from them, nor from the general position of the cidevant colonies. Education is confined almost exclusively to the gentry, to the descendants of the conquering chiefs, and of those of their caste who followed their immigration ; and education is almost invariably influence. But this source of influence is strengthened in Chili by the long continued habits of subserviency among the other classes of society and by the disposition of the wealth of the country, which is concentrated in the hands of the upper class ; a wealth which they have abundant bravery to defend, even if the enlightened spirit of the age permitted the sacred rights of property to be invaded. To which we may add that the revolution has been principally the work of the gentry. Whatever therefore may be the written or theoretical equality among the inhabitants of Chili, the power and government of the country will practically and actually remain in the hands of the present possessors, for a period only to be limited by the slow progress of education, of other habits, and of commerce. Some deserters from the corps, or some gifted individuals of the other castes will no doubt rouse the whole mass to exercise the franchises given by laws, in order to advance them individually to power and ascendancy ; but the moment that this object is gained, they will be reunited to their corps or will unite with the interests of the ruling caste ; just as we have seen in Europe nobles quit their station beside their peers to head popular factions, and, after violent disturbances, acquire higher titles or greater fortunes, perhaps thrones, and then join again the ranks of their original companions, to gain a

superiority over whom they quitted their places—just as we have seen men not nobles, but of superior talents, rouse the people and force their admission into the class which their birth did not give them a right to enter. Such is man: and such is the destiny of every country which has been conquered: if the wants of the labouring classes in England were to occasion a complete destruction of the present order of things there, it would only originate a fresh race of nobility, and a new dynasty of kings. The condition of our country is therefore (without descending to cant, or to affectation of sentiment) an agreeable spectacle for every lover of republican institutions; a great part of it having been settled by men from the middle class of society in the mother country, pretty nearly equal to one another in knowledge, and every thing else, unless where their spiritual leaders formed few and not strongly discriminated exceptions; and other parts having been occupied by the vestiges of two broken parties, also nearly equal among themselves; the ancient inhabitants not being numerous enough to be converted into vassals, and having spaces behind them to which they might fly to avoid the common destiny of conquered nations; the experiment of a pure republican form of government may therefore be fairly tried here; and as yet every appearance indicates a long duration of our institutions, if we only hold together; for we are thus too strong to be conquered by any foreign force—a force which, if conqueror, would make us the vassals and be itself the noblesse. Our only danger then is from disunion; because if separated, farewell to republican forms of government; mutual hostilities, jealousy, and individual ambition, will then soon overwhelm the robe by the sword, and such a state of things, will demand the institution of a fighting corps, a Rajah poot caste, to defend the independence and the property of the several miserable sections, which will run the career of the nations which have preceded us, and which after long contests, after the distinction of ranks shall have been thoroughly established, will be absorbed by one overweening power. Far from us, and from our posterity, be such a catastrophe.

The government of Chili appears, like that of the other

late Spanish colonies, to have acquired a consistency. There may be some changes of the individuals at the head of it, or in its forms, but it is consolidated in fact; and, above all, it can never revert to its old masters, nor can it ever become a colony to any power, especially to a foreign power. It would not astonish me, if at some future period Chili, Alto, Peru, and Peru Proper were to unite themselves into one nation. If it had not been for the relations of Chili with Buenos Ayres, and of Upper Peru with Colombia, as well as those of Peru Proper with the same country, I should think this union likely to take place, before a very remote time: if Peru had not concluded its revolutionary struggle aided by Colombia, such an event would have been almost certain; and they would have formed a very fine, rich, and strong nation. As things have turned up, they will most likely remain for a considerable time in their actual condition; neither is strong enough to conquer the other, and if they ever unite it will be by amicable treaty. However this is speculating far ahead.



CHAPTER XVII.

UPPER Peru, now the republic of Bolivar, is another of those countries whose statistics are difficult to be ascertained. Humboldt* quoting Schmidtmeier, calls the population of the Provincias de La Sierra 1,300,000; he gives the area of Upper Peru as 37,020 square leagues†. Brackenridge‡ calls

* Vol. VI. Part I. p. 366.

† Ibid. p. 171.

‡ Ibid. Vol. II. p. 144.

the population of Upper Peru 1,500,000; he enumerates the provinces of Charcas, Potosi, La Paz, and Cochabamba at 1,496,000, Santa Cruz de La Sierra, Moxos and Chiquitos at 220,000, making a total of 1,716,000 of which 500,000 whites and 986,000 Indians*. But the *Gaceta de Colombia*, the official journal at Bogota, gives, in the number of the 27th of November 1825, the decree of the general assembly of Upper Peru dated the 11th of August 1825, constituting the future denomination to be the Republic of Bolivar†; and in the succeeding paragraph, not marked however as official, there is an estimate of the population of "the six provinces of Upper Peru which have erected themselves into a new republic denominated Bolivar in honour of the liberator, &c.; viz. La Paz, Potosi, Cochabamba, Oruro, Chuquiza, and Santa Cruz. They contain a population approximating a million of souls," &c. It is worthy of remark that the act and declaration of independence dated the 6th of August 1825, published in the same Gazette of the 11th of December 1825, is signed by the deputies of Charcas, Potosi, La Paz, Cochabamba, and Santa Cruz. I take the semi-official estimate and the official document, to be substantially correct; with only one observation, that it is said by the South Americans, and no doubt with great justice, that the enumerations of the inhabitants by order of the governments are likely to be underrated, as the people concealed as much as possible their actual numbers, out of fear of the levies of men or money, to apportion which these enumerations were generally made: those calculations therefore which were deduced from the old Spanish colonial documents, are probably near the truth. The great uncertainty, existing to the latest dates, respecting the geography and political situation of the provinces lying in the interior of the continent, has occasioned the variation among different authors in their designation of the provinces which they denominate Upper

* Humboldt, pp. 148, 149.

† It is curious that this should have been published as Bolivia in most of our newspapers, and in the Colombian state papers and journals.

Peru, but the official declaration above quoted admits of no contradiction.

The republic of Bolivar has adopted the constitution proposed to it by the liberator, and has chosen him president for life, with leave to name his successor. This is a strong form of government, with checks upon the executive and legislative powers, the efficacy of which remain to be proved. Some of its provisions, particularly that of the presidency for life, were discussed by the convention which established our constitution; but some of the details, the mechanism, of the government, so to express it, are as new as they are complicated; if the engine thus complicated will work, it is probable that the nation will remain republican; I have no doubt that it will as long as Bolivar is at its head; but it is very questionable whether the inhabitants will not get tired of so many forms as are prescribed and desire to simplify the system*: if a man should succeed Bolivar who wishes to strengthen the hands of the chief magistrate, he will have little difficulty, it seems to me, in creating a disgust for the complexity of the present constitution; then it remains to be seen whether this plan, added to their ancient predilections, will not have so prepared the people's mind for monarchy, as to lead to such a government. Still I do not conceive that a monarchy can be any where established in the new nations without its assuming a constitutional shape, probably on the model of the governments of France or England, with an extensive representation of the white population at least. The question therefore of the durability of republicanism in the republic of Bolivar, I believe, will depend greatly upon the general adoption of the American system which it is the object of this memoir to advocate. For the present, the government of this nation appears to be sufficiently characterized with the modifications of permanency, and sufficiently established, for all the purposes of civil society, in its exterior as well as its interior relations; and there cannot be a hesitation in de-

* The writer little imagined when he penned this sheet that his calculations would so soon be verified: he does not efface because it yet remains to be seen whether the Bolivian constitution will not ultimately prevail.

ciding that it is for ever enfranchised from foreign dominion. Although I am not able to cite authorities, as heretofore, for the numerical ratio of the different races which inhabit this country, yet the proportion assigned by judge Brackenridge for the provinces he enumerated as above quoted is probably not far from being correct with respect to the republic of Bolivar, that is, the whites constitute about one-third of the population, the remainder being of the mixed race and Indians; there are very few negroes or mulattoes. Whatever has been said, in treating of the other cidevant colonies, respecting the ascendancy of the whites, applies to this country; but I must confess that the devotion exhibited for the liberator, which is almost the same sentiment as that which is in royal dominions called loyalty, and the strength of the constitution which has been adopted, seem to manifest even a greater aptitude for a constitutional kingdom than is exhibited by any of the other states. If Bolivar had sons I should be inclined to anticipate their succession, under colour of an appointment by the incumbent, at the entreaty of the legislative bodies, which might easily be got up by a skilful and popular chief; but as he has not children, and as he is now of an age when he can hardly expect to have them of sufficient maturity to be placed at the head of the government until he is far advanced in life, I must infer from the precedents in history that, in case the present form of government lasts, at least one succession will take place strictly in conformity with the provisions of the constitution he has established. The character of Bolivar however, and the proofs he has given of his preference of fame to power, are guarantees of his sincerity, even if he had heirs in the direct line to succeed him, and much more standing as he does without the strong inducement of parental affection to prompt a deviation from the splendid career he has chalked out for himself. If then the American system be adopted, the republic of Bolivar will probably continue for a long time in its present situation; if not, no man can answer for its destinies, nor for the effect of the complexity of its constitution: and then it is very certain that the character of the Bolivians must possess much more stability than that of any other peo-

ple which has preceded them on the great stage of history, if they do not follow what appears to have been the course of every nation, except our own, and after various alterations or contests subside into the calm of an hereditary monarchy—although I still maintain that there is little probability of this any more than of the other states adopting any modification of monarchy without a constitution and a representative system. The limitrophe empire of Brazil gives an example of this kind of monarchy; but the fact is that Chili is as near to China for all purposes of communication as Chuquizaca to Rio de Janeiro, indeed the access by sea is easier than the passage of the immense unknown regions which separate the empire from the republics, or rather separate the populations, the substance, and the body of the respective nations, wheresoever their boundary lines may be imagined to run; the communication between them is likely to be for a long time down the river La Plata, or by sea, to Buenos Ayres: so that the forms adopted in Brazil will not much affect the republic, whatever may be the operation of the examples of Chili, Peru Proper, and especially of Colombia with which it is now so intimately connected.

But there is a cause which will much more immediately press upon the general sentiment, and the forms of government in the republic of Bolivar as well as in all the new states; it will be found in the propensities and prejudices of the Indian portion of the population, and their descendants however mixed with other blood. I have already endeavoured to explain my idea that democratic institutions can hardly be said to exist in countries where so large a proportion of the population is composed of a race which is looked upon as subordinate to the whites in consequence of deeply rooted prejudices. If the present patriotic, I had almost said cosmopolite, declarations of the leaders of public opinion, and of the governments, could be carried into effect, the Indians would be elevated to an equality of condition in society and to an equal participation in the government, by the diffusion of education and of all the privileges of the citizens; in this case the Indians would bring into, and add to, the common stock, their prejudices, their habits of think-

ing, and their propensities for particular forms of government. And what are they? We know that their governments, at the time of the conquests of their several countries by the Spaniards, bore a remarkable affinity, a strong family likeness, to the constitutional empires or kingdoms of Europe—first were the emperor, the inca, the toqui; characterized by all the attributes of the European monarchs, almost enshrined within their palaces, or surrounded by a court and guards paying them almost divine honours when they left their usual places of abode, qualified in terms equivalent to the sacred majesty, *semper augustus*, dread sovereign, most potent king, your grace, by the grace of God, and twenty other hyperboles which attach to crowns and supreme power in those monarchies which assume to be peculiarly civilized; to which were added descents and titles equally pretended to in Europe and in Asia, from the heroes of the darkest ages of antiquity, the Lydian kings, the Roman emperors, the conquering prophets, children of the sun, and brothers of the moon. Then came the caciques, the apoulmenes, almost sovereigns in their own territories, where they were approached with homage nearly similar to those of the monarchs, with state and pomp equal to those of the English or French dukes or the German electors, and yet who were proud of occupying titles and places in the households of their sovereigns; then caciques of the second order, or simple ulmenes, powerful in their districts, filling, like the noblesse of Europe, the subordinate offices of the army and of the civil department: nor must the hierarchies be forgotten so resembling those of Europe. After the conquest, to the hereditary attachment and prejudices of these Indians in favour of the descendants of their ancient and indigenous princes was added a new subordination to the colonial nobility, and generally to the white race. If the Indians therefore should be elevated to the grade of constituent members of the new form and organization of society, they will bring into it their old prejudices, the more concentrated and the more inveterate from having been so long compressed, in favour of forms of government which their education, and their habits of thought, have rivetted upon their minds.

If, on the other hand, they are not admitted to an equality with the whites, how can governments be called democratic in which the majority of the population is held to be inferior to a class privileged by its colour, or by any other cause? It is a curious predicament, in which without introducing such an equality there can not be a democracy, and yet when introduced it will bring with it prejudices and causes which have a tendency to monarchy and aristocracy.

The jealousy which always has existed, and always will subsist, between people of different races and different colours, will come in as a further inducement to the adoption of forms, to which one caste may be reconciled by their being connected with traditions of long lost national independence, power, and splendour, and which are fresh in the experience or recollection of another caste in association with reminiscences of recent superiority and the pride of conquests. This jealousy has not heretofore been able to shew itself, indeed it did not exist; for the feelings which predominated among the Indians in their subdued condition must have been ineffectual hatred to the ascendant caste or the humility of a subjugated race; the other race could not entertain an idea of rivalry. But when those who were formerly depressed and disregarded are raised to a legal equality and are placed in a condition in which they may compete with their former masters, then jealousy will ensue, and probably violent contests; the wealth, organization, discipline, and above all the habitual superiority, on one side; and the numerical force disproportionately on the other side. I have no doubt that all contests will terminate as heretofore to the advantage of the whites: but both sides, fatigued with the dangers, insecurity, and apprehensions which must attend such a state of things, will naturally seek for a mediatory power, which may protect on one hand and maintain the party most likely to be overwhelmed in its newly acquired rights, and on the other may guard the less numerous party from the encroachments, and even the spoliations or invasion of the rights of property and security of person which it will apprehend from those whom it had long kept in a state of subserviency. Both parties will look for a

power which is able to keep peace between them. This power will be found in a sovereign with a strong army to enforce his decrees. The power of the European monarchs mainly originated from this principle, more or less developed: the ambition, influence, and power of individuals certainly were the immediate causes; those individuals being however generally and originally kings or chiefs of the conquering nations, but who were, as we have before intimated, and cited history for the proof, little more than presidents for life, a life continually in hazard. They could not nevertheless have permanently extended the limits of their authority, if they had not been able to array against the nobles and the conquerors, the numerical force of the mass of the people, the conquered race, endued with consistency by concentration round the monarch, and with stability, by rallying it to this standard, together with those nobles or those of the conquerors who were attached to him from affection, interest, or hostility against others of their own caste, coping the whole with the king's name, "a tower of strength." Or if they had not found means to marshal against the body of the people, the gallant chivalry whose discipline and esprit de corps more than sufficed to counterbalance a formidable disparity of numerical force: thus alternately subduing the one party by the other, the noblesse and their adherents by the people, and these by the others. This intermediary power, therefore, will probably be called upon to protect either party against the encroachments of the other, in all countries where such parties exist. But neither the spirit of the age, the dissemination of liberal ideas, their precedent prejudices and habits, nor the characters of the individuals who lead, nor of the nations in question, will admit of a monarchical form of government without a regular constitution and an organized distribution of the four grand powers of civilized, nay of every, society—the executive, the judiciary, the aristocratic, and the popular.

These positions apply to the hypothetical condition which I do not believe will occur, that the prejudice of superiority on the side of the whites, and inferiority on that of the other colours, will be effaced by public sentiment, as well as by

the laws. It can scarcely be expected that for ages to come events will destroy the indurated impressions of more than three hundred years, not to go further back and search for their origin in nature, or in the almost obliterated traditions of the children of the sun.

If then the races preserve their relative situation with respect to one another, as it is my opinion they will, the present forms of government will endure for a considerable time, under modifications no doubt, but still founded upon the same principles—principles producing the effects, as I believe, which have been heretofore so largely discussed; but whose durability and whose resemblance to democratical institutions will mainly depend upon the formation of a confederacy which will interdict wars within or between the American states, thus depriving ambition, one germ* of the despotic principle, at once of its plausible excuse for grasping supreme domination, and of its means and implement for making the acquisition.

* And only *one* germ. This ambition must be supported by the *imperative principle*, the faculty of commanding, else it falls; and it must be also supported by the other germ of despotism—the *submissive principle*, the impulse of obedience—that which qualifies men to be reigned over—that *flocking* disposition which induces men to follow where some individuals lead—that which makes some soldiers fly when their chief is down—the sentiment which makes people take the horses from other men's carriages and perform the part of horses or donkeys themselves—they call it loyalty abroad. The two germs are necessary to engender despotism, for, unless some would drag the triumphal car, none could ride in it, and vice versa: and what is remarkable, one of these creates the other, for where some cringe, others will domineer.

CHAPTER XVIII.

THE last of the cidevant Spanish colonies, in the order which has been adopted, now constitutes the republic of Peru proper; and the cursory review of its situation will conclude my observations upon the particular condition of Hispano-America.

In the work which has furnished me with the greater part of the materials for the statistics of these countries, there appear some discrepancies for which I cannot account, but the general inferences will not be much affected by them.

The area of Peru is given in Vol. VI. Part I. page 339, of Humboldt's Personal Narrative, at 41,400 square leagues; in page 167 at 41,500; in pages 127 and 169 at 41,420; and in page 171 at 37,020. In page 339 the population is set down at 1,400,000 souls, being thirty-four to the square league on an area of 41,400 leagues. In page 138 it is stated that thirty years ago (from 1824) Peru contained 1,000,000, of which 600,000 were Indians, 240,000 mestizoes, 40,000 slaves, and thence 120,000 whites. These proportions probably are still nearly correct, and it is also probable that the given number of inhabitants in 1823 as well as the average number of inhabitants to the square league vary from strict accuracy only by some fractions. There can not be a doubt but that the rumours of a sensible decrease of population in all these countries, in consequence of the relentless manner in which their revolutionary wars were conducted, have a serious foundation. But at the same time it is to be remarked that the prolific nature of the cli-

mate and of the constitutions of the people have done much to repair the losses, and therefore, allowing for the time that has elapsed since the war terminated in the several countries, it is most likely that the number of the inhabitants is at this moment (1827) pretty nearly what it was computed by Humboldt in 1823. At any rate, the general results, and the train of reasoning upon political economy, are not affected by slight variations from strict accuracy. These matters, and the data upon which they are founded, can never, from the nature of things, be more than approximative.

Peru was the seat of the second best viceroyalty in the gift of Spain; habits of luxury and ostentation were carried to an Asiatic excess; there was a vast deal of the actual reality of aristocracy in presence of an absolute chief, as well as much of the outward exhibition of it; and the power of the viceroy was in effect absolute, whatever might have been the nominal counterpoise of the audiencia. The enumeration of the inhabitants at the date given above, at once accounts for, and justifies (as far as military predominance can be justified) by the impulse of self preservation, the despotic nature of the government of Lima: there were 140,000 whites interspersed among a subjugated population of 880,000 souls of the other castes, among whom were 40,000 negro slaves owned by a comparatively small number of the aristocracy; this alone would have been sufficient to cause the permanent establishment of a species of martial law; for without the essence of that law, a rigid subordination among the dominant class and a severe surveillance over the subdued castes, the former must have been overpowered by the latter: the luxury derived its origin from the same cause; for nothing is more generally known than that the military are naturally luxurious, seeking to indemnify themselves in anticipation or after a campaign for the fatigues and deprivations of active service; this is fostered and increased by the homage which has ever been paid, and ever will be, to the brilliant profession of the sword. But another cause corroborated the former institutions of Peru; it was the *quasi* place of arms for Chili during the long and bloody wars with the Araucanian Indians which

more than once threatened the existence of the Spanish dominion in that country ; and therefore Peru was influenced not only by the spirit of its own military, but to it was added a frequent reinforcement by the arrival of the recruits for Chili which passed by Lima after the fatigues of a sea voyage and long marches by land, during the time occupied by both of which the pay of the forces must have accumulated for mere want of opportunity to expend it, and, in the true spirit of improvident and generous soldiers, they must have seized the earliest opportunity to spend their money in a delicious climate full of new and untried luxuries ; while consciousness of their strength and well founded hopes of conquest inspired them with a dashing and imperious temper. Far be it from me to aim sarcastic or depreciatory observations against the profession of arms, the profession which has generated the grandest, the sublimest, emotions and resources of the human soul ; or to decry that art for which many causes fill me with respect ; but, in spite of all my predilections for it, I can not disguise from myself the tendencies of the military spirit.

The circumstances of colonial Peru were such as inevitably to give to the country and to its government, as well as to its inhabitants, a complexion more despotic and aristocratic than that of any of the other colonies : and we see that the contest between the colony and the mother country was consequently terminated at a later period than in the other colonies.

The invasion of Peru by San Martin would have given, if it had been successful and if he had possessed the requisite talents, a new impulse to the old spirit of the country ; it would not have been so much a liberation as a new conquest, renewing the principles of conquest in the persons of the Chilian *soi disant* auxiliaries, and of those Peruvian chiefs who made common cause with them. The result of all the circumstances under which Peru stood as a colony, and in her revolutionary contest, is that she has the germs of anti-republican institutions enracinated in her territory more deeply than they are in any of the other new states, as I believe. Bolivar completed the liberation of Peru, and it remains to

be shewn what will be the effect of the influence of his example and his principles, which I think have been demonstrated by his whole conduct, to be as republican as the condition of South America will permit: he has a most difficult part to act, but it seems as if providence has endowed him with all the qualifications necessary to enable him to perform it with equal renown to himself and advantage to the immense regions which regard him as their tutelary angel.

Assuming the above details to be sufficiently correct, the observations, heretofore made relative to the other states apply also to Peru, and therefore will not be recapitulated. The disproportion between the whites, and Indians with the mixed blood, is enormous; the prejudices of superiority on the one side and of inferiority on the other are the same here as in the other countries, and will produce the same results which have been ascribed to them elsewhere: a species of equality will subsist among the whites, but laws cannot establish it between this caste and the others until a length of years shall have obliterated those deep rooted prejudices. If the country remains at peace, its present form of government will continue, and meanwhile it is sufficiently established and consolidated to be adequate to all purposes of domestic or of exterior relations. But to preserve republican institutions the interposition of the great American system is necessary.

Peru will necessarily be a commercial nation to a great extent; her mines alone will secure her this advantage; and the excellence of her climate, the wants and the desires of her population, with the goodness of the soil in many parts of her territory, would make her commercial, even if she possessed no mines; a nation with such inclinations and with such resources to supply her with means to purchase gratifications cannot fail to become a large exporter as well as importer. From this circumstance, and from the extent of the Peruvian sea coast, from the intercourse which has subsisted by sea with Chili particularly, from the evident propensity of the people who reside upon the shores of the Pacific, from the facility with which ship timber may be procured, from the

enjoyment of health upon the coast so much superior to that on the Atlantic side, from the temptation of the markets of the East Indias, together with those of the numerous islands of the intermediate seas, and finally from the immense advantage which they may derive in pursuing the whale fishery, so abundant in the ocean that washes their strand, or in taking other marine animals, from all these causes extensive maritime speculations must arise ; thence will follow the necessity of an armed marine to guard their interests, and a supply of sailors will thence be created as well as the knowledge and aptitude necessary for a navy. The same arguments apply to Chili and to the Pacific bord of Guatimala and Colombia. I have brought both together into one point of view to avoid repetition. The distance of these countries from Europe, and their demand for the commodities of the old manufacturing nations, would seem to require that they should not rely upon foreign navigation but should profit of the facilities which nature has afforded them, and especially of their comparative immunity from disease which I have formerly stated as one of the greatest impediments to the inhabitants of the countries bordering upon the eastern sea coast addicting themselves to maritime enterprise to any great extent. The mutual demand of those countries for their reciprocal productions will be a further stimulus for their betaking themselves to the ocean, in preference to a tedious, expensive, and dangerous land transportation, across the vast deserts, which separate them, sometimes by burning sands, and more generally by arduous mountains : indeed the bulk of some of the articles which they interchange, the wheat of Chili for example, seems to forbid land carriage.

I infer, upon the whole, that the great scene of South American and Mexican navies and commercial navigation will be the Pacific, and do not doubt but that it will be established upon a large scale. The first development of their destiny has been made by the liberal employment of naval forces by Chili and Peru during their late contest with Spain ; the fate of both appears to have been materially influenced by their fleets ; in which large numbers of the natives have been employed mixed with Europeans or North

Americans, from whose experience and discipline they must have learned the most useful lessons. The archipelago of Chiloe, and the necessity of frequent intercourse between the islands composing it and the main land, would alone be a guarantee for the prevalence of a maritime disposition in the dominions of Chili : these islands are at once a provocation to naval expeditions and a fruitful nursery for seamen.



CHAPTER XIX.

THUS has a summary, much more extensive than I had expected it to be, laborious to myself, and I fear tedious to many of my readers—thus have data, and arguments grounded upon them, too long for a mere pamphlet, and yet I fear not long enough nor strong enough to produce the conviction which it has been my desire to establish—thus have historical positions, what I believe to be statistical facts, and reasoning drawn from them—thus have all the preceding pages,—prepared for the discussion, which they were designed to support, of the most important topic that has ever been offered to the world. What previous conception has equalled in moment the project of uniting the whole American continent in one grand, splendid, and powerful confederation? It was not equalled in importance by the design of the same kind of the generous Henry the fourth and his Sully, and the black hearted Elizabeth, for regulating the disputes of Europe by an areopagus of monarchs—not by the existing Holy Alliance : the materials on which European industry is chiefly employed, the articles which contribute to European luxury, those which are become articles of almost primary necessity, and the far greater part of the monetary representatives of value, are derived principally from Ame-

rica: the country whence are furnished the means of acquiring wealth must be, in this light at least, of greater importance than those countries where they are employed or where they acquire new forms; that country, and those politics must be considered of prior importance which can stop half the industry and close the mints of another continent by a simple commercial interdict. The project is not equalled by the Roman designs of universal empire; for these had in view the reduction of the human race to a tributary state under the oppressive despotism of the oligarchy of a single city; while our object is to guaranty the freedom, liberty, happiness, and prosperity of an immense continent. It is not equalled by the renown of the ancient confederacy of a handful of petty oligarchies and narrow kingdoms in old Greece, because the space of territory and the number of souls embraced by that inefficient alliance, compared with the two Americas and their inhabitants, would bear the proportion of a mote to a mountain.

The summary contained in the preceding pages has attempted to demonstrate that continental Europe is identical in interest with America, whatever it may be in passion; that the interest of all the powers of Europe, except England, but not excepting Spain, is, that all America should be at peace internally and externally, should push every branch of industry to the utmost, and thus advance her agriculture, recollecting that the term is not confined to the culture of the cerealia, but includes plantations of the aloe and the quasi harvest of cochineal, together with cultivation of the thousand crops peculiar to her climates, and with the propagation of stock for meat, for wool, or for their hides—thus in a word to supply innumerable materials, either raw or manufactured, to exchange with the old continent for its productions, and to supply the necessities or luxury and the manufacturing or commercial enterprise of its inhabitants. It is the interest of continental Europe that America should be largely commercial, and should in consequence be strong at sea, in order to counterbalance the maritime power and the all absorbing commerce of England. This interest also demands that America should be united and strong at home, in

order to perpetuate this counterpoise and to prevent the disunion, which, by distracting with wars the attention of the nations of America from the means by which alone these objects can be ensured, would enable the sea girt isle to monopolize the commerce of the western world, and to acquire by subsidies or by intrigue such an ascendancy over the recent nations as would tend to make her the carrier, the depository, and the entrepot of their commercial riches, to the disadvantage of the rest of Europe, and such as would especially prevent the formation in America of a naval power, which alone might restrain, or united with that of the other governments might give the law to, the domineering cross of St George. With these views it is the interest of continental Europe that the several governments and the civil policy of the American states should be consolidated, and, each within itself, acquire a consistency and permanency, in order to enable them and the inhabitants to pursue the course prescribed equally by their own and by European advantage. The passions and the prejudices of the old governments might incline them to wish that the new states should model their institutions upon the antique mould; but the prudence and policy of statesmen must convince them that it would be madness to sacrifice to such wishes the other more essential, more indispensable, objects, and that it is infinitely more advantageous for them to enable the new governments to pursue steadily the designs indicated by their and by the European common interest, by countenancing and contributing to their permanency, instead of risking by distraction the acquisition of an English monopoly, and thus perpetuating her naval ascendancy, her means of annoyance, of rendering commercially tributary, and thus of impoverishing, the rest of the world.

The interest of England, on the contrary, her passions, and her prejudices, must direct her policy to keep the American nations separated, weak, and in a state of war, to prevent their acquiring either a military or commercial navy, which might interfere with the domination of her fleets, and would partake with her the profits of maritime transportation: it is her interest that they should be at war, in order

to keep up their demand for the implements of destruction with which she can furnish them, to prevent their having leisure to establish manufactures which might interfere with the demand that exists among them for her productions, and in order to prevent them from turning their attention to any thing beyond the supply of the precious metals, and almost equally precious raw materials which she knows so well how to employ in those manufactories where she secures the profit arising from the manipulation or preparing them for market, and whence issue the staples which enable her to tax the world. It is her interest to seize and fortify the great intermediate points of commerce, such as Cuba and the other West Indian islands, as she has seized Gibraltar, Malta, the Ionian isles, St Helena, and nearly all the regular commercial stopping places on the surface of the globe, in order to convert them into rendezvous for her fleets, points of deposit, and garners into which she may collect the commerce of the world. The interest of England is therefore contradictory to that of America and of Europe in whatever relates to the affairs of the western continent; it is her interest that all its inhabitants should be mere day labourers producing the raw materials of manufactures and commerce.

The interest of America is to acquire such strength as shall enable her to preserve the external peace of every one of her family of nations; and to maintain their internal tranquillity, with the view of gaining time to acquire this strength, in order to devote herself to the establishment of a commercial navy and of armed fleets, so that she may by the one place herself in a situation to transport her productions without being obliged to concede to foreigners the profits of her carrying trade, and by the other may be competent to defend that commerce; it is her interest to be strong and that her governments should not experience any convulsions, in order that they and her inhabitants should have an opportunity to devote themselves to the perfection of the agriculture and the arts she already possesses, and to devise and establish the multitude of other resources of wealth and of real independence, which are offered to her industry by the variety and beneficence of her climates and soils: above all;

quiet is necessary to her in order to gain time for the natural increase of her population, which has been seriously affected, in some of the countries at least, by the recent war. It is too evident to require demonstration that none of these advantages can be so well improved in time of civil disturbance or of foreign war as during a season of tranquillity and peace. She has been already too long at war and vexed with violent intestine commotions; she demands repose.

It would be detrimental to America that any one European nation should engross her commerce, whether it is done by violence or by intrigue, influence, subsidies, or négociation; if by subsidies or by distribution of money, the sums so invested within her territory by a foreign nation must be eventually repaid in some way or other; and if they are repaid by the effect of commerce, they would still be as much (and probably more) to her inconvenience, as if they were to be refunded by actual payments in shape of stock, or of the paying off of such stock; because that kind of prospective advantage would not be relied upon by foreign powers unless with a very clear certainty of deriving from thence, not only the principal and interest, but also a profit which should cover the risk and the inconvenience of the delay. England has for a very long time been in the habit of paying subsidies or making loans to the powers of the continent, and has by them added largely to her public debt; but it is held by many clear sighted politicians that this inconvenience has been much more than counterpoised by the profit made by her merchants and manufacturers upon the articles sold in these countries under the commercial treaties which often accompanied those of subsidy, or by effect of the influence and prepossession which always, between nations as well as between individuals, must be the consequence of their assuming the relation of debtor and creditor.

It would be the interest of the American states to be quiet for some years under any form of government; and it is much more so under the forms they have adopted, which are probably as nearly approximative to republican institutions as their previous condition, the nature of their population, and their predominant prejudices or habits, will admit. This

interest is not however confined to the separate and individual nations ; it is the interest of all that all and every individual nation should be thus internally and externally tranquil, in order that the whole continent should derive from such tranquillity the benefits which will arise from it, because the first interest of the whole is that the continent should acquire such a consistency of strength and wealth as will enable the whole to make head against foreign imposition, and in order that the acquisition of such strength by each should produce an equilibrium between the several states which shall put it out of the power of any to predominate, or tyrannize over, or to absorb the others—to produce, in short, a balance of power among the American states.

But man is a belligerent, an ambitious, and a grasping, animal ; his natural inclinations direct him to aim at domination over his neighbours. It is in vain to talk of what ought to be ; what has been will be again under similar circumstances : therefore, if America does not adopt precautions, if she does not change the plan and the circumstances which obtained in Europe from remote antiquity, her destinies will be the same as those of Europe, her history will be a repetition of that of Europe, with nothing more than a change of names, as the history of modern Europe is a repetition of that of ancient Asia : one nation will make war upon another, for which any visions will serve for pretexts, but ambition or a desire for war will be the real causes ; these nations will form alliances with others, and they will massacre one another until some of the allies get tired of the contest, or until its great men are bought off, or until the belligerents are exhausted ; then they will make an ephemeral peace, which will last only till they are refreshed and ready to renew a war between the same powers, or perhaps with new adversaries, or until leading individuals of a new generation, succeeding that which was at war, feel disposed to gain for themselves the powers and the wealth which were the portion, in consequence of war, of the chiefs of the generation that preceded them. Thus in America will be acted over the farces and the tragedies which have filled the scrolls of history with traces of blood and tears.

CHAPTER XX.

ALL men agree, even those who have profited of it agree in their mature age, that war is a positive evil. How then are wars to be prevented in America, and how are the advantages of tranquillity internal and external to be secured to the western continent? These are to be secured, and those to be prevented, by guarantying to each nation its limits and its institutions, with a tribunal of delegates from each, which shall decide without appeal upon all subjects of controversy between them, and between them and foreign governments, clothed with power, and having forces at the disposal of the tribunal, adequate to put down opposition to its decrees, if any should arise among the confederates, and of such imposing magnitude, as to overwhelm any foreign assailant.

This was the design which Henry the fourth suggested for Europe; which Barlow projected, almost prophetically, for America; and which Bolivar has officially proposed to us.

There is no cause of quarrel on account of such a confederation, for Europe has set us the example of it in her Holy Alliance. But if there are reasons to apprehend foreign hostilities or interference in our mutual or domestic arrangements on that or on any other ground, they are also reasons for our establishing a power which may enable us to defy all danger. If reason and prudence, a respect for the rights of nations and a desire to preserve the peace of the world, be listened to, there would be no quarrel about it. If the confederation

be well formed, it will be too strong to quarrel with. As to the possibility of attacking one power by surprise, and battering down its towns, or capturing its fleets in sight of its sovereign, until it consents to abandon the confederacy, chopping it asunder piecemeal, playing the game by which the armed coalition was dissolved, and by which Denmark lost her fleet, this would be prevented by putting the forces of the confederation at once into condition to repel aggression, and especially by having good intelligence of the movements of the maritime powers; indeed the great distance that would have to be traversed by a fleet to attack these countries, and the magnitude of the preparations which would be necessary, would put it out of the power of any nation to attack them by surprise or before forces were collected to meet the attack. Besides, the example of the two attacks mentioned, and their consequences, are so fresh and so striking, that it cannot be supposed any country would be mad enough to succumb to an attempt to dis sever the confederation, if it were formed; the loss of a fleet or of a town or two would be nothing compared to the disadvantage of a separation, and the damage done for this object would be compensated by the confederation. Any nation, even haughty England, would recoil at the hazard of sending across the ocean such a fleet as would be requisite for the object; she could not do it without stripping her dock yards, and then she would be exposed to the natural mode of checking and at the same time punishing her assaults, fire and steel at Portsmouth, at Liverpool, or even perhaps at her boasted London; for nothing can be plainer than the expediency of reciprocating the attack by assailing her in her vitals—assailing with a merciless war; and the sense of the world would justify it, because the object of the confederation being the conservation of peace, any attack upon it, with a view towards its dissolution, would be a wanton and profligate inroad upon the first principles of justice, and would deserve the utmost severity of the last appeal of kings. Upon the earliest news therefore of the sailing of a fleet from any country to attack the confederation, squadrons would put to sea to rendezvous upon the coasts of the power making the movement, with

orders to carry fire and sword into her harbours. The apprehension of this measure would oblige the power to keep at home such large squadrons as to expose that which she should dispatch across the ocean to almost inevitable defeat.

But this argument upon the safety of the confederation from foreign attack, either with the view of dismemberment or with any other object, is only to shew its security; for it can hardly be imagined, after the universal detestation created by the two attacks above alluded to, that any nation would be so lost to a sense of the common decencies of civilization as to attempt, upon such grounds, to disturb the tranquillity of a continent so remote and so disengaged from the affairs of the old world. It is given only to answer by anticipation the objection which might be made, that foreign nations would attempt to dissolve it, by shewing that it would be out of their power to effect such a design.

The rest of the civilized world would be deprived, in America at least, by the confederation, of the two principal impulses which have heretofore caused wars: the desire of conquest; and fear of being conquered; that is, the propensity to seize the possessions of others, and the desire to prevent others from reciprocally exercising the same propensity.

The first, the appetite for acquisition by other nations, will have no aliment here, because the world knows, by this time, that none of the American nations can be conquered. I do not mean that their armies and fleets cannot be beaten, they will have at times to undergo the fortune of war; but no foreign government can subdue countries of almost unlimited extent, with scattered populations; collected in masses only in a few places and at remote intervals. If a successful inroad were made by a powerful force, it could hold in possession nothing beyond its line of sentries; the natural fortresses of the mountains, lakes, rivers, forests, and deserts, would afford secure refuge for the government of the country in case of successful invasion; and even if the persons of the governmental officers were captured, the local or district authorities would still be competent to carry on that species of war which is infinitely more formidable to invaders than pitched battles, the guerilla, the war of posts,

of bush fighting, and of incessant molestation, consuming daily the lives of the invaders, exhausting their strength by harassing alarms and constant watchfulness, and depriving them of sustenance by intercepting their convoys from abroad, and by preventing their drawing supplies from the country, by means of lines almost imperceptible, at a distance from their adversaries, and intangible by regular troops. Mere famine would thus break down the invading army, and the larger the army the more certain the operation of this system, while a small force would be liable to be overwhelmed by the numbers brought to bear upon it. This system in fact is calculated to give efficiency to the inhabitants of the country, and militia are as useful in it as regular troops; it gives fearful odds in point of numbers, for it converts the whole population of a country into an army to assail the invaders.

Conquest is therefore out of the question in America. The only mode of obtaining an ascendancy here by a foreign power is general corruption, and the excitement of an inclination, a partiality, and an adherence to the foreigners among the great body of the people; a position whose absurdity is too apparent to require discussion; for whatever might be the case with a few leaders, it can never be supposed that the great majority of a nation can feel partiality for strangers, much less for those who invade them in arms; nor can it be imagined that the finances of any nation would suffice to the corruption of the mass of another people, particularly of people richer in metallic wealth than any other in the world, and who supply the materials for the current medium of all others.

The first and strongest inducement which leads the great men of a nation to desire war, the inclination for conquest, is then obviated as regards America; and with it are obliterated its appendant passions, thirst for glory, desire for celebrity, for acquiring rank by means of renown, and for accumulating wealth by means of spoil, appropriation of territories, or in shape of rewards for services: permanent conquest is out of the question, the commanders of invading forces would have to look for defeat, starvation, and disgrace,

in lieu of success, honours, and the spolia opima; they would therefore be very little inclined to try the experiment which in other countries has raised the sword to the highest honours and to wealth; the stimulants, the probabilities, which impel ambitious men abroad to trouble the repose of their neighbours, are wanting here; and of course there is little probability that enterprises designed for conquest will be undertaken against us.

The second great incentive to war is the apprehension (or the pretext of it) of attempts at conquest by another party. This can never exist in Europe with respect to America. The vast extent of our territories leaves us nothing to desire in this respect; it would be the height of folly in any American nation to wish an extension of her possessions, for what each already owns will not be populated for ages, even sufficiently for the comfort of the inhabitants. It is not the common people with whom the desire of conquest ever originates; such an inclination begins with the chiefs of the country, and is excited among the people by them with the greatest difficulty. Although there may be found among us some leading men either embarrassed in circumstances, or who are not possessed of domains equal to their wishes, yet all who own more land than is sufficient to their own personal cultivation must perceive that their property can rise in value and in productiveness only as the country fills with inhabitants, and that if more territory be acquired by their nations new avenues for dispersing the population will be opened, and by this means for diminishing the value of their estates; wealth has universally an influence, and all men of wealth, all who are at their ease, in the American states, must be opposed to extending the territorial possessions of their governments; interest is so evident in this particular that it may be relied upon with certainty. As to the governments, they will have enough to do to keep and to improve the soil they already possess; it is much more likely that they will undergo subdivisions than that they will attempt to enlarge the territories which they have. If our people inhabited cold and unproductive climates, as did those barbarians whose hordes overran all Europe of old in search of warm suns and

prolific lands, if any thing were to be gained by expatriation, there might be some colour for apprehensions of large armed emigrations, although the spaces to be traversed on the ocean would be ten times as large as those which were crossed by the conquering Normans, and although the difficulty of finding vessels enough to carry them on such long voyages would be almost insuperable. But what inducement could be presented for change of residence to people inhabiting the most delicious climates on earth, whose soils yield almost spontaneously the richest productions of nature, and whose mountains scarcely conceal in their entrails the metals, the accursed gold, the evil tempting silver, and jewels the gaud of vanity or pride, which have been the objects of the covetousness and of the passions of mankind since their earliest creation.

Whatever then may be the temptations for some nations of America to desire to occupy the territories of others in the same continent, there never can be any inducement for them to aim at foreign conquests; and upon this head the prudence or foresight of Europe will render her perfectly tranquil.

In saying this however I must not be taken to anticipate the subject of Cuba, of which hereafter.

That conquest in America by foreign powers cannot be effected is very certain; but the question of conquest of one nation by them in concert with another nation of the same continent is a very different affair. If the American states are divided, if they place themselves exactly upon the footing with respect to one another on which the nations are in other parts of the world, if they do not take advantage of the experience of past ages, and of their present anomalous situation, and provide a method by which the contingency of future disputes may be settled, by which a bond of mutual interest may be wound round them, and by which their sympathies may be united into a sort of enlarged *nationality*, if they do not adopt measures which shall constitute them an exception to the general precedent, to the heretofore universal routine of national history, they must and will undergo the lot which has

befallen all other nations, they must and will go through the same train of events which has been followed by all the nations that have preceded them, and their history will be nothing more than a repetition, altering only names and dates, of that of every people whose annals are before us. While time and opportunity invite, nay woo, her to be wise, if America does not profit of the occasion, and take precautions, which the lapse of a very short period will place irrevocably beyond her control, to guard against the occurrence of all the events that have happened to other nations, she will like them see her fertile fields converted into bloody arenas of conflict, her towns will be circumscribed with walls and ramparts, to serve for the concentration of her strength, for schools for the science of slaughter, and for the scenes of reiterated sieges, as has occurred before, all over the earth. If she does not take those precautions, she will be exposed to the reiteration of past examples of alliances between some of her governments and foreign, even ultra marine, powers, against others of her nations, disguising under pretences of resentment for injuries illy concealed designs of conquest and partition. In such cases, the weaker nation attacked on its sea board from abroad, and invaded upon its interior frontiers by a people familiar with the climate and skilful as its own inhabitants in all the modes of attack and defence peculiar to this continent, accustomed to the topography of similar regions, and identical in habits, resources, and vigour—in such cases indeed conquest in America will depend only upon the fortune of war, and in such cases American nations may be divided, rent asunder, into fragments, tributary to their neighbours on the same continent, or colonies again to European monarchies. Conquests cannot be effected here by foreign powers; but they may be effected by these aided by American allies. They will fight for it no doubt, and bravely, the clarion of fame will resound the glories of victorious chieftains, and will fatigue the echoes of the world with the mournful eulogies of fallen heroes; but how much more glorious, how much more splendid to the rejoicing ear of civilized and pious humanity, will be the

praises of those pacific triumphs which diffuse happiness, wealth, prosperity, and comfort over flourishing countries, which extend the victories of art over the crude materials lavishly offered by prolific nature, which clothe, instruct, and embellish the existence of whole nations, and which will be the effect of such an arrangement, such a continental confederation, as shall unite the two Americas, shall interdict mutual wars, and shall interpose a tenfold buckler between the nations of the continent and foreign violence.

I have alluded above to the possibility of a desire being excited in some of the American nations to acquire the territories of others, or to add them to their own dominions. That such will be the case, from time to time, we must anticipate not only from the inherent disposition of mankind, but also from every thing that appears in the records of their past actions; no nation has yet formed an exception; the Assyrians covered in the clouds of remote antiquity, the English, polished France, the more than half civilized Aztec, and the wild Cherokee, the wide Germanic empire, and even Genoa, circumscribed within her narrow limits, all ages, and all nations, large or small, civilized or barbarous, have given proofs of the universality of the passion for conquest, of the predominance of this ravenous disposition to seize the territories belonging to others. Shall we differ from the rest of the human race; shall we alone be exempted from the excesses of this plundering mania; shall we monopolize the feeble remnant of the principles of justice and respect for the rights of others, which yet linger on earth; and shall we alone be excepted from the prevalence of the disposition to incroach upon our neighbours which has characterized all our predecessors? A knowledge of our own temperament, the records of past time, the nature and the character of man, forbid the most sanguine to hope for the realization of such utopian visions: if we could thus dream, unfortunately there are too many and recent instances militating against them even in the short history of the United States, where we have seen that the power of the whole confederation is called upon sometimes to interpose its overwhelming authority to prevent one state from taking possession

of a paltry island, a sand bar in the midst of the waves*; sometimes to settle a pretension to extensive regions in the heart of a state†; sometimes to determine a frontier‡; and sometimes to protect the miserable remnant of the aboriginal possessors of the country against the impetuous violence of individuals who hunger after the contracted vestiges of their ancient sovereignties§. Happy is it for us that the wisdom of our fathers devised a method, and that the good sense of the present generation preserves with a holy reverence the means, by which such desires are repressed, and by which passions are curbed, without appeal to the sword; the inevitable consequence of them, unless that wisdom, and that good sense, had anticipated such events, had provided by the confederation the security against conflict, and had endued the central authority with power and force to restrain any encroachments upon the rights or disturbances of the peace of the parties to the great compact, and to maintain the internal tranquillity of the whole system. But if we see these things, these effervescences, take place in so well poised a system as ours, we can not expect that they will not occur among the varied and discordant elements which compose the nations of the two continents, unless we imitate the splendid example of this confederation, and adopt some plan, as nearly analogous as circumstances will permit, for preserving the general harmony. Without it, the temptations are so provoking, the inducements are so great, the spoil so alluring, and the facilities so inviting, that the continent will never enjoy ten years together of peace. The character and disposition of the inhabitants of both Americas are already quite sufficiently martial; and when the tumultuous elements are roused into action, when the people become familiarized with war, the mass of combustible materials will be immensely increased; and will be added to the constantly existing causes for war. A state of war, above all wars of invasion or of internal defence,

* E. g. The Pea Patch.

† Luzerne and Lycoming counties in Pennsylvania.

‡ On the Hudson between New York and New Jersey.

§ As in the instance of Georgia and the Creeks.

frontier war, are inconsistent with republican institutions ; the army must have the ascendancy ; in such wars it is too necessary to be otherwise ; the commanders must have nearly absolute power, and the army must be attached to them, else they, and it, can not suffice to the very objects of their existence : the army and a large one, becomes an indispensable portion of the government and of society ; and with it are introduced martial principles and a habitude of military obedience. It is impossible therefore for any one to flatter himself that a republican form of government can endure in America in the midst of the continual wars which must prevail, if measures are not adopted to prevent their occurrence : in fact we see and know from example that republics contend with great disadvantage against military governments, and as yet all have been overcome ; those in Greece, Rome, and Holland, are instances, if those aristocratic oligarchies can be called republics. The American nations are the only real republics the world has ever seen ; and if we wish that this beautiful model of theoretical perfection in government should last beyond the present generation, or even last for our own lives, we must in common prudence take precautions to prevent the occurrence of these events, and the fermentation of those causes, which have, down to our own age, been the destruction of every thing that bore a resemblance, however slight, to the institutions to which we are all, or at least to which every man here professes to be, attached.

When any one has a favourite idea which occupies his mind with an absolute conviction, it assumes to his eyes the qualities of an axiom. Such is to my mind the necessity of a general confederation among the American states ; and demonstration of this, to me self evident, truth seems equivalent to a train of argument to convince others of the accuracy of the position that twice two make four, and I feel the same difficulty in proving the one by reasoning, that I should have in demonstrating the certainty of the other ; at every instant while I write, things to corroborate my position occur to me which I reject as too trite, too common place, too universally known, to be admitted into a grave discussion ; this is the inevitable consequence of a deep conviction of the truth of

what one dwells upon. But at the same time I do not cease to protest that I am the last person in the world to deny to others the privilege which I claim for myself as an independent member of society, that of judging for one's self and of frankly expressing an opinion, without intolerance and without ascribing improper motives to those who differ from one in opinion : thus, although either proposition, that two and two make four, or that a confederation of the American nations is absolutely necessary to gain and to secure every thing which men value, strikes me as equally self evident, and equally difficult to make plainer by demonstration, yet I should as soon pretend to censure a man for not perceiving the truth of the one as of the other. However I must still go on to accumulate arguments for the confederation, with all the disadvantage of a consciousness that they bear the same appearance of awkwardness that would be worn by arguments to prove the truth of the first axiom in Euclid, for to my eyes the truth of both is equally manifest.

As the world stands, commerce is an indispensable want of all nations which pretend to civilization. Among the eight hundred millions of souls who inhabit the globe, the human intellect is continually in action, is continually making discoveries, and is incessantly giving publicity to such discoveries either of inventions for the first time made, or of improvements upon the ideas, and inventions of the past generations. A nation without intercourse with the rest of the world would have no more to go upon than the stock of intellect contained among its own inhabitants; but one which is in correspondence with the whole mass of its contemporaries, drawing from them their varied sources of information, brings in fact to bear upon its own concerns the intellect of the whole human race; so that a nation of three millions of souls isolated from the rest of the world would have only three million minds occupied in devising expedients for advancing its prosperity; but a nation which maintains correspondences by means of commerce with the rest of mankind profits of the intellect of eight hundred millions of reasoning and intelligent beings. This alone would be a sufficient argument in favour of commerce. If a continent

containing sixteen millions of souls should suffer its commerce to be monopolized by a nation of twenty millions of inhabitants, it would of course only have the benefit of the inventions on the accumulated knowledge of its own sixteen millions and of those twenty millions, making an aggregate of the intellect and information of thirty-six millions, instead of eight hundred millions. No other proof is necessary of the expediency of a nation or of a continent extending its commercial intercourse so as to be participated in by all the countries of the world; nor is it necessary to add a treatise upon the equalization of trade, the keeping down prices of the importations, and the enhancement of the value of the exports by means of the competition between traders from different countries. I have heretofore gone so much at large into the demonstration of the probability that England will monopolize, by means of her vast marine and unlimited manufactures, the commerce of the cidevant Spanish colonies, unless measures are adopted to guard against such an event, that it seems hardly requisite to enlarge upon the subject.

But it is necessary to show the immediate inconvenience to these United States of the absence of such precautionary measures, and, by inference, the necessity of the confederation I advocate, which is, as I believe, the only precaution that the nature of things and the passions of mankind admit.

When our revolution broke out the country was much divided in sentiment, a formidable portion of it maintaining an affection, which was singular enough, for the mother country; to give one example only, the legislature of Pennsylvania prescribed to her delegates in congress, in the winter of 1775—6, a course of conduct opposed to ideas of independence; and yet the patriotism of this great state was never doubted. The propensity towards England survived, in the breasts of many, the war of the revolution: at its close, to the astonishment of the present generation, we perceive that the remnant of colonial prejudices had preserved among part of the inhabitants, some portion of that extraordinary and durable antipathy which has existed for ages among the English race towards France, even although without the

support of the French our struggle would probably have had a different termination : when the contest ceased, England was ready, with her immense commerce and her unlimited resources for manufacturing, to take advantage of the newly opened market ; she did profit of it with vigour and with the most tempting inducements ; thereby she verified the predictions of Dr Price that North America independent would not cease to be tributary to England, but would yield her a more ample profit, from the perquisites of commerce, and a larger revenue, by means of the revenue derived from the customs upon that commerce, than she ever drew from the colonies while they continued to acknowledge her supremacy. The consequence has been, and is, that our trade with her and her colonies equals about the half of the whole of our commerce. There can be but one reason for this ; which is to be found in the scarcely latent predisposition for England—a predisposition, a prejudice, which still imports our fashions, our tastes, our literature, even part of our politics and political economy, along with her dry goods : we carry it so far that we are humbuged, (if I may permit myself so coarse an expression) by the set speeches in her parliament, intended for publication and exportation, arguing that it is better for nations, abounding in raw materials and abundantly able to manufacture them for their own use, to import the manufactured articles, after having exported the crude material, paying for them when manipulated the advanced price incident to their additional value when they have had applied to them the labour of preparation for use : some of us believe the dicta of her chancellor of the exchequer that it will be beneficial to other nations to adopt a perfect equality of duties, to abolish all commercial restrictions reciprocally with her, the nation which owns more than twice as much shipping as ourselves, and which has in operation machinery for manufacturing equivalent to the power of two hundred millions of human hands : some of us are persuaded by her secretary for foreign affairs that it would be to our advantage to make no distinction between our own vessels carrying cargoes from hence to her islands, and bringing cargoes directly back, and her vessels which bring from

her ports cargoes of dry goods, purchase with the proceeds cargoes of grain costing not the half of what they imported, carrying this grain to the islands and taking cargoes, thence home, to renew this triple voyage and triple freight. If we, an enlightened people, a sensible people, a reasoning people, have among us many influential persons who can give credence to such stuff, to such errant *charlatanerie*, and if we have and still continue to draw our supplies of many articles, cloths for instance, which could and can be supplied to us of better quality and at lower prices by other nations, particularly by France—if we have still upon us the scars left by our colonial fetters, are we not led by common sense to anticipate that attempts will be made to captivate the affection of the rich regions just opened to the commercial enterprise of the world, and are we not impelled by every dictate of policy and of forethought to endeavour to prevent the effect of such attempts?

The fact is that the vestiges of our colonial servitude are deeper than we are disposed to confess, the declaration of independence to the contrary notwithstanding: we are violent enough in declamation about our independence; but, as I have observed elsewhere, who at this time of day cares for speeches? deeds, actions, are the only proofs; and of the declaimers I say, “by their fruits ye shall know them.” If I am to be reigned over, I had rather it should be by George the fourth than by Huskisson or Canning: if I must be fettered, let my limbs be bound, but for heaven’s sake do not attempt to fetter the mind. Let us put an end to this colonizing of the intellect: for if such a state of things is to continue, what a farce it is to pretend to be legislating for ourselves. It is true that acts of parliament have not the force of laws, but articles in the *Quarterly* have. We could hardly be kept out of an alliance when France and England went to war; indeed we were like to massacre one another to determine the question of alliance, and with which power; and yet we were only remotely and contingently interested: the impulse in this instance began abroad, it was imported: again, we followed the cry of the English radicals about the Holy Alliance, having really little to do with it; or if some

of the English, the true John Bulls, were right, that alliance is of great value to us, because it will infallibly restrain the outrageous maritime pretensions of Great Britain, and this is the secret of their virulence against it. In short, Europe is posterity in our eyes—we look across the water to see the impression which our acts are to produce, and England especially sends us politics with her pattern cards; sometimes her ministerialists, and more generally her opposition party, dictate to us; both of them, with respect to foreign relations, English to the back bone. This colonial propensity is probably one reason why some of us are indifferent or averse to the design of an American alliance; and we cannot more effectually serve England, we cannot renew our allegiance to her more faithfully, than by refusing to unite with the rest of our own continent. In the name of our country, in the name of our national pride, in name of the judgment of posterity, let us for once at least dare to be thoroughly and independently American.

It is a singular mark of the durability of our colonial vestiges, so much to be deplored, and which leads us to look over the sea for approval or disapprobation of what we do, that the discontinuance of our embassies of the first grade in South America has been seriously spoken of, when we have so deep an interest in that quarter, and have to expect immeasurable intercourse, as well as political and commercial relations there, while we do not even meditate any change in our diplomatic intercourse with the greater European governments, mere zeros in politics in relation to us, when compared with the importance of South America. I am not in favour of maintaining any thing short of high diplomacy with the European powers, if for no other object than that of rigid watchfulness; but every reason of sound policy dictates that we should have ministers of the first class near the new governments of this continent: the object of contributing to their respectability in the eyes of the world would be a sufficient cause for this, if we had no other.

It is in vain, and every page of history shews it, to reason from the apparent interest alone of nations; this has been said before, and I renew the assertion; passion, prejudice, and

caprice govern men more than interest ; if we take a different view, we must to support it assume that the majority of mankind are well informed, have strong perception of the truth of obscure and profound topics, and draw wise conclusions. If mere interest governed men, why are not our seaports supplied with bread stuffs from the Black sea, whence we might draw wheat which would not cost more than thirty-seven cents the bushel delivered here.

It is our true policy then to attach Hispano-America to us by the bonds of affection, of sympathy, and of prejudice, as well as by interest, in order to obtain their custom for as large a portion of our agricultural and manufactured articles as we are able to spare or as may be adapted to their consumption, and to secure to ourselves the advantage of so much of their carrying trade as they are not able to furnish transportation for themselves. We may at this moment conciliate their warmest affections, and thus obtain a preference in their demand for imported articles, while we secure also their preference of our vessels to transport their commodities. If we do not take measures of this character, England will : we see already that she is attempting to bribe them high for the object ; she has lent them enormous public and private loans, and she is spreading wide ramifications of influence through their territories, in shape of mining associations and even colonies ; both of which not only purchase adherence by the disbursements of large sums of money, but also perpetuate it by holding out the prospect of annual profit from the same sources, and in addition, these measures create a personal influence by bringing the agents into immediate contact with the body of the people*. It is worthy also of remark that whatever propensity for herself England was able to excite here, was brought into activity after the close of a violent war, and of course it had to overcome the exacerbation created by that war. But England has no such feelings to encounter in the Hispano-American states ; she has

* I am informed by a *high authority* that not less than \$16,000,000 have been actually invested, and paid, by English companies, in mining speculations ; without estimating the nominal unpaid capitals of those companies.

scarcely ever appeared to them, but in a beneficiary light ; before their revolution they knew her as constantly endeavouring to break the rigorous system of commercial and political interdiction and non-intercourse enacted by the mother country, thus attempting to supply them with articles of luxury and indulgence in spite of their mistress ; they knew her as the furnisher of the slaves they wanted, under the infernal Assiento contract which this nation (now preaching almost servile war against all governments which own slaves, and overwhelming them with fanatical abuse on that account) seemed to have principally in view in one at least of the wars she waged against Spain, as much with a design, as is probable from the course she pursued, of taking advantage of the facilities the contract afforded for introducing her goods and manufactures, as with the purpose of deriving the profit from the sale of the slaves she supplied. Since the revolution began England has continued to appear to the Mexicans and South Americans with an agreeable and conciliating aspect by in fact permitting her subjects, whatever mere statutory or diplomatic declarations she made upon the subject, to take an active part in the war by serving as officers or even in whole regiments or crews, by selling to them ships of war and afterwards fighting in them, by supplying large loans at the moment when the war turned upon the point of money and must have ceased without it, at last by continuing to lend to the governments or to individuals, and by making establishments for mining and other objects alike beneficial to the resources of the governments and to the general prosperity of the countries. It is nothing to say that all these were not operations of the English government, but of individuals ; the government might have prevented them if averse to the system ; they arose from the genius and system of the nation. Very likely these measures were not the execution of a deep laid, well designed, and digested scheme by which all details of execution were specifically laid down and different operations designated to be pursued in different contingencies ; such design would oblige one to attribute much greater talents than I am disposed to ascribe to the ministry, although I am far from denying them to possess very con-

siderable talents. But there is one predominant principle in English politics which savours strongly of the maxim ascribed by an old poet to a father, "get money my son, fairly if you can, but get money." Thus the impulse, the grand object of the English nation, is to introduce her trade and to employ her money, and her ships, every where; the details of this design are only applications of the principle to the various conjunctures as they successively arise. The loans to the new states possibly were originally begun as speculations by individuals upon their own mere motion; but it seems difficult to believe that millions upon millions should be so employed without a secret understanding with the government; at any rate loans of such amounts, and enterprizes of such extent, could not have been made without the government being perfectly informed of their negociation; and not having been forbidden by the government, they were made with its connivance at least. But upon whatever grounds commenced and carried on, the effect is the same, the English nation and English trade acquire such an influence there as promises to secure, if not a monopoly, at least a share of the commerce and of political influence much larger than would naturally fall to England, and demanding vigorous measures on the part of other nations interested to prevent an undue and unreasonable ascendancy of that commerce and those politics.

The United States, however, have also always appeared in positions with respect to Mexico and South America, which exhibited us in a favourable light to the eyes of the inhabitants: they have drawn from us large supplies of munitions of war and of subsistence, very useful in carrying on the contest; and as we were the first to recognize their acts of independence, this alone would necessarily leave a favourable impression upon their minds. We shewed the value of independence, and demonstrated by our example the way to acquire it. They are not, as they themselves declare, insensible of this benefit. They have imitated our institutions and forms of government as closely as they could under the circumstances in which they were placed, and as nearly as the character of their populations admitted; of the advantages they

have hence derived they have also acknowledged their sense. A continental sympathy, a similarity of origin, a common destiny, seem to draw all the nations of America together with bonds of fraternal affection. We have one advantage over England in never having inflicted the slightest evil upon South America; whereas they can not even yet entirely forget the ruthless incursions of the Buccaneers, who were chiefly Englishmen or at least were called so by them, nor the outrages of those naval commanders who defaced the towns and the maritime frontiers with fire, and stained the pages of the history of their own country with blood wantonly shed, and spoils unrelentingly seized. We stand untarnished, uncensured, in their sight; we have never done them injury: nor have we ever, as a nation, given them the least cause of offence; on the contrary all our relations with them hitherto have been characterized with affection and conciliation; for the effusions of one or two enthusiastic, not to say violent, men on the floor of congress cannot be, nor ought to be, considered as any thing more than the effervescences of individuals in direct opposition to the sentiments of the whole mass of the population of the United States.

The Hispano-American colonies are situated with regard to their mother country, differently from the position in which we found ourselves at the close of our revolution, in relation to England. We had been in the habit of using, and of course felt a kind of necessity for, the manufactures of England, who was the first manufacturing and commercial nation in the world, able and eager to furnish us with every thing that we could or would purchase from her. Spain on the contrary is only a very secondary manufacturer, and now can scarcely be called a commercial nation. The cottons, cloths, iron, and most other articles demanded by South America must be furnished by other nations, and were most of them furnished to Spain to be transported at an advanced price to her colonies before their emancipation. Their wants are in future to be supplied from those other nations without the interposition of the mother country, a change vastly to their advantage. They have not therefore the same inducement that we had, for renewing their old commercial rela-

tions ; and the question is not between them and the mother country, as in our case, abundantly capable to suffice to all their demands ; but it is a competition between other countries, able to supply them, to determine which shall supply those demands, whether for manufactures or productions, or for the transportation of their equivalents until they have vessels enough of their own to carry for themselves.

This question is mainly between England and ourselves ; and it depends, in my opinion, almost altogether upon the course we shall adopt with respect to the confederation. If we now shake them from us, if we repel their affectionate advances, and thus mortify equally their national pride and their natural feelings, it appears that their inevitable course will be to throw their commerce with all its golden advantages into the lap of the nation which is wooing their attachment with the most pointed attentions, and which is lavishing money and influence to induce them to fall into her arms open to receive them with the utmost cordiality.

I will not go so far as to say that, if we become a party to the confederation, we shall monopolize the whole commerce of America ; I do not know that it would be in all points of view desirable that we should do so ; because then whatever improvements those countries are to derive from abroad would come to them through our medium, and it has been before attempted to be shewn that it is best for nations to have intercourse with all the world, in order that they may import the new ideas and the knowledge which are furnished by the whole human race ; and for ourselves, for our own interest, even without any philanthropic views, we must desire that the nations with whom we have commercial relations should progress in the grand march of refinement and civilization, should devise new cultivations, and create new productions, so that new staples may be afforded to be exchanged with what we can supply to them, so that they may have new wants or desires, and so that our commerce with them may be extended. We have seen that after newly discovered countries have been gleaned of what precious metals or valuable products of the chase they have on hand to barter for the beads or looking glasses exhibited to their admiration by the first commercial

enterprizes which reach their shores, commerce with them flags, until, having acquired a taste for the products of foreign industry, they apply themselves to raising articles to exchange for other articles of whose existence they were ignorant during their unsophisticated condition, or discover and bring to market woods, dyes, or minerals; previously of little value in their eyes. Thus intercourse with foreigners creates industry, and new tastes, improves the condition of a people, and benefits equally themselves and those with whom they have intercourse. The well known picture of a people in the rudiment of intercourse with foreigners is presented, because it is the most striking which can be given : but the same principle obtains in all stages of a nation's existence ; we, as well as the South Americans and Mexicans, are annually demanding for our consumption articles which were not known to common use until recently. Let me give one singular instance which at first glance may appear trifling, but which is immediately in point ; Leghorn bonnets and hats were, until within a few years, articles of luxury confined to the seaboard and to the wealthiest ; they are now in frequent use in the interior at hundreds of miles from the sea, among persons whose wealth would not have formerly permitted them to hope for such a species of finery ; and the demand for them has created a new and profitable industry, giving bread, and even ease, to a part of the population which previously was without a profitable object for application of their labour, but which now obtains comfortable livelihood by manufacturing from native grasses, imitations of the imported article which are little disparaged by comparison with it. This small item in the national industry will serve to prove the position, that those articles of foreign luxury which are introduced in consequence of a general intercourse with the rest of the world tend to diffuse a general spirit of refinement, to create a demand for other enjoyments, to awaken the enterprize and industry of the people, to furnish new objects of commerce by that industry, to improve the condition and the manner of living among the people at large, and to extend commerce by creating new staples, at the same time that the effect of the whole system is highly beneficial to

the habits and of course to the morals of the country. Upon these grounds, if there were none other, we ought to wish that those nations, with whom we expect to have large correspondence, should not be contracted to narrow bounds in their intercourse with other regions. Perhaps also we are not yet entirely prepared to supply all the objects demanded by the new states; and if the present mode of regulating commerce continues to prevail, the countries which produce those things that we have not will take measures to prevent their being carried by us.

I will not say therefore that we can or ought to monopolize the trade of the new states, but if we attach them to us, mere prejudice, or an habitual preference, will insure to us a larger share of their commerce than is given to any other power. To go into a demonstration of the immense importance of this commerce would be as superfluous a task as to attempt by enumerating the properties of day light to shew that the sun is a source of benefit to the world.

Interest alone does not exclusively influence commerce; we could have purchased many things cheaper from France, at the consummation of our independence, than from England, and yet we did not. The first steps are those which influence the future destinies of commerce. When correspondences are established, when the state of the markets is known, where to send, where to buy, whom to address, and when the intercourse is once arranged, it is difficult for the mercantile world to be brought to a change; they would have to alter their whole system and to begin *de novo*, with all the inconvenience of creating anew every branch of their business; it is so much easier to go on in the old beaten path, that it is pursued by the generality without much variety. Commerce does fluctuate it is true; but a total change is the work of generations: how long was England engaged in intrigues and even violences before she could displace the Dutch from their commercial ascendancy? In our case we should have a still more difficult task, for we should be obliged to compete with a people who are fertile in expedients, attentive to every thing which tends to disseminate a taste for their productions, adapting them to the lightest ca-

prices of those with whom they deal, printing upon muslins *fac similes* of our declaration of independence, and likenesses of those chiefs by whom their armies have been beaten, in order to sell them to us—what expedients have they not resorted to?—and moreover they are a people to the full as industrious as ourselves. We should then find it almost impossible to supplant England if she acquired a precedence over us in the South American and Mexican markets; and we can get it there only by attaching those nations to us. Why should they give us a preference without an inducement upon our part, when there is another nation both able and willing to supply all their wants, anxious to purchase their good will at almost any price, and which will eagerly enter into any sort of alliance with them, leaving us to enjoy our own precious conceit of magnificent unconcern. If we get thoroughly established in those markets we cannot be displaced without a long series of events certainly not to be expected, nor without the operation of causes which can not effect a rudimental change in commercial affairs in fifty years: to quote the Dutch again, all the intrigues and all the artillery of England did not force them to give way to her ascendancy in nearly twice fifty years, nor until England herself put a Dutch king on her throne; yet that nation at the period of their greatest commerce cannot be compared with us, because they were merely merchants, carriers of foreign goods, with scarcely agriculture enough to feed their people, and not containing the fourth of the amount of manufactures that we now do. But if England gets possession of the southern market, and pursues a reasonable course of conciliation, I do not see how we are to displace her; we cannot underwork her; for it is only in the produce of machinery that we can equal her, nor can we do this absolutely, because machinery is made more cheaply in England than among us; we can supply the works with some raw materials, say cotton and dyes, at rather less price than she has to pay for them, because she is obliged to import while we grow them; of course their freight adds to their cost, and this brings the cost of the manufacture nearly upon an equality, by affording an offset to the superior price of the machinery: in

other articles, requiring manual labour, she has the advantage of lower wages for the workmen, and in them we have nothing to set off but the additional price they must bring to meet the expense of more distant transportation. We know that she has betaken herself to various arts to place her manufactures upon an equality with ours where they have a preference; cotton goods are those to which I particularly allude, which we have been able to afford at prices a shade less than hers of similar quality, and she has even counterfeited the American manufacturer's brands. How then are we to compete in a foreign market with a nation which we cannot undersell, after that nation has got possession of the market, as well as of the dispositions of the people with whom she deals, and when she is wide awake to every measure which may make either for her interest or against it? If we could even undersell her one or two per cent, that advantage would not be enough to make it worth the while of the southern merchants to alter their system of trade and their correspondences.

We shall be placed in a pretty situation, if England becomes a party to their alliance, as she most likely will, after the southern states have formed a confederation among themselves. This is so evidently the true play of England, that it seems an inevitable consequence of our refusing to join in the alliance, and she is not the nation to overlook such an advantage; it will ensure to her almost the whole commerce of those countries. We can do without it, may be said by some; so we can; and we can do without houses, and live as the Indians did, in wigwams, but what is life worth in such a condition? who would give up an advantage when it can be obtained without degradation? what reasonable man will consent to relinquish the South American trade, if it can be procured by any reasonable means?

The object of the new states in forming a confederation is to prevent wars among themselves, and to acquire force enough to protect themselves from foreign violence. They would therefore not be averse to forming an alliance with a government which would not interfere with their domestic arrangements and institutions (and England would not interfere with

them in such a case, out of mere policy), which is able and willing to supply them with all the articles their commerce demands, from pins to ships of the line, which is strong enough to counterbalance alone any power with whom they may be at variance, and which, united with them, would be an overmatch for any two powers of the world. Where should we be in such a contingency? The gulf of Mexico girdled with islands in possession of a power always our rival, the mouth of it occupied by a strong post in her hands or under her influence, for it no longer admits of a question that Cuba will within a very short time be in the hands of the Americans or of England, and thus the entrances into the gulf will be converted into a new Elsinore, rather larger it is true than the entrance into the Baltic, but quite as defensible by a strong naval power, and the whole of Hispano-America under the influence of the same rival, without redemption, Mexico on one of our frontiers, a weak one too, and the Canadas upon another. We should be hemmed in, our frontiers open, our commerce lost, and we shall be the gibe, the derision, of the world. And for what? Because we choose pertinaciously to adhere to an old saw. I do not call any thing that ever fell from the great man who entered his caveat against "entangling alliances," an old saw; but I will give that epithet to the novel application and use of this sounding phrase. He never intended to apply it to the present conjuncture, for it was not, and could not have been, within the scope of his views, when he used it; he applied it to the position of affairs at the time he wrote, when two belligerents contending for mutual extermination agitated the whole globe, had involved all civilized nations but ourselves in their contest, and threatened to sweep us into the vortex; where there was danger that foreign influence and the violent excitement of parties here would precipitate us into a war, foreign to our interests, alien to our institutions, upon the side of one or other of those governments that were grappling man to man and ship to ship on every battle field and on every ocean. The dictum was perfectly correct under the circumstances, and there were no indications that they would be changed during the lives of the present generation; but it is not applicable to the ac-

tual condition of America ; nor could that great man have foreseen that the Spanish colonies would so soon have thrown off their vassalage to their metropolis, and started, Minerva like, armed and mailed, into existence, descending sword in hand into the arena of nations, to claim an equal and eminent position among the ancient sovereignties of the earth. He could not have conceived that all Europe would have formed an alliance, and marched the *arriere ban* of a continent upon the colossal but splendid domination of one glorious man ; nor that this alliance should have survived the destruction of his power ; and still less that the manufacturers of England should have ostensibly abandoned, at this exact crisis, and when they can do it to their own benefit and to the detriment of every one else, the old principles of their navigation act, and their system of commercial restriction, attempting by a series of astute operations or intrigues to bind the globe in ligaments of cotton twist. If he had foreseen these things, if he had anticipated the institution of an American system, and a grand American confederation, his truly American heart would have dictated an exception to the general rule he laid down against alliances ; a rule he only intended to apply to Europe, and which never was intended to be, and which never ought to have been, extended to our own continent ; it might as well be pretended that the rule applies to the admission of new states into our confederation.

I must confess that I have none of the horror of alliances, which *pro hac vice* fills the breasts of some of my fellow citizens, but which did not fill them between the years '74 and '84, nor between '93 and 1801, nor between 1811 and 1815. The choice of the allies is a most important affair, and the repose of a nation depends upon its making a proper selection ; but a nation at war without allies is exactly in the position of an individual in a quarrel without friends ; either may be very right, very brave, very skilful, and all that sort of thing, nevertheless, with all the justice of the cause and ability to maintain it, he and it will be alike well beaten. It has been said that if we are at war we shall find no difficulty in getting allies ; so I have also heard that a man who

is right in his quarrel will always be sure of finding supporters; this is fine theory for fairy land, but I have yet to see it in real life for the individual, and I did not see it 1813 for our nation; besides, if this argument be used, the principle of refusing alliances is given up. I am not in favour of alliances with the Ashantees, or with any other government with which we have no common interest, to involve us in wars with which we have nothing to do; what I contend for is the propriety of an alliance with nations whose interests are interwoven with our own, and who will be dangerous neighbours unless we are allied with them.

The old principle was promulgated during the excitement occasioned by the French revolution, and by the intrigues set on foot to induce us to take sides in the wars of that period, and intended to be applied to that conjuncture; it is not applicable to the present state of things, nor to our own continent. As well might the arguments in favor of a navy be applied to the contingency of an invasion from Mexico; it is said that a navy is the most efficient and safest defence of this country—agreed, it is necessary in all contests with European governments; but of what use would a navy be if we were threatened with an attack from Mexico? Could a fleet defend Arkansaw, or Missouri, or the long line of our back settlements, or the Mississippi, or Ohio, or Kentucky, or Pittsburg, or in short any part of the interior? We are vulnerable there by Mexico; the rifle and the bayonet are the defence of the interior, where they would be well used. A great argument against alliances is that they would involve us in wars, whether we will or not: we refused alliances in Europe for twenty years, yet we were at last forced into a war, and this after they had the audacity to say that we could not be kicked into war—many a brave man paid the forfeit, and many a salvo of artillery, many a gleaming sabre, answered that insolent bravado.

But my object is to avert war, by the American alliance. We cannot keep out of the conflict when there is a serious one on the Atlantic side of this continent. Again, it is said we must avoid war, which would endanger our institutions, &c. &c. Certainly we ought; and once more this is one great

end of the American alliance : but we cannot keep out of wars, until all men are converted to justice, and inspired with similar pacific sentiments; that is until the golden age returns, of whose approach at this present writing there are no symptoms. We must be content to take mankind as they are, and all visionary dreams founded upon ideal and impossible perfection of our sinful nature must be abandoned by those who love their country; we cannot reform the world, and must therefore take proper precautions to prevent the evil passions of others from injuring ourselves; it would undoubtedly be a most felicitous state of world if the lion and the lamb would lie down together, but as long as lions retain their appetites and lambs are good eating, the strong or the ambitious will attack or prey upon the weak and those who are likely to be overcome. I am not to defend the morality or the justice of those propensities; but such has been, such is, the world, and whatever nation wilfully shuts its eyes to the lights of experience and to the actual state of human society, deserves all the consequences of its folly and imprudence. I am not discussing the condition of angels; I write for men, plain men.

Indeed it is difficult to conceive that any nation can get along without alliances at various times. I do not pretend to discuss the word "entangling," which seems to be introduced euphoniæ gratia; if it is not, the advocate of an alliance has only to say the particular instance he recommends is not *entangling*; but I meet the question on the broad ground. Nations will go to war, it is vain to reason about it, as long as men are men they will fight; they have employed themselves in that *delectable* amusement, in some quarter or other, for about six thousand recorded years; and, as I am not a believer in the mutability of our nature, I have no doubt that they will continue to diversify their history by the same entertainment; if they can find no other reason for it, they will fight for the sake of fighting. When nations are at war, one of them at least will seek to strengthen itself by the aid of some power not previously engaged in the contest, and will acquire that aid, if in no other way, by paying fortunes to the chief men, the rulers, of the nation whose

co-operation it desires: then the opposite party must resort to alliances with some power which is disengaged, or must be beaten and overwhelmed. If our late war with England had continued, what would have been our condition without alliances? She had a much larger revenue than ourselves, and an army as well as a fleet manifold more numerous: we should unquestionably have fought bravely, but our sea board towns would have been destroyed, if not held in possession by her; she could not have conquered the country, nor recolonized it, because at the worst we could have retreated to our mountains; but nevertheless that *worst* would have been a deplorable misfortune: our self love may endeavour to disguise these truths, but they are truths. It is, among other things, to prevent the possibility of our ever being reduced to such extremities by any power, that I earnestly advocate the American confederation. The posture of affairs, in the winter of 1814—15, was equivalent to an alliance between us and France, it was nothing short of a diversion by her in our favour; and whether this diversion was made in consequence of a written agreement between us and France, or in consequence of a peculiar contingency abroad, it amounted to the same effect. In order to satisfy the reader of the correctness of what is advanced, nothing more is necessary than to recall to his memory the history of the period, for in politics we can not hope to penetrate into the conclaves of cabinets, nor to have accurate details of their deliberations; this is out of the question until all the actors upon the scene are passed off the stage, and then it is barely possible that their secret motives and their hidden resolutions may be developed; we are therefore driven to draw our inferences from those facts and acts which have been performed before our eyes.

When the offer of the mediation of Russia was made, she was in treaty with general Moreau: was there any connection between these two things? did the minister here wish to attract public attention to an object of major interest, so as to divert it from one which he had every reason to conceal? did he wish to cover his communications upon this subject with the British forces in our waters under the veil of the

mediation? Men are alive who can answer these questions, but they will not: for myself, I believe this transaction with Moreau to have been the real object of the negotiation with admiral Warren, to cover which Mr. Daschkoff offered the mediation: at the same time I must do him and his government the justice to aver my belief that, the mediation being offered, their conduct in it was perfectly loyal and honourable, and that Russia acted in it without connecting it in the least with any motive which might have prompted the original measure. However, we acceded to the proposal of the mediation although England did not, and sent ministers to Europe, who were moved from place to place for more than a year, before they could open a congress with the English commissioners. Meanwhile, Napoleon was overpowered; his fall and the consequent peace with France afforded a sufficient reason for the indifference of England to peace, and for her procrastination of the negotiations. But in the fall of 1814 she entered in good earnest into those negotiations, and peace was announced on Christmas day in Ghent: in March 1815 Napoleon—the lion—broke his fetters and plunged into France; all Europe was put into motion upon a tremendous and very doubtful conflict. Here then is the secret cause why England made peace in December, at the very time when she had equipped a powerful force which was on its way to be defeated at New Orleans, an event she certainly did not expect or she would not have risked the expedition: she must have been well informed of the discontents and the symptoms of an approaching explosion in France, which we now know (although the public here were not apprised of it at the time, whatever might have been the secret intelligence of our government) had been in preparation from midsummer of 1814. She saw therefore the greatest probability that all her battles on the continent would have to be fought over again, and in common prudence she was obliged to prepare for the contest by disengaging herself of an active enemy, not knowing with any degree of certainty how many more she would have shortly to encounter. Had not England been obliged by the state of Europe to make peace, what would have been our situation? The

interest of her manufacturers and her merchants would hardly have induced it, because the markets of all Europe were open to them. We should have been compelled to seek alliances wherever we could have found them; and thus the necessity of the case would have forced us into an alliance, if we could have formed one, in spite of the maxim now so perpetually quoted; and moreover the universal approbation of the people would have sanctioned such a departure from the rule.

What has happened may again occur; and we may again be placed in a situation which will equally require the abrogation of the doctrine to "avoid entangling alliances;" it was adapted to a position of the world widely different from the present, and to the present it does not apply. Can any one in his sober senses believe that the rule ought to be observed if England would now attempt to take possession of Cuba?



CHAPTER XXI.

THE singular series of reports which had come out at the time of my writing what was said in a former page upon the desire and the probability of an attempt of England to get possession of Cuba, has received strong confirmation since that page was written. England has most unexpectedly sent a strong body of troops to Portugal, to protect that country, as she says, against Spain. Now when did England ever engage in a war purely on behalf of another nation? Was Portugal in danger of conquest by Spain? Not in the least; Spain has enough to do to keep her own subjects quiet: and the immediate *declared* cause of the movement, even of the English guards, was that some Portuguese had gone into Spain, and, with her sanction, had returned to Portugal with

the project of opposing the constitution. Did any civilized nation ever go to war with another about a mere affair of police, a business for the provost marshal at worst, about a parcel of deserters! The refutation of the pretence for these hostile demonstrations goes with it, appears upon the face of the thing, it is in itself an absurdity. - But England is not in the habit of making such operations without deeper views. She will claim from Spain an indemnity for the expense of the movements, which she pretends have been made on account of the hostile intentions towards Portugal that she attributes to Spain : and there are still her other claims upon Spain to be settled. Spain has no money, she can pay neither the one nor the others with cash ; and England will demand something else ; either the cession of Cuba, or possession of the island until her claims are defrayed out of the revenues—that is, till the day of judgment ; for Spain has now nothing but Cuba and the Manillas left to assign or to mortgage ; and the latter would be a very incompetent fund to meet the amount England has already pretended to, without computing what she will ask for the Portuguese expedition.

Report has succeeded report that England was about to take possession of the island. Every one knows that a single rumour may be raised to promote a speculation ; that it may be created by malice, caprice, or by visionary politicians. Isolated rumours are therefore received by the prudent with great caution : but when they are reiterated in various shapes, when they have universal currency, when they bear the aspect of a general accordance, when they agree with the evident politics or interest of a country, and when they are supported by manifest demonstrations or facts, they ought to be carefully examined by nations and governments whose vital interests are likely to be affected by the measures they indicate. Long continued and consistent reports must have some kind of foundation, some real cause ; they are like the deep groaning of the earth which precedes and announces the approaching earthquake—like the hollow moan of the winds, the precursor of the coming storm. With respect to the designs on Cuba, the rumours have had every characteristic which entitles them to the gravest considera-

tion of this country and of America at large : they have not only been long continued, universal, and consistent, but they have also been, and are, supported by the palpable interest, the politics, and the measures of England. Is further proof wanted that England aims at interfering with Cuba? Mr Canning has declared, in the insolent speech which has destroyed his reputation as a statesman—which contains expressions equivalent to tweaking the nose of every sovereign of Europe and of every chief of the executive branch elsewhere—in that tirade he declared that his object had been from the moment the French armies entered Spain, to use all the means he possessed as minister of a great power, to effect a separation between Spain and her cidevant colonies. The possession of this island will complete the line of circumvallation, so to express it, the chain of posts, she has been occupied in tracing and establishing in the West Indies. A simple inspection of the map will shew the value of this line to her, and its fatal effect upon us, in every point of view. It will give to her immense marine a surveillance over every rag of canvas that is spread between Charleston and Trinidad, and over the whole commerce of the Caribbean sea and the gulf of Mexico : it will give her the master key to the gulf, and plant her sentinels in the gorge of the real Atlantic mouths of the Mississippi; it will place her, the nation which employs black troops in the islands, within arm's length of the inflammable materials of our southern frontiers; and we have had in two wars sufficient specimens of her disposition to avail herself of any advantages which may be afforded by the nature of those materials.

If we are not put upon our guard by the rumours which have been alluded to, we shall have no other warning. She will negotiate for the cession or the hypothecation of the island in the recesses of the Escorial, if it is conceded to her by way of indemnity, for the expense of the Portuguese business or for satisfaction of the Spanish debt; and if she does not acquire it by treaty, the first news we shall receive of the overt act will be the mooring of a fleet in the Havannah; we shall not be warned, as in ordinary cases, by the activity of her dockyards and the movement of troops to the ports,

because there will be a sufficient excuse for them given by the expedition of fresh troops to Portugal. If the report current at the moment I write this that five sail of the line and three frigates are ordered to the West Indies, to reinforce her squadrons already there, we need no other warning; if this be not enough for us, we must be blind indeed.

But if we had not these indications before us, her whole history shews that she is somewhat given to anticipate matters a little in the business of treating; witness her exploit at Copenhagen, her very summary conduct in the affair of the armed coalition, and her attack upon New Orleans at the moment when she was in the act of concluding a treaty of peace; to say nothing of her custom of sweeping the seas by her letters of marque and reprisal, as well as by her regular ships of war, before issuing her declarations of war. When we have before our eyes these reiterated instances of her habit of striking before crying gare, and of her *trifling* aberrations from the received law of nations, and when we have the loud voice of fame ringing precautionary counsel into our ears, we shall have none but ourselves to blame if our supine indifference is next disturbed by the intelligence that the haughty cross of St George floats upon the tropical winds over the battlements of the Moro. And then!—Why then the mischief will be done—and we shall growl, and negotiate, and fight perhaps. But the precious time will have slipt away—*illabitur irreparabile tempus*—when we might have guarded against the evil, and probably prevented the effusion of blood, by uniting ourselves with the rest of America, creating a strength which could not be disregarded, and announcing the determination of a continent in the thunder of the concentrated voices of all the fraternity of the allied nations—of thirty millions of souls.

If there were no other reasons for the confederation, they are found in the necessity to us that no strong naval power, always jealous, if not inimical to us, shall ever possess the key to the vast west and to the immeasurable resources of both the American continents.

If we do not interfere to prevent the capture or possession of Cuba, and we are hardly able to do it alone, South Ame-

rica and Mexico cannot prevent it; they are not strong enough, and have no fleet: what ships they have, united to ours, will be formidable; but the navies of either North or South America alone are not competent to oppose that of Great Britain: this is the fact; all the world knows it; and it would be worse than folly to attempt to disguise or conceal it from ourselves: a writer must have a very low opinion of the intelligence of his countrymen, who could descend to the servile adulation of attempting to pamper their self love, at the risk of enervating their decision upon a topic pregnant with the most important results: the writer of this sheet has not such an opinion of his fellow citizens, and his feeble pen shall never be exerted in an attempt to deceive them. We may go to war to liberate Cuba from the dominion of a naval power whose presence at the debouche of the Mexican gulf in no wise accords with our convenience, our interests, nor our honour; but it is vain to fancy that we alone shall be able to wrest it from that power whose possession of the island is the most to be deprecated by us. We must call in the aid of other nations interested, like ourselves, in the inviolability of Cuba in the hands of its present owners, or in its affixation to the American system. Who shall be, what ought to be, that power, these nations? I answer decidedly, the rest of America.

France is also interested in protecting the island from England; first to preserve it for a member of the house of Bourbon; but if this can not be, then to sanction its occupation by the powers of America, or its emancipation, and its establishment as a separate nation, when it must be guarantied by some other powerful governments in order to give it a security that its own strength is inadequate to afford: France is interested in one or other of these courses, because if England should get possession of Cuba, the commerce of the island, of the Caribbean coast of Colombia, and of the gulf of Mexico, will be lost to the residue of Europe, and will be monopolized by England, and because such a monopoly will tend to double the resources and the naval power of a nation already much stronger than is consistent with the interest and politics of continental

Europe. The same reasons must actuate the other cabinets of Europe ; they can not, in common prudence, look with indifference upon the destiny of Cuba ; they are all of them more or less concerned in the present commerce of the countries, the direction of whose trade depends upon the solution of the pending question ; and they can not but be aware that this trade is about to become the most important object of mercantile enterprise. It follows, of mere political necessity, that all continental Europe must view with favourable eyes whatever measures America may adopt to preserve Cuba from a fate which will be to the injury of them all. The question then occurs, whether the European powers will not make common cause, and interdict the occupation of the island to England ; and whether they will not equally oppose its occupation by America. As to the first, I do not think that Europe will, unless the impulse is given elsewhere, risk the very probable excitement of another general war ; as to the second, my opinion is that Europeans must be sensible that America can not desire any extension of territory ; they must know that we have, and that we are aware we have, already territory enough in all conscience, more than we know what to do with, and more than we can fill with our population, for many generations to come : of course attributing to us only moderate perceptions of our true interests, they must conclude it is not from any ambitious designs that we desire to substitute ourselves, I mean America at large not any particular nation, in place of the actual owner, in case that owner is to lose the island. They must know that if Spain is strong enough to maintain her possession, will keep it, and will make peace with the late colonies, instead of using the ports of Cuba and the force stationed there as a means of annoyance to them, then it can not be an object with America to deprive her of it. They will know finally that if America does take possession of the island, it will be the consequence of dire necessity, an act of pure self defence, in order to secure our own commerce and safety, and to afford facilities to the trade of the rest of the world, that it will be as much for the benefit of the world at large as for our own advantage ; and hence it results that

Europe will not be adverse to such an enterprise upon our part, if it does not take sides with us ; and that it will adopt the latter measure is a very probable supposition.

If these positions are correct, continental Europe may be induced even to favour the formation of an American confederation, in order to bear directly upon the immunity of Cuba from England, as well as to create a power to keep her otherwise in check ; this suggestion has already been made.

Should the vast design be effected of connecting the Atlantic and Pacific oceans by means of a canal adapted to sea vessels, across the isthmus which unites the two Americas, the importance of preventing the occupation of the post at the mouth of the gulf by one grasping commercial and naval power will be enormously increased. Every nation on the surface of the globe will be interested in keeping free the access to and egress from this canal, which will be the high way, not only for the commerce of all the Pacific coasts of North and of South America, as well as of the islands of that ocean, but also for the trade with all the East Indies, China included, and even with Asiatic Kamschatchka : the future extent of the value of this commerce can only be pictured by the most brilliant imagination : all the world partakes in it directly or indirectly ; and of course the whole world is interested in keeping its adit clear. The protection of the canal itself, and of the commerce which will pass through it, is another great inducement to the confederation : these are objects of too great importance to be entrusted to any single government ; the canal will become an extension of the ocean, a new highway of nations ; and the welfare of mankind will demand that it shall be a safe, secure, and peaceable one. Europe is too distant to afford this security, to guaranty this peace ; and no one of the American nations will be strong enough in an age to protect it. It must therefore be confided to the united strength of America ; and without such an union, or such a safeguard, the greatest improvement of modern times will become comparatively useless to the commerce of all mankind, who are alike concerned in its results. The first and most indispensable requisite to the utility of the canal is that Cuba shall not be in the hands of a na-

tion already oppressing, taxing, the earth with its commerce, and so powerful in its naval force as to interfere with the security of the rest of the human race.

It may be said that England will not venture to awaken the hostility of the rest of Europe as well as of America by seizing Cuba. But she has risked this hostility for less objects : did she not keep Malta after the peace of Amiens at a like risk, and did she not persevere in keeping it when Europe was actually roused by this among other reasons to a general war against her ; does she not hold it at this hour ? Is not her seizure of the cape of Good Hope another example ? Gibraltar another ? Her late attempt to establish, and her actual enforcement of, the rule of the war of 1756, yet another ? These during wars it is true ; but they were not less violent aggressions upon the rights of particular nations, and upon the commercial convenience of all : yet she dared them. And as to Cuba, its possession is vastly more important than either of the other points to the advancement of those views which led her to seize Gibraltar and the Cape. She is bold enough to attempt the seizure of Cuba with the same views, and she is strong enough to effectuate the attempt, if she is not prevented by the presence or the vicinity of a powerful force. I believe she will make the attempt immediately, and that the dispute in Portugal will serve as the pretext, or will answer for the cover ; but if she does not now make it, the design will only be postponed to a more convenient opportunity ; she will never lose sight of it, she will endeavour sooner or later to make herself mistress of the island, and she will succeed in the endeavour, unless the American confederation is formed. The adoption therefore of a decided and effectual measure to guard this invaluable post ought not to be procrastinated, unnecessarily, one hour, and the guard ought to be perpetual and vigilant. No other than the confederation will be adequate to the object : always near, and always strong enough to interfere with effect, the confederation can and will protect the island. If we trust to the intervention of any European power, we might as well reconcile ourselves at once to the extension of the English acts of parliament, and her orders in council, over the

American seas ; we had better immediately begin to familiarize ourselves with the idea of her monopoly of the West Indias. Europe is too far removed from the scene of action, and England may almost when she pleases be in possession of the island which will give her that monopoly in effect, and which will render her mistress of these seas, before her continental neighbours are ready to contest the matter with her. But an American confederation is as it were upon the spot or can arrive in time to forestal her. It is in vain to talk of the laws of nations; cannon are the promulgators of the laws of nations, and power is the only law which obtains among them. Binkershook, Grotius, and Vattel are fine text books whence to extract the data for able or long official letters, and they afford materials for excellent recrimination; but no man who has lived through the last thirty years and has witnessed the proceedings of all the great parties which have figured in the history of the times, even if he do not turn back to the anterior precedents, can place reliance upon expectations of the obedience of nations to any law but that of present expediency; much less can he expect England to abide by those written codes. Nor will England be deterred by fear of exciting a war in Europe by a seizure of Cuba, if she is ready for a war; we have seen over and over again that she does not mind war, and that apprehension of it does not stop her from pursuing what she thinks her interest; the only thing that seems to induce her to pause is the calculation of the relative advantage of a design compared with the cost of a war, and even this weighs but lightly with her. I could accumulate instances to prove the position, but they are familiar to every one who is intimate with her history: does she not even at this instant hazard a war of extermination rather than admit the vast majority of the inhabitants of Ireland to a participation in the rights which she declares in the abstract to belong to all mankind, and does she not refuse that participation upon a pretence belonging to the oldest and darkest periods of monkish infatuation, at variance with the illumination and the spirit of the age we live in? England is therefore not to be trusted, the influence of the laws of nations upon her is

not to be relied upon, unless she is guarded against, unless they are guarantied by the actual presence of power to restrain her and to enforce them. Besides, if she is at war with Spain the mere letter of the law of nations will authorize her to capture a Spanish colony; if she make a treaty with Spain the mere letter of the law will sanction her receiving a cession of the island; however repugnant such a capture or such a cession may be to the interests of the rest of the world. The fact is that the spirit of the law, well understood, is the preservation of the rights, interests, and convenience of all the nations of the globe: but when a nation keeps within the limits of the *lex scripta*, violations of the spirit of the law, acts which militate against the convenience and interest of others, are cause of war, whose only restraints are the probability of success, and the incident cost of a war in blood and treasure. Spain is exasperated to the last degree against her late colonies, and if she finds that she can not keep Cuba, she will be very much disposed to cede it to a nation whose presence there will be the most injurious to their future destinies. Not but that she is aware of the grasping disposition of England, as is proved by the late memoir of the archbishop of Toledo, if it be genuine, or she will be made so by that paper, if it has been fabricated in another country: it either shews a spirit of great distrust, if it be truly a Spanish state paper, or it appeals so directly to the temper, the prejudices, and the superstition of the Spanish people, that it will excite that distrust. But nevertheless it is very likely that Spain will sacrifice the island to get rid of her debt, in spite of her feeling towards England, or if she perseveres in opposing the British pretensions, it will be captured from her, unless other powers interfere, not only by negotiations but by actual force, to prevent such an event. We can not be certain that the European powers will interfere, and in common prudence we must do so: the proverb is too old to be disputed, that "what one does one's self is well and actually done, but there is no reliance upon the execution of what is left for others to do."

It may be urged that the interest of Spain is so direct to

retain Cuba that she will not relinquish it to any power. But I have more than once repeated that I believe the passions of men govern them more than their interest; and hence I infer that Spain will be apt to cede the island to the power whose possession of it will be most inconvenient to her late colonies: her interest will also not be silent, because she owes a large debt to England which she has no means of paying; except by abandoning to her an island which she has no chance of preserving to herself. It is in vain to disguise this fact; Spain will not be allowed by her cidevant colonies to preserve Cuba. The ports of that island afford her too many facilities for invading or for otherwise annoying the new states; and although it would be more for the advantage of these states that Spain should continue her ownership, than that any other of the greater powers of Europe should supply her place, provided she had cordially and frankly acknowledged an independence against which she contends in vain, yet it is now too late to counteract the deep impression left upon the Americans by her conduct during the war, which has left a rancorous feeling not to be expiated for a generation, and which will lead them to attack her wherever they can reach her; the same rancour they know exists on her side, and will induce her to maintain a series of hostile operations against them, even after making peace, from a place that affords her such tempting opportunities. The new states will therefore take possession of Cuba; they can and they will unless anticipated by England; not from ambitious views of extending their possessions, but on the naked principle of self defence. Spain must be aware of this, and will on that account be the less reluctant to abandon it to England, if they treat; and if the present disturbance between the two countries continue, as has been before said, England will capture the island. It is to be remarked that in speaking here of Cuba, I consider that Porto Rico will follow its destiny as being a mere appendage.

The minister of internal and foreign relations of Mexico thinks that the large and expensive expeditions of Spain to

Cuba are proofs of her having had recourse to and the aid of foreign assistance. See his report of 9th January 1826. He seems to allude to France, as that foreign power; and it appears to me very possible that he may be correct; but not in the inference he draws of unfriendliness to South America; this would be too blinded a policy to be adopted by so intelligent a government; if France did assist Spain in forming these expeditions, it must have been with intention of securing the island from England: thus the supposition of the minister confirms my positions.

Among the various rumours which always are floating in the political atmosphere is one that England and the United States have since a considerable time concluded a secret treaty stipulating that neither will take possession of Cuba. I do not believe that such a treaty exists: to be sure, there is no penetrating the fire proofs of the secretary of state's office, but I cannot conceive that the executive would venture, as parties stand, to enter into an understanding of the sort, or of any other kind, however beneficial to the country, without the advice of the senate; it could not be a treaty or an obligation on part of this country, without such consent: and on the other hand, if such a treaty had been made, the public would have heard of it pretty decisively in some way or other: nor is any reason apparent why such a treaty, or obligation, or understanding, should be kept secret; for it would be very satisfactory to us to know that such was actually the state of things, and it would not be for the advantage of England to conceal it; in as much as it would obviate in Europe many of the suspicions and imputations upon the devouring propensity of her ambition; it would even refute part of the arguments of Don Pedro Inguanzo's memoir to the king of Spain. But supposing such an understanding did exist, the precaution of making sure of compliance with stipulations would not be misplaced; for deviation from which there are such temptations, and such plausible excuses as the satisfaction by Spain of the English debt, or the liability of the island to capture as the colony of an enemy, in case the present disturbances should degenerate into decided war.

Probably no condition of Cuba would be as well for the United States as its remaining under the dominion of Spain; *remaining* permanently, not in such a predicament as to keep us in constant alarm and anxiety on the subject. And if she would or could make an honest, cordial, peace with her late colonies, abandoning sincerely all ideas of impossible conquest, or of disturbing their tranquillity and of wasting her own blood and treasure, whether in mere revenge for what has passed, or in idle attempts to regain what she has lost, in fruitless attempts to arrest the irresistible march of nations towards the accomplishment of their destinies, in contestation against the decrees of fate which have received the nutus, and have been sworn to by Styx—if she would or could be reconciled to her offspring, the young eagles which have quitted with adult wings the parental eyrie, then her continued possession of Cuba, her only remaining important colony, would be possibly as advantageous to the South American and Mexican states as the annexation of the island to the American system, by affiliating it to the great American family. Cuba cannot, with safety to us, be adopted into the government of either Mexico or Colombia, unless with a qualification, which those nations, or at least Colombia, would probably be averse to admitting, after their unequivocal declarations against slavery. It would not do for us to have the condition changed of a population composed of so many slaves and of so many free blacks or mulattoes, within a summer day's sail of our southern frontier: as long as Spain holds the island, the actual condition of that population will not be changed. Spain will never under any circumstances be a naval power formidable to America; our fleets, or those of the southern nations, will always be either of them an overmatch for hers: but she will be sufficiently strong, when she is regenerated, retaining Cuba, to make herself respectable, and to preserve the island from foreign violence as well as intestine commotion long enough to give time for the other nations who have common interest in it to arrive with succours, and to bear a proportionate share in preserving the inviolability of the Mexican gulf, which would, in such a state of things, be as much her interest as that of

America. If this posture of affairs were attainable, it would not be for the interest of the United States to disturb it; because it would not interfere with the condition of the slave holding states, and because it is hardly possible that under any other circumstances we could have a larger proportion than at present of the commerce of the island, beyond what would be the result of the increase of its population and wealth.

But I must confess that I do not see how it is possible for the island to continue in its present state, when the proverbial pertinacity of the Spanish character is taken into consideration, together with the determination of the new states to drive her from her last position of annoyance, and with the interest as well as the disposition which I at least attribute to England upon the subject of Cuba. I therefore infer that there is nothing in the problematical or contingent future condition of Cuba which affords the slightest argument against the necessity of the American confederation; but on the contrary, that every sound political anticipation upon the fate of the island, and all its actual as well as its probable future condition, together with every branch and filament of its concerns or relations, and their influence upon the repose, the interest, and the convenience of America, afford arguments, not to be refuted, to demonstrate the vital necessity of the confederation.

CHAPTER XXII.

LET it be permitted to descend from considerations of general and expansive concern to one of a more contracted and individual scope. What will be the effect upon the executive of the United States of its adoption of the views here endeavoured to be sustained? The objection that such consideration is an intrenchment on the right of individuals to judge for themselves upon all matters of their own concern, cannot hold good in this country, whatever might be the case in a monarchy; here the administration is the organ for execution of the people's will; its acts are the deeds of the people, and its impulses therefore are matters of public concern; and, without presuming to dictate, which no individual has a right to do, it is the prerogative of every citizen respectfully and decorously to submit to those in authority, and to his fellow citizens, his humble opinions upon the expediency of measures which are to affect the commonwealth.

The administration has been censured by some persons for every step it has taken in reference to the subject proposed to it by the South Americans and Mexicans. This memoir has nothing to do with the question between the *ins* and the *outs*; it is intended neither to support nor to assail the administration; it is general in its views upon a general and national subject; but the writer cannot understand the propriety or expediency of setting fire to one's own house in order to drive out a resident one does not like, or of opposing a measure of national interest in order to thwart an

administration which one desires to remove ; it appears to him that every man's regard for his own interest, which is of necessity involved in that of the nation at large, should lead him to wish the government and the country to prosper, conduct it who may, or let whoever will be at its head. With respect to the question of the confederation, if the people are in favour of the course advocated by these pages, the point is decided ; and it is in order to convince the people, whether in favour of the administration or not, of the expediency of adopting the American system, that I have hitherto argued. But now let a few remarks be devoted to its immediate effect upon whose opposition to, or recommendation of, the design must have considerable operation upon public sentiment.

The design of confederating in grand alliance the whole of a vast continent, is one of unrivalled magnificence, and will be celebrated in history among the most distinguished of recorded events : those men therefore who are at the head of a government and who co-operate in the establishment of so splendid a system, will have their names enrolled upon the list of the benefactors of mankind, to be handed down to an admiring posterity. A design somewhat similar to this, but upon a more contracted scale, although unsuccessful, has been a cause of panegyric, for two centuries, upon the good Henry IV. and his great Sully. Can any man be insensible to the desire of placing his name beside theirs, nay above them, by actually executing upon a broader basis, the project which has illustrated the names of Henry and Rosny ? Can any man be deaf to the call of glory, which appeals to him from the midst of the clouds of futurity to attempt an immortalizing action ? The future renown, the glory, and the present admiration, which the executive would acquire by attempting, and much more by succeeding in the attempt, to unite all America in a confederation, are of themselves sufficient inducements, adequate incentives, to the undertaking. The fame of conquest is common ; the celebrity of legislation is partaken by many ; the reputation of constructing monuments, edifices, and improvements, decorates the memories of most great men ; but

the pacific agglomeration of nine nations, of thirty millions of souls—the beneficent conciliation of a whole continent, and its union for the purpose of maintaining peace and promoting wealth and prosperity among all its inhabitants, of repressing among foreigners even the idea of disturbing the tranquillity of its happy shores—the glory of such designs, is unique in the annals of the earth, and will stand alone to eternity, for never again can the great families of the human race be placed in a crisis which will enable a similar splendid undertaking to be realized : proportionable to its singularity and to its magnitude will be the gratitude, the admiration, of the world to the founders of the new epoch in the history of mankind. There may be suggested a question of the present effect upon the personal popularity of the members of the administration if it adopt the project and recommend it to the nation. The first answer is, that whatever may be the present effect, the admiration of all men will be the future reward of such a course : the second is that I cannot think so basely of any men who have been thought worthy by a majority of the people of the United States to fill their highest offices, as to believe them capable of hesitating from so vile a motive, if they are convinced of the expediency and propriety of the measure ; and, thinking as I do of the confederation, I am sure that, after the existing discrepancies of party shall have sunk into the oblivion which is the fate of all party excitements, the good sense of the people will visit redoubled indignation upon the heads of those, who, being satisfied of the advantage of the confederation to them and to the world at large, should dare to palter with their interests, under an apprehension of a temporary risk of popularity or of a loss of offices. No man was ever great but by connecting himself with a great cause ; nor did ever man obtain renown but by hazarding, by daring, to act : the event of all actions is hidden in shadows of futurity ; but he who feared those shadows, and stood trembling upon their verge, has gone to his forgotten grave, unknown, unnoticed, to join the herd of vulgar spirits, who have lived, eaten, and died, after an existence monotonous to themselves, and without note, consequence, or advantage,

to their country. It may be that my impressions with regard to the confederation are wrong ; but if they are wrong I glory in the error of Henry, Sully, and Bolivar. If I am right, and I believe myself to be so, I am certain that my countrymen, when they have had time to examine the subject, when they have disengaged it from party excitement, with which it has been attempted to be united, when they have reflected upon it, will be almost unanimously in favour of the confederation. If they become so, and if the administration shall have thrown its weight into the scale, it is not necessary to indicate the consequences to them. I will be still more specific—the confederation is an object worthy of the support of that individual who year after year exhorted the congress of the United States to recognize the independence of Spanish America : if the cause shall be espoused by him, and if he shall succeed in convincing the representatives of the people in this point too, it will have the effect of securing those who are attached, and of conciliating many who are opposed, to him, while the masculine vigour of such a line of conduct must gain him the respect of all men.

All that can be said, has been said against the members of the administration, for what has been done in respect to this question ; it would have been better for them to have gone the whole length ; they would not have been more censured and they would have staked their popularity upon a magnificent die. It is not yet too late, they may yet signify to the congress of Tacubaya their desire of protracting the definitive determination upon the subject until a positive decision is had on it by the next congress ; and the South Americans will wait for it.

In thus treating on the probable effect upon the existing administration, of adopting the system proposed, the writer is not taking side either for it or against it ; the union of this nation with the rest of America is what he has in view, and to support this measure his humble exertions are devoted, be the negotiations conducted by whom they may : it is a national cause, and he cannot confound it with party, nor with preference by any part of the community of individuals for office : he holds the maxim of the gallant Decatur, “ our

country, right or wrong, still our country;" but he holds no less steadfastly another, "our country, rule who may, still our country."



CHAPTER XXIII.

IT has been attempted to sketch with a flowing outline so much of the politics of Europe as appear to the writer to be connected with, or to bear upon, the discussion of the grand subject of this memoir. It has been essayed to delineate in a rapid portraiture the most striking features of the Mexican and South American politics, statistics, and actual situation, in order to prove that the new nations are in a condition to form a durable and formidable alliance among themselves, with us, or with whom they please; that their governments are sufficiently established, and characterized with the attributes of permanency, for that or any other purpose; that their peculiar situation and relations in respect to one another, to us, and to the world, and above all that the peculiar nature of their populations, require the establishment of a confederation upon the system proposed, for the sake of their own tranquillity, welfare, and interest, for those of the United States, and for those of all civilization. It has been attempted to be shewn that the position of the West Indian islands, especially Cuba, with respect to us, to the rest of America, and to Europe, demand of this continent the measure here advocated. It has been attempted to demonstrate to America and to Europe that the policy, the ravenous commercial spirit, the ambition, and the character of England, tend to renew, in our days, and in her domination, the decree which went forth from Cæsar that all the world should be taxed; and therefore that a grand confederation

of America is necessary to repel that nation within the bounds prescribed alike by the safety, the prosperity, and the interest, of these United States, of the other American nations, and of the world. The arguments are addressed equally to the United States and South America and Mexico.

The consideration of the English policy has occupied a large portion of the preceding pages; this has been occasioned by my impression of the dangerous tendency of the plans she is, and has long been, pursuing, and by my belief that her system savours, more than any previously formed project, of a design, an aim, at universal empire, a predominating sovereignty of the most offensive nature—the sovereignty of her shops—*a cotton kingdom*. The subject has been dwelt upon because I conceive that England is the power chiefly to be guarded against, and that her plans are the most deleterious to the welfare of America, the most dangerous to our institutions, and most calculated to disturb the repose of a population unfortunately composed of different races, one of which occupies a situation in society that she does not hesitate to attempt changing.

It has been finally attempted to be shewn that the people of the United States, and their public servants, are called upon by every motive of policy to unite with the rest of America in forming a general alliance and confederacy, to preserve peace and harmony among themselves, to avert the possibility of foreign wars, to insure the prevalence of our political institutions, to secure domestic tranquillity, to bind the continent together in the bonds of fraternal affection, to concentrate among themselves the advantages and profits of their rich and unbounded commerce, and last in the enumeration, but first in all generous hearts, for the GLORY OF AMERICA.

CHAPTER XXIV.

THE details of a treaty of confederation do not belong to the plan of this memoir; the establishment of the principle is what it has in view. But the general outline should be, A strict alliance, guarantying to each party the integrity of its possessions; A central congress, which is to determine disputes which may arise between any of the parties, or between them and foreign governments; A prohibition of war between any of the parties, and between any individual party and a foreign government; War if necessary to be waged by the confederation, which alone is to have power to make peace; Contingents of land and sea forces and funds of treasure to be supplied by the parties, and placed at the disposal of the confederation, powerful enough to enforce compliance with the general will; Among the powers of the congress of the confederation to be the authority for digesting a CODE of national law; The functions of the confederation to be limited to the authority conceded to it, not to extend to the domestic or interior government of the several parties, its object being only to preserve peace within and between the states, and with foreign nations, by bringing the whole power of the continent to bear upon those who attempt its interruption.

For such a plan of confederation, for any general confederation, the present is the only opportunity we shall ever have: there are now no antipathies between the American nations, no enmities*; these will speedily arise if we are not

* Except between Brazil and Buenos Ayres.

in alliance, and then confederation is impossible; alliances may be made, but they will be made here as they are all over the world—to be broken. If such a treaty of confederation be not now in agitation at Tacubaya, it ought to be proposed by us; and if the sanction of congress be wanted for so decisive and distinguished a design, it ought to be suggested to the congress of Tacubaya that it will be proposed next winter, and no doubt the result of the deliberations of our legislature will be readily and eagerly awaited.

I HAVE done. The sentiments expressed in these pages are illy written: I can not help it: the subject is too magnificent, too engrossing, to permit the choice of words or the parsing of sentences while the mind is enveloped in such a theme, a theme pregnant with the destiny of nations, with the fate of the world. The pen which has been used is an iron one, I know, but I have neither time nor patience for phraseology, nor do the topics treated of allow, condescend to, measured and melodious periods.


“I too am a Roman citizen,” and, as a free and equal participator in the privileges and immunities guarantied by the laws and the constitution, I have, equally with every other citizen, an absolute and indefeasible right to promulgate opinions upon all subjects of political import. I blame none for disagreeing with me, and I claim an equal indulgence. My hopes and my prospects depend on the welfare of our country, and are inseparably involved with those of my fellow citizens, not one of them would be more deeply affected in feeling by her reverses.


I have felt an irresistible impulse to raise my feeble voice, and to declare my individual vote, with the reasons which convince me of its correctness, in support of a measure for which our major interests appear to me to cry aloud. It is in the execution of the task that I have failed to satisfy myself.

Political dogmas have been opposed, and personal prejudices have been encountered, directly, unequivocally ; not ignorant that I did so, nor unaware of the consequences in this country in case of failure in producing conviction ; but they have been encountered under a grave impression of the tremendous consequences which await us and our future generations upon the determination of the grand crisis now in action—those prejudices have been encountered, and those consequences to myself and to my interests have been risked, and if it please God, I will encounter and risk them upon this and upon every occasion, when I conceive the welfare, the honour, the interest, or the prosperity of my country at stake. To determine the question rests with the PEOPLE at large, and to them I appeal—I put myself upon the country.

THE END.







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